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Algorithmic game theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in
strategic situations, in which an individual’s success depends on the choices of
others. Research in this area tends to focus on one of the following challenges:
• Price of Anarchy: Characterize the inefficiency of equilibria vs the global
optimum.
• Computational Complexity of Equilibria
• Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Design games with desirable properties that
are efficiently implementable.
Many strategic interactions are in their nature recurrent (e.g. financial markets)
with the agents participating in them repeatedly. These agents learn over time to
adapt to their environment as is defined by the game and the dynamic behavior
of the other agents[96]. We show that incorporating the assumption of adaptive
agents can lead to exciting new insights to long standing questions in all areas of
algorithmic game theory.
A Learning Theoretic Refinement of the Price of Anarchy: It is well
understood that competitive environments can result in losses to social welfare
due to the lack of a central coordinator who could enforce the global optimum
solution. Defined as the ratio of the cost of the worst possible (Nash) equilibrium
over the cost of the optimum, price of anarchy (and its variants) are commonly
used metrics for these inefficiencies. However, such worst case analysis can be
rather misleading as worst case equilibria may never arise in practice. Can natural
learning algorithms beat the price of anarchy?
We show that in the class of atomic congestion games natural learning algo-
rithms can indeed learn to navigate away from such worst case equilibria. In some
cases the implied performance bounds are exponentially better than the previously
known worst case guarantees. Furthermore, such positive performance results are
shown to be robust even when we impose restrictions on availability of accurate
up-to-date information on which agents can base their decisions.
Learning Inspired Equilibria and Computation: The plausibility of the
Nash equilibrium, as a universal solution concept has been under attack, due to re-
cent negative complexity results (e.g. for normal form games with constant number
of players[27, 24]). To make matters worse, there exist games of constant overall
size, for which Nash equilibria are unstable for most reasonable dynamics[88].
In this section we will look into learning inspired solution concepts such as
strong CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) and CUBR (Closed Under weakly
Better Replies) sets. A strong CURB (CUBR) set is a cartesian product of pure
strategy sets such that each player’s component contains all best (weakly better)
responses to itself given any joint probability distributions of its opponents over the
set. A strong CURB (CUBR) set is said to be minimal if it does not contain any
proper subset that is also a strong CURB (CUBR) set. Such minimal sets exist
in all finite games and are asymptotically stable for a great number of natural
learning dynamics. Furthermore, we prove that we can also compute all minimal
strong CURB (as well as CUBR) sets for any normal form game with a constant
number of players in polynomial time.
Mechanism Evolution: The goal of mechanism design is to design games
that are uniquely solvable by reasonably self-interested players and which lead to
socially optimal outcomes. Such guarantees are of critical importance in the case
of economic interactions which are key revenue producers, such as ad-auctions.
However, in many cases of social and economic interactions, centralized design is
impractical and sometimes even undesirable (i.e. internet). Nevertheless, such
mechanisms seem to be working fairly well in practise. How is that possible?
Most mechanisms that we participate in are not the product of ”intelligent
design”. Instead mechanisms evolve. All games (mechanisms) that we participate
in are in essence social contracts. The rules of these interactions change over time
as the result of actions of the same individuals who participate in them. These
changes are not random. On the contrary the involved agents are trying to bring
on changes to the structure of the game, so as to improve their experience from
participating in the game.
We formalize these intuitions and we analyze their implications in the context
of oligopolistic markets. Specifically, we allow players one extra dimension in the
pursuit of their strategic goals, the possibility of forming coalitions with other
agents. We focus on the class of linear and symmetric Cournot games and we
study the nature of stable coalition structures. We show than even the worst
stable coalition can lead to a significant increase in market prices and profits for
the firms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The central goal of this thesis is to explore the impact of combining learning algo-
rithms and game theory. Game theory attempts to mathematically capture behav-
ior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success depends on the choices
of others. In practice, the interacting entities may be numerous and entangled via
complex networks of interdependencies. Over the last decade, the prevalence of
these issues has risen dramatically following a number of paradigm-shifting events
such as the cataclysmic rise of the Internet as a social networking tool, the painful
realization of the extent of inter-connectivity of the global economy as well as the
necessity of international cooperation for addressing global sustainability concerns.
As a result, there has been recorded a swift increase of the interest for a more de-
tailed, realistic and quantitative understanding of such networked interactions.
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) employs analytical tools from computer sci-
ence, such as worst case analysis and complexity theory, to characterize behavioral
solutions to strategic situations prescribed by (classical) game theory. Research in
this area tends to focus on one of the following challenges:
• Price of Anarchy: Characterize the inefficiency of equilibria vs the global
optimum
• Computational Complexity of Equilibria
• Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Design games with desirable properties that
are efficiently implementable.
1
Many strategic interactions are in their nature recurrent (e.g. financial markets)
with the agents participating in them repeatedly. These agents learn over time to
adapt to their environment as is defined by the game and the dynamic behavior
of the other agents. Understanding how agents can learn in the presence of other
agents that are simultaneously learning constitutes a research problem that is as
expansive as it is challenging. Such questions have fueled research endeavors both
in economics as well as within computer science (multi-agent learning)[96].
This thesis concentrates on the intersection of algorithmic game theory and
learning. Incorporating the rather natural assumption that agents learn to adapt
to their environments can lead to exciting new insights to long standing questions.
In this chapter, we will provide an informal discussion of the results of this research
agenda. The results are organized in three categories, one for each subarea of AGT.
Along with their presentation we will briefly discuss how they extend our current
understanding of each subarea.
1.2 A Learning Theoretic Refinement of the Price of An-
archy
The price of anarchy of a game captures the loss in system performance due to
the lack of a centralized authority that could enforce the globally optimal solution.
Specifically, the price of anarchy [62] is defined as the ratio of the cost of the worst
possible (Nash) equilibrium over the cost of the optimum. Given the assumption
that the system is in equilibrium, a low price of anarchy implies that the system
performance is close to optimal. In their seminal work, Blum etal [15] showed that
some systems with low price of anarchy can be shown to perform well, even under
2
the weaker assumption of learning agents. Surprisingly, in recent papers Blum etal
[16] and specifically Roughgarden [85] demonstrate that the above intuition is the
norm. If a system provably has low price of anarchy, learning works regardless of
whether we reach an equilibrium or not.
On the other hand, a high price of anarchy seems to indicate that such a system
is in need of a central coordinator. However, such worst case analysis can be rather
misleading as worst case equilibria may never arise in practice. We tackle this issue
by modeling players’ behavior with learning algorithms and pursuing the following
questions: Can natural learning algorithms beat the price of anarchy? Can they
learn to distinguish between good and bad equilibria and converge to the good ones?
In chapter 3, we investigate these questions for the class of atomic congestion
games. These games are rather widespread and capture settings where the experi-
enced performance of an action depends only on the number of other agents using
it (e.g. internet/traffic routing, machine scheduling, . . . ). Unfortunately, the price
of anarchy can be arbitrarily bad even for simple congestion games. Surprisingly,
we show that under natural behavioral assumptions, agents learn to navigate away
from such worst case equilibria. We analyze system behavior under the assump-
tion that agents use the well-known multiplicative updates algorithm (and variants
thereof). We use dynamical systems theory to prove that the system converges to
a rather restraint subset of equilibria that we call ”weakly stable equilibria”. Pure
Nash equilibria are weakly stable, and we show using techniques from algebraic
geometry that the converse is true with probability 1 when congestion costs are
selected at random independently on each edge (from any monotonically param-
eterized distribution). As a result, in many cases the system performance can be
shown to beat the price of anarchy and actually be close to optimal.
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One point of departure between the theoretical perspective of game theory
(or even learning theory) and the reality of distributed systems is the availability
of accurate up-to-date information on which agents can base their decisions. In
chapter 4, we focus on a concrete model of limited information access and show that
the positive performance results extend to this case. Our motivating example was
to examine whether the processes of a distributed system can learn to automatically
fine-tune the distribution of the system workload. Unlike in traditional game
theory, here agents can query the current state of the other parts of the network
but cannot reliably predict the effects of their actions on them. In order to predict
the evolution of this multi-agent system, we analyze a novel class of ”random”
walks which has a negative drift when we are far from the origin. The implied
performance bounds are exponentially better than the previously known worst
case guarantees.
The common theme throughout this work is that certain networked systems
exhibit impressive capabilities in terms efficient self-organization. In such systems
placing a ”grain of intelligence” on each node, gives rise to a collective intelligence
that guides the system to almost optimal solutions. Understanding the capabilities
and harnessing the potential of such systems is an exciting area for future work.
1.3 Learning Inspired Equilibria and Computation
The main goal of game theory is to predict the behavior of self-interested inter-
acting agents. Usually solution concepts come in the form of equilibrium notions
with Nash equilibrium constituting the predominant such concept. It is widely
accepted (at least inside the CS community) that any solution concept should be
4
convincing, universal 1 and efficiently computable[77]. In recent years there has
been a lot of work on characterizing the computational complexity of finding Nash
equilibria in games. Unfortunately, most results in this area tend to be negative
[27] and currently the attention of the research community is mostly focused on
approximation algorithms and identifying tractable special cases. Although the
importance of these current approaches is beyond doubt, if we take a step back we
see that incorporating learning theory into this framework can lead to new insights.
Looking back at the desirable properties of a solution concept, we see that
universality and computational efficiency are well-defined, whereas what it means
for a solution concept to be convincing is largely open to interpretation. Learning
theory could actually provide us with an elegant solution to this predicament. The
legitimacy of a solution concept can be characterized by its robustness to multiple
learning dynamics. Under this interpretation Nash equilibria can be cast into
doubt since most simple dynamics (i.e. reinforcement learning) tend to converge
not to Nash equilibria[88] but towards weaker notions of correlated equilibria in
general games. On the other hand, not all correlated equilibria can interpreted as
the result of natural learning behavior.
A more promising approach would be to consider the set of all (coarse) cor-
related equilibria, since they are closely connected with the behavior of no-regret
dynamics (see Chapter 2). Unfortunately, correlated equilibria offer no insights
on the behavior of some rather common dynamics such as best-response dynam-
ics. Sink equilibria[46] on the other hand are specifically tailored to capture the
long-run behavior of best response dynamics, but are inconsistent with any other
learning behavior (e.g. AMS-dynamics).
1exist for all games
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In chapter 5, we will look into learning inspired solution concepts such as strong
CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) and CUBR (Closed Under weakly Better
Replies) sets. A strong CURB (CUBR) set is a cartesian product of pure strategy
sets such that each player’s component contains all best (weakly better) responses
to itself given any joint probability distributions of its opponents over the set. A
strong CURB (CUBR) set is said to be minimal if it does not contain any proper
subset that is also a strong CURB (CUBR) set. Such minimal sets exist in all
finite games and are asymptotically stable for a great number of natural learning
dynamics. Furthermore, we prove that we can also compute all minimal strong
CURB (as well as CUBR) sets for any normal form game with a constant number of
players in polynomial time. As a result, these concepts are shown to be universal,
robust to different learning dynamics and efficiently computable for any normal
form game with a constant number of players.
These solution concepts are closely related to the notion of CURB (Closed
Under Rational Behavior) sets, introduced by Basu and Weibull [11] and CUBR
(Closed Under Better Responses) sets [81], introduced by Ritzberger and Weibull.
A CURB (CUBR) set is a cartesian product of pure strategy sets such that each
player’s component contains all best (weakly better replies) replies to itself given
any product of mixed actions of his opponents with support within their CURB
(CUBR) sets. CURB sets can be computed in polynomial time in the case of
extensive games[79] as well as two player normal forms games [13]. In the case
of finite extensive forms games, the notion of primitive formations (Harsanyi and
Selten[50]) captures the property of strong CURB sets. Finally, in independent
working papers Klimm and Weibull[59] as well as Zapechelnyck [108] concurrently
define the same notion of strong CURB sets under the names sCURB sets and strict
curb sets, respectively. In [59], Klimm and Weibull also present an algorithm for
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finding all minimal sCURB sets of finite games. In finite games, the notion of
strong CUBR sets is equivalent to that of CUBR sets, so our results extend to
CUBR sets as well. The advantage of the strong CUBR set definition is that will
allow for a unified treatment of strong CURB and CUBR sets.
This line of research shows that by focusing on identifying attractors of natural
learning dynamics, we can derive solutions concepts which have better computa-
tional properties than Nash. In fact, given that Nash equilibria can be rather poor
predictors of the players’ behavior[88], by following learning-oriented solution con-
cepts, we can improve simultaneously both the quality of our predictions as well
as their computational tractability. In order to further increase the precision of
our solutions beyond these set-valued concepts, we need to focus on specific classes
of learning algorithms. Exploring the tradeoffs between the size of set of allow-
able learning algorithms and the precision of the corresponding attractors while
maintaining computational tractability is the natural next step in this line of work.
1.4 Mechanism Evolution
The goal of mechanism design is to design games that are uniquely solvable by
reasonably self-interested players and which lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Such guarantees are of critical importance in the case of economic interactions
which are key revenue producers, such as ad-auctions. However, in many cases of
social and economic interactions, centralized design is impractical and sometimes
even undesirable (i.e. internet). Nevertheless, such mechanisms seem to be working
fairly well in practise. How is that possible?
Most mechanisms that we participate in are not the product of ”intelligent
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design”. Instead mechanisms evolve. All games (mechanisms) that we participate
in are in essence social contracts. The rules of these interactions change over time
as the result of actions of the same individuals who participate in such games.
These changes are not random. On the contrary the involved agents are trying to
bring on changes to the structure of the game, so as to improve their experience
from participating in the game.
We can formalize these intuitions by looking at mechanism evolution as a meta-
game. The players in this game are the same players that participate in the current
iteration of the evolving mechanism. The utility of a player in the current iteration
of the game, is naturally her expectation of profit for participating in the game.
Finally, the allowable actions in the meta-game express the power of each player to
bring on changes to the game structure. This power depends on the nature of the
social interaction. For example, in the case of economic markets the participating
firms can form (or destroy) coalitions, so as to change the current balance of powers.
Once we have captured mechanism evolution as a meta-game, we can now apply
the usual game theoretic thinking to this context. Specifically, we can conclude that
not all games are stable2. In fact, if we model accurately the mechanism evolution,
we would expect that the stable instances in this meta-game should capture the
characteristics of the games that are employed in practice. A natural question that
arises is how do these games fair in comparison to an arbitrary (unstable) game
of the same class. We answer such questions for the case of oligopolistic markets.
Specifically, we address how dynamic coalition formation affects the social welfare.
In order to answer this question however, first of all we need to be able to define
the meta-game and specifically how the producers evaluate a specific market that
they participate in.
2For any notion of stability (equilibrium) that we choose.
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Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies constitute the two most prevalent models of
firm competition. The analysis of Nash equilibria in each model reveals, as desired,
a unique prediction about the system. Quite alarmingly, despite that both models
are plausible interpretations of the function of economic markets, their projections
expose a stark dichotomy. Under the Cournot model, where firms compete by
strategically managing their output quantity, firms enjoy positive profits as the
resulting market prices exceed that of the marginal costs. On the contrary, the
Bertrand model, in which firms compete on price, predicts that a duopoly is enough
to push prices down to the marginal cost level. This suggestion that duopoly will
result in perfect competition, is commonly referred to in the economics literature
as the ”Bertrand paradox”.
In Chapter 6 we analyze these models in disequilibrium under minimal be-
havioral hypotheses. Specifically, we assume that firms adapt their strategies over
time, so that in hindsight their average payoffs are not exceeded by any single devi-
ating strategy. Given this no-regret guarantee, we show that in the case of Cournot
oligopolies, the unique Nash equilibrium fully captures the emergent behavior. No-
tably, we prove that under natural assumptions the daily market characteristics
converge to the unique Nash. In contrast, in the case of Bertrand oligopolies, a
wide range of positive average payoff profiles can be sustained. Hence, under the
assumption of self-interested adapting agents, the Bertrand paradox is resolved and
both models arrive to the same conclusion that increased competition is necessary
in order to achieve perfect pricing.
In the case of Cournot markets we have seen that players can reasonably esti-
mate their expected average payoffs from participating in the market. We can now
define (chapter 7) a model of a coalition formation process that can be applied on
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top of such a market. This defines an evolutionary mechanism where agents can
explore one extra dimension in the pursuit of their strategic goals, the possibility of
forming coalitions with other agents. We focus on the class of linear and symmetric
Cournot oligopoly games, and we study the nature of stable coalition structures,
i.e., partitions where no profitable deviation exists according to the rules of our
coalition formation process. We prove that the ratio between the social welfare
of the worst stable partition and the optimum social welfare is Θ(n2/5), where n
is the number of firms that participate in the market. We denote this ratio as
the price of anarchy of the Cournot coalition formation game and we note that
this implies a significant improvement of the actual price of anarchy of Cournot
oligopolies which is known to be Θ(n). Notably, we show that all results are robust
even under weak (no-regret) behavioral assumptions.
1.5 Chapter Organization & Dependencies
Chapter 2 contains some basic facts about learning in games. Chapters 3 and
4 focus on a learning theoretic approach to the price of anarchy. Specifically, in
these chapters we analyze the performance of variants of multiplicative weights
algorithms in families of congestion games. In chapter 5 we consider the notions of
strong CURB (as well as CUBR) sets and provide positive computational results
for these concepts. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the setting of oligopolistic markets.
Specifically, in chapter 6 we analyze both Cournot and Bertrand markets under
no-regret behavior. In chapter 7 we look into issues that arise in Cournot markets
when players can learn to form coalitions.
10
CHAPTER 2
LEARNING IN GAMES
2.1 Basic Definitions
A strategic game is a triple (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N) where N is the set of players and
for every player i ∈ N , Si is the set of (pure) strategies (or actions) of player i,
and the utility function ui is a real valued function defined on S = ×i∈NSi . For
every strategy profile s ∈ S, ui(s) represents the payoff (positive utility) to player
i. For any strategy profile s ∈ S and any strategy s′i of player i we use (s−i, s′i)
to denote the strategy profile that we derive by substituting the i-th coordinate of
the strategy profile s with s′i.
A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if ui(s) ≥ ui(s−i, s′i) for every s′i and
every i ∈ N . Analogously, a Nash -equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile s
such that ui(s) ≥ ui(s−i, s′i) −  for every s′i, and every i ∈ N . These notions are
extended to randomized or mixed strategies by using the expected playoff.
A correlated equilibrium (CE) [9] of a game (N ; (si)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N) is a probability
distribution pi on S = ×i∈NSi such that for all players i and strategies si, s′i ∈ Si,
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(s−i, s′i)pi(s−i, si) ≤
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(s−i, si)pi(s−i, si)
Less formally, a distribution of strategies is a correlated equilibrium (CE), if
after a player’s part of the strategy profile has been announced, she prefers to play
it instead of something else, assuming that the other players also play their part
of the strategy profile.
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A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE)[106] of a game (N ; (si)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N) is a
probability distribution pi on S = ×i∈NSi such that for all players i and strategies
s′i ∈ Si,
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(s
′
i, s−i)pii(s−i) ≤
∑
s∈S
ui(s)pi(s),
where pii(s−i) =
∑
s′i∈Si pi(s
′
i, si) is the marginal probability that the strategy tuple
s−i ∈ S−i = Πj 6=iSj will be played.
The notion of the coarse correlated equilibrium is a straightforward general-
ization of Nash equilibrium, where we allow for correlated behavior amongst the
players. It is straightforward to show that the coarse correlated equilibria form a
convex set that contains the set of correlated equilibria.
2.2 Online Learning and Regret Minimization
An online learning algorithm is an online algorithm for choosing a sequence of
elements of some fixed set of actions, in response to an observed sequence of cost
functions mapping actions to real numbers. The t-th action chosen by the algo-
rithm may depend on the first t−1 observations but not on any later observations;
thus the algorithm must choose an action at time t without knowing the payoffs
of any actions at that time. More formally,
Definition: An online sequential problem consists of a feasible set F ∈ Rm, and
an infinite sequence of functions {f 1, f 2 . . . , }, where f t : Rm → R.
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At each time step t, an online algorithm selects a vector xt ∈ Rm. After the vector
is selected, the algorithm receives f t, and collects a payoff of f t(xt). All decisions
must be made online, in the sense that an algorithm does not know f t before
selecting xt, i.e., at each time t, a (possibly randomized) algorithm can be thought
of as a mapping from a history of functions up to time t, f 1, . . . , f t−1, to the set
F .
Given an algorithm A and an online sequential problem (F, {f 1, f 2, . . .}), if
{x1, x2, . . .} are the vectors selected by A, then the payoff of A until time T is∑T
t=1 f
t(xt). The payoff of a static feasible vector x ∈ F , is ∑Tt=1 f t(x). Regret
compares the performance of an algorithm with the best static action in hindsight:
Definition: The regret1 of algorithm A, at time T is defined as
R(T ) = max
x∈F
T∑
t=1
f t(x)−
T∑
t=1
f t(xt).
An algorithm is said to have no regret or that it is Hannan consistent [48], if for
every online sequential problem, its regret at time T is o(T ).
2.3 Multiplicative Updates Learning Algorithm
In our work, we will be focusing on specific families on regret-minimizing algo-
rithms. Of particular importance will be the weighted majority algorithm intro-
duced by Littlestone and Warmuth [63] as well as the Hedge algorithm of Freund
and Schapire [43]. These algorithms maintain a vector of n probabilities for the
n available actions, and at each round they choose an action according to this
1Sometimes referred to as external-regret
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probability. (Initially, the probabilities are all equal.) At the end of each round,
they update the weights multiplicatively, favoring actions that exhibit low cost.
To define the multiplicative updates learning algorithm, let ε be a small positive
number. We will be using costs (i.e. negative payoffs) in our definitions, since this
will agree with most of our applications. Let ci[1 : t] =
∑t
r=1 ci[r] be the cumulative
cost of action i and Z(t) =
∑
i∈Si exp(−εci[1 : t − 1]). In period t, each player
samples action i with probability
P (i, t) =
exp(−εci[1 : t− 1])
Z(t)
, (2.1)
i.e., to obtain P (i, t) from P (i, t− 1) we multiply it by exp(−εci[t− 1]) and then
renormalize all probabilities so that they sum to 1.
An algorithm is said to exhibit ε-regret, if its average performance may be
at most ε worse that than of the best fixed action in hindsight, as time goes to
infinity. The multiplicative updates algorithms exhibit ε-regret, but can still in
practice offer no-regret guarantees by iteratively reducing their ε performance gap
to zero.
2.4 Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) constitutes one of the most well-studied set-
tings of dynamic agent behavior. EGT is the brainchild of John Maynard Smith
and G.R. Price [67],[97], who combined ideas from game theory and evolutionary
biology in attempt to explain behavioral patterns observed in animal populations.
The prototypical model of dynamic behavior in this context is the replicator
dynamics. The replicator dynamics constitute a rather simplified approximation of
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biological evolution. According to it, the likelihood that a specific behavior (gene)
will be replicated grows in proportion to how well it performs relative to the mean
performance of the currently adopted behaviors (genes) in the population. In the
usual case of a homogeneous population, if we denote by xi the fraction of the
population using strategy i and fi(x) the payoff of using strategy i given the state
x of the population, the replicator dynamics has as follows:
x˙i = xi[fi(x)− f¯(x)], f¯(x) =
n∑
i=1
xifi(x)
Players are assumed to be matched randomly inside the population, and
their utilities are captured via a symmetric two-player game G with actions
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and utility function u(xi, xj). Hence the payoff of strategy i,
fi(x) =
∑n
j=1 xju(xi, xj) is merely the expected utility of the player given a random
matching to another player in the population2.
Given the underline game G, the replicator equation defines a system of dif-
ferential equations. The main goal of evolutionary game theory is to characterize
the (asymptotically or Lyapunov) stable fixed points of such systems. A Nash
equilibrium is a fixed point of the replicator dynamic, and every stable fixed point
is a Nash equilibrium. The challenge however lies on deciding whether the set of
stable fixed points, defines a refinement of Nash equilibria, that allows for more
accurate predictions that the set of Nash Equilibria.
Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) is a static solution concept that sheds
some light into this issues. Informally, ESS requires that a strategy should be
robust to small mutations of the population structure. Specifically, if x is the
2The population is assumed to be infinite, so the distribution appears identical to all players
regardless of their strategies
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current population structure and is invaded by a mutant population with strategy
x′, then ESS requires that for all sufficiently small ε:
u(x, (1− ε)x+ εx′) > u(x′, (1− ε)x+ εx′)
This definition implies that any invading mutation is performing strictly worse
than the current strategy and hence it will quickly wither out. By linearity of
expectation, this definition can be shown to be equivalently to the following:
u(x, x) ≥ u(x′, x) or
u(x, x) = u(x′, x) and u(x, x′) > u(x′, x′)
The last definition implies that ESS is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In
terms of our goal of characterizing stable states of the replicator dynamics ESS
are particularly useful since all ESS are asymptotically stable fixed points of the
replicator dynamics. Unfortunately, not all asymptotically stable fixed points are
ESS.
A weaker notion of evolutionary stability is the notion of neutrally stable strate-
gies (NSS)[97]. NSS requires that the invading mutants should not outperform the
incumbent strategy, but unlike the ESS allows for the mutants to earn exactly as
much as it. More formally, a strategy is a NSS if for all sufficiently small ε:
u(x, (1− ε)x+ εx′) ≥ u(x′, (1− ε)x+ εx′)
Equivalently, NSS can be defined via the following properties:
16
u(x, x) ≥ u(x′, x) or
u(x, x) = u(x′, x) and u(x, x′) ≥ u(x′, x′)
In a similar fashion to the ESS, all NSS are Lyapunov stable fixed points of the
replicator dynamics, but not all Lyapunov stable fixed points are NSS. Therefore,
NSS (ESS) are sufficient conditions for (asymptotic) stability. However, in order
to characterize worst-case stable fixed points we need necessary conditions.
The most general positive in this direction, gives a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for asymptotic stability for the heterogeneous (multi-population) replicator
dynamics. In this case, each individual in role i can be divided in ni subpopu-
lations one for each pure strategy si ∈ Si available to the agents in role i. The
population state is a vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with each xi representing the state of
the subpopulation corresponding to role i. Again, each population is assumed to
be infinite. Finally, n players one from each population are picked uniformly at
random and interact via an underlying game G. This is a game of n players, each
with strategies Si, and with utility functions ui : ×iSi → R. Finally, we extend
the utility functions over mixed strategies in the usual multi-linear fashion. The
replicator equation in this case, has as follows:
x˙sii = x
si
i [ui(si, x−i)− ui(x)]
In the case of multi-population replicator dynamics a strategy profile is asymp-
totically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash [55], [103]. Unfortunately, such
general results do not carry over to (Lyapunov) stable states.
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Although the replicator dynamic was introduced in the context of evolutionary
biology, it has gained considerable popularity amongst economists. Part of this
success lies on the fact that the analysis of the replicator dynamics in many cases
seems to be in agreement with dynamics which have a more concrete economic
foundation. In chapter 3, we provide some justification behind such phenomena
by showing that the replicator dynamics is the continuous time analogue of the
multiplicative updates learning algorithm. The versatility of the multiplicative up-
date algorithm [6] indicates that the replicator dynamic has numerable reasonable
economic interpretations.
2.5 No-Regret Learning and Coarse Correlated Equilibria
It is well known that the long-run average outcome of repeated play using no-
external regret algorithm converges to the set of coarse correlated equilibria[106].
Similarly one can use a somewhat more restrictive notion of no-internal-regret3
algorithm, whose long-run average outcome of repeated play converges to the set
of correlated equilibria.
Here we prove that any coarse correlated equilibrium can arise as the limiting
result of regret-minimizing play and, similarly, that any correlated equilibrium can
arise as the limiting result of internal-regret-minimizing play.
In [38], Foster and Vohra prove that in the case of calibrated forecasting rules
3Integral regret is a refinement of external regret according to which instead of comparing the
performance of the algorithm with that of the best action in hindsight, we compare it against
the performance of the best algorithm from the following class of learning algorithms. These
algorithms take as input the actions of the original learning procedure and consistently map each
action to some other. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between no-external regret
and no-internal regret algorithms can be found here [17].
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in almost every game (excluding a set of games having measure zero in the space
of all payoff matrices), every correlated equilibrium can be attained as the limit
point of the empirical distribution of play where the players respond myopically to
some calibrated forecasting rule. Our results are analogous, but do not have the
measure zero exception set.
Theorem 2.5.1 Given any coarse correlated equilibrium C of a normal form game
with a finite number of players n and finite number of strategies, there exist a
set of n no regret processes such that their interplay converges to the correlated
equilibrium C.
Proof: Suppose that we are given a coarse correlated equilibrium C of a n-player
game. We will start with the case when these probabilities are rational. In this case,
there exists a natural number K, such that all probabilities are multiples of 1/K.
We can create a sequence of outcomes S of length K, such that their sequential and
cyclical play is statistically equivalent to the given coarse correlated equilibrium
C. Let’s denote the j-th element of this sequence as < xj1, x
j
2, . . . , x
j
N >, where
0 ≤ j ≤ K−1. Each element of this sequence will act as a recommendation vector
for the no regret algorithm.
Given the sequence, above we are ready to define for each of the N players a no
regret algorithm, such that their interplay converges to the given coarse correlated
equilibrium C. The algorithm for the i-th player is as follows: at time zero she
plays the i-th coordinate of the first element in S and as long as the other players’
responses up to any point in time t are in unison with S, that is for every t′ < t
and j 6= i the strategy implemented by player j at time t′ was xt′ mod Kj , then
the i-player will follow the recommendation of the S sequence playing xt mod Ki .
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However, as soon as the player recognizes any sort of deviation from S by another
player, then the player will just disregard any following recommendations coming
from S and will merely follow from that point on a no regret algorithm of her
liking.
Given the algorithms we have defined above, it is quite straightforward to verify
that indeed their interplay will lead to the given coarse correlated equilibrium C.
We need to also prove that all of these algorithms are no regret algorithms.
When analyzing any of the algorithms above, we have to take into account two
cases a) while the other players strategies are such that no deviation is ever recorded
from the recommendation provided by C, in which case the definition of coarse
correlated equilibrium implies that the players have bounded total regret (only
corresponding to the partial sequence they played when t mod K is not 0). Once
a first deviation is witnessed by the player in question, she turns to her no regret
algorithm of choice and the no regret property then follows from this algorithm.
The only issue that is left to be addressed is to argue how this proof can be
generalized in the case the probabilities that appear in the correlated equilibrium
C are not all rational. In the case of games with rational payoffs, which are really
the games we are interested in, any such correlated equilibrium can be approx-
imated with arbitrarily high precision by a correlated equilibrium with rational
probabilities. If we want to converge to a given coarse correlated equilibrium C
with irrational probabilities, that can be achieved as long we can express the prob-
ability distribution of C in an efficient manner. In this case, instead of having
a sequence S of bounded length whose repeated play converges to the correlated
equilibrium, we will have sequences Si of increasing length. Every player will be
able to reproduce them and hence derive her recommendation and check for de-
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viations from the other players as before. One way of achieving this is to define
Si’s such that for every i the sequence S1, S2, . . . , Si when played sequentially are
statistically indifferent from the i-decimal digit approximation of the correlated
equilibrium. A specific ordering on each player’s strategies can be agreed upon
and the sequences Si can de uniquely defined as the ordering of those outcomes in
a lexicographically manner. The rest of the proof holds as is.
An analogous statement holds for the correlated equilibria and the no-internal
regret algorithms.
Proposition 2.5.2 Given any correlated equilibrium C of a normal form game
with a finite number of players n and finite number of strategies, there exist a set
of n no-internal regret processes such that their interplay converges to the coarse
correlated equilibrium C.
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CHAPTER 3
MULTIPLICATIVE UPDATES LEARNING IN CONGESTION
GAMES
3.1 Introduction
Congestion games have been studied extensively in computer science, often from
the standpoint of analyzing the price of anarchy: the ratio of solution quality
achieved by the worst-case Nash equilibrium versus the optimal solution. Kout-
soupias and Papadimitriou [62] introduced the price of anarchy in the context of a
load-balancing game studying the makespan objective function. Congestion games
both with makespan and with social welfare objective function are well understood;
see the surveys by Vo¨cking [102] and Roughgarden [84]. Analyzing the inefficiency
of Nash equilibria provides useful information about the solution quality achieved
by selfish players once they reach an equilibrium, but does not provide a model
of how selfish players behave, and it says little about whether selfish players will
coordinate on an equilibrium, nor which equilibria they are likely to coordinate on
if the game has more than one.
Learning has been suggested as a natural model of players’ behavior in games.
No-regret learning algorithms suggest simple and plausible adaptive procedures
where players do not have regrets about their past behavior in some precise sense,
which makes them natural candidates to model selfish play. In the theory of
learning in games, many have studied the limit of repeated play when all players
use such no-regret learning strategies. The resulting equilibrium concepts (variants
of correlated equilibrium) typically have worst-case equilibria that fall short of
the solution quality achieved by Nash equilibrium. Thus, although researchers
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studying certain restricted classes of games have proven that the outcome of no-
regret learning matches the price-of-anarchy bound [15, 16, 18], there are broad
classes of games in which there is a large gap between the predictions arising
from analysis of Nash equilibria versus analysis of learning processes (correlated
equilibria).
To illustrate this point, consider the load balancing game introduced by Kout-
soupias and Papadimitriou [62]. In this game, there are n balls and n bins. Each
ball chooses a bin and experiences a cost equal to the number of balls that choose
the same bin. If the objective function is the makespan (i.e. maximum load in a bin)
then an optimal solution places each ball in a separate bin. These solutions coincide
with the pure Nash equilibria of the game. However, there are many other mixed
Nash equilibria, including the fully mixed equilibrium in which each ball chooses
a bin uniformly at random and the expected makespan is Θ(log n/ log log n). The
same game with a non-linear congestion cost results in an arbitrarily high price
of anarchy both in the makespan and in the average congestion cost models: the
same symmetric fully mixed equilibria are expected to have some bin with con-
gestion Θ(log n/ log log n), which can have arbitrarily high congestion cost. Worse
yet, the game can have correlated equilibria that are exponentially worse than the
worst mixed Nash equilibrium. In the simple case of linear edge costs the expected
makespan is Θ(
√
n). The ratio is even worse if the congestion cost is decreasing,
as in the cost-sharing games where a bin with x players costs 1/x to each player.
As before, pure equilibria coincide with the social optimal solution, which in this
case has a total cost of 1, while the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is expected to
use a constant fraction of all bins, and hence to cost Θ(n).
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Our question. We focus on understanding the quality of outcomes reached by
players using “realistic” learning algorithms. Restricting attention to realistic
learning algorithms is consistent with our goal of modeling realistic player be-
havior, and it is also necessary because within the class of all no-regret learning
algorithms one can find contrived algorithms whose distribution of play converges
to an arbitrary (e.g. worst-case) correlated equilibrium of any game1, as well as
contrived algorithms2 whose distribution of play converges into the set of Nash
equilibria of any game.
Our results. We consider a class of learning dynamics, called the aggregate
monotonic selection (AMS) dynamics, that extends the multiplicative weights
learning algorithm [6, 63] (also known as Hedge [43]) to players whose learning
rates may differ and may vary over the strategy space. We show that if players
use AMS dynamics to adjust their strategies, then game play converges to a subset
of Nash equilibria, which we call weakly stable equilibria. These are mixed Nash
equilibria (σ1, . . . , σn) with the additional property that each player i remains in-
different3 between the strategies in the support of σi whenever any other single
player j modifies its mixed strategy to any pure strategy in the support of σj.
Pure Nash equilibria are weakly stable, and we show that the converse is true
with probability 1 when congestion costs are selected at random independently on
each edge (from any monotonically parameterized distribution). Thus, our results
imply that in congestion games, learning via AMS dynamics surpasses the Price
of Total Anarchy (as defined by Blum et al. [16]) and also the Price of Anarchy
1See section 2.5 for a proof. A well-known result of a similar flavor, but using calibrated
learning rather than no-regret play, is due to Foster and Vohra [38].
2For examples, see the discussion of related work below.
3Note that the definition does not require each of the strategies in the support of σi to remain
a best response after player j modifies σj . This modification may cause player i to prefer a
strategy lying outside the support of σi.
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for mixed Nash equilibria.
Intuitively, players using this learning algorithm are able to steer clear of unde-
sirable mixed Nash equilibria because of symmetry-breaking properties resulting
from the inherent randomness in the algorithm. In a load-balancing game, for
instance, when one player randomly chooses a machine it causes others to reduce
their probability of choosing that machine in the future, and this asymmetry is
self-reinforcing. We justify this intuition by showing that the symmetry-breaking
is implied by spectral properties of a matrix that is defined at each mixed equilib-
rium of the game, and that these spectral properties in turn imply weak stability
in the sense defined earlier.
In section 3.5 we show that a discrete version of the process with a small amount
of added noise at each step follows the solution of the differential equation closely
enough to converge to the set of ν-stable equilibria, a generalization of weakly
stable equilibria in which the Jacobian is allowed to have eigenvalues whose real
part is at most ν, an arbitrarily small positive real number.
Our techniques. Our technique is based on analyzing a differential equation ex-
pressing a continuum limit of the multiplicative-weights update process, as the mul-
tiplicative factor approaches 1 and time is renormalized accordingly. For the case of
the Hedge algorithm this differential equation turns out to be identical to the asym-
metric replicator dynamic studied in evolutionary game theory. More generally,
the differential equation is the extension of the replicator dynamic called aggregate
monotonic selection (AMS) dynamics introduced by Samuelson and Zhang [89].
As a first step in analyzing the dynamical system, we need to show that every
flow line of the differential equation converges to the set of fixed points. As in prior
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work on replicator dynamics in potential games (e.g. [3]) we do this by proving
that the potential function [74] associated with the congestion game is a Lyapunov
function for any AMS dynamics; that is, it is non-increasing along flow lines of the
differential equation and is strictly decreasing except at fixed points.
The set of fixed points of the differential equation includes all the mixed Nash
equilibria (not just the weakly stable or pure ones) as well as some mixed strategy
profiles that are not Nash equilibria at all. To see which fixed points arise as limit
points of the flow starting from a generic initial condition, we need to distinguish
between stable and unstable fixed points. For a fixed point p that is not a Nash
equilibrium, it is not hard to argue that p is unstable. For Nash equilibria, we
prove that the dynamical-systems’ notion of stability — a fixed point where the
Jacobian matrix has no complex eigenvalues in the open right half-plane — implies
our game-theoretic notion of weakly stable equilibria. To do this, we prove that
when the Jacobian matrix is restricted to the subspace of strategies played with
positive probability, this submatrix J is nilpotent, i.e. its only eigenvalue is 0. It
is easy to see that Tr(J) = 0. The difficult part here lies in showing that we also
have Tr(J2) ≥ 0, which uses Steele’s [98] non-symmetric version of the Efron-Stein
inequality (Lemma 3.3.7). The fact that Tr(J) = 0 and Tr(J2) ≥ 0, together
with the absence of complex eigenvalues in the right half-plane, implies that all
eigenvalues are 0. This in turn entails a linear relation on “two-player marginal
cost terms” that implies our game-theoretic notion of weak stability.
Clearly all pure equilibria are weakly stable. To show the opposite is true
with probability 1 when congestion costs are selected at random independently on
each edge, we in fact prove a stronger statement — the existence of a non-pure
weakly stable equilibrium implies the vanishing of a non-zero polynomial function
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of the edge costs — using techniques from algebraic geometry. To illustrate the
idea, consider the special case of load balancing games with monotonic cost func-
tions, where weakly stable Nash equilibria are “almost pure” in the sense that
each machine has at most one randomizing player using it. (For example, in a
load-balancing game with one player and 2 identical machines, any mixed strategy
of the one player is stable.) When congestion costs are selected at random, such
almost-pure mixed Nash equilibria cannot exist: the probability that two machines
have the same cost is 0. To extend this reasoning to general congestion games we
need to use more sophisticated techniques, as weakly stable Nash equilibria need
not be almost-pure. However, a weakly stable mixed Nash equilibrium must sat-
isfy many polynomial constraints (Nash constraints, insensitivity to one player’s
change). Using an algebraic-geometric version of Sard’s Theorem, we show that
congestion costs that have stable mixed Nash equilibria satisfy a nontrivial poly-
nomial equation. In the case of load-balancing games this is a linear relation (two
machines having equal cost), but in general it will be a higher-degree polynomial.
Related work. No-regret learning algorithms have long been studied in the
context of adaptive game playing. There are a number of simple and natural
families of no-regret learning algorithms such as the regret matching of Hart and
Mas-Colell [51] and the multiplicative weights or Hedge algorithm, introduced by
Freund and Schapire [43], which generalizes the well-known weighted majority
algorithm of Littlestone and Warmuth [63]. In general games these algorithms
converge into the set of coarse correlated equilibria, but not necessarily into the
set of Nash equilibria as we prove here for congestion games and the Hedge algo-
rithm. Our decision to analyze the Hedge algorithm in this work was motivated
by the algorithm’s ubiquitousness in learning theory and other areas of theoretical
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computer science [6]; the issue of whether similar results can be obtained for other
algorithms such as regret matching [51] is an interesting open question.
There are a number of other learning-like processes, such as fictitious play
[73], calibrated forecasting [40, 37], regret testing [41, 45], and others (see [52])
whose play is known to converge to Nash equilibria in some games. Some of these
results use simple stochastic processes that are tantamount to stochastic search for
a pure Nash equilibrium (e.g. [52]) but are not regret-minimizing, while others use
complicated adaptive procedures satisfying calibration properties that are closely
related to the no-regret property (e.g. [37]). Unlike some of these works, our goal is
not to discover uncoupled adaptive procedures for finding a Nash equilibrium but
specifically to analyze the behavior of a particular simple, realistic, and well-known
adaptive procedure.
The dynamics of repeated play in congestion games has been studied in non-
learning-theoretic models such as sink equilibria and selfish rerouting [30, 46, 71].
For nonatomic congestion games (i.e., games with infinitesimal players) Fischer,
Ra¨cke and Vo¨cking [34, 32] and Blum, Even-Dar, and Ligett [15] considered learn-
ing dynamics in the setting of multicommodity flow (or more generally congestion
games) and showed that the dynamics converges to a Wardrop equilibrium. Fis-
cher, Ra¨cke and Vo¨cking [34, 32] consider a replication-exploration protocol, while
Blum, Even-Dar, and Ligett [15] show that in this setting, if each player uses any
no-regret strategy the behavior will approach the Wardrop equilibrium. The set-
ting of atomic congestion games studied here is much more intricate because the
game typically has many Nash equilibria forming a disconnected set with many
components, and we need to distinguish between the stable and unstable ones.
More recently, Blum, Hajiaghayi, Ligett, and Roth [16] defined the price of
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total anarchy and showed that in a number of games, the known bounds on the
price of anarchy extend also to the price of total anarchy: the worst case bound
on the quality of coarse correlated equilibria to the optimum outcome is already
achieved over Nash equilibria. Roughgarden [85] extends this to a wider class of
games. Our results complement these by showing that if one assumes players use
a specific, standard no-regret algorithm (namely, Hedge, or AMS) rather than an
arbitrarily bad set of no-regret algorithms, one obtains much stronger guarantees
about the distribution of play in atomic congestion games: it converges to a weakly
stable Nash equilibrium.
The replicator dynamic and other differential equations are studied in evolu-
tionary game theory [97, 92], which also considers associated notions of stability
such as evolutionarily stable states (ESS) and neutrally stable states (NSS). The
book of Fudenberg and Levine [44] provides an excellent survey on these topics.4
For each of the three main steps in our analysis, we identify here the most closely
related work in evolutionary game theory. In congestion games, the replica-
tor dynamic converges to its fixed point set. Proofs of this theorem and
generalizations, using the game’s potential function as a Lyapunov function, have
appeared in many prior works, e.g. [3, 55, 73, 91]. The short proof that we present
here conveniently provides a quantitative bound on the rate of decrease of the po-
tential. A weakly stable fixed point of the replicator dynamic is a weakly
stable equilibrium. Our notion of weakly stable equilibrium is similar to, but
weaker than, the notion of neutrally stable states. It is known that neutrally sta-
ble states of a game are Lyapunov stable points of the replicator dynamic (hence
weakly stable), but our line of attack requires the converse, which is not true in
general [103]. Here, we are able to deduce this converse by introducing a weaker
4For more general theory of differential equations see the book by Perko [78].
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game-theoretic notion of stability. In almost every game, the weakly stable
equilibria coincide with the pure Nash equilibria. The most closely-related
result in evolutionary game theory is Ritzberger and Weibull’s theorem [81] that
every asymptotically stable fixed point set of an AMS dynamic is not contained in
the relative interior of any face of the mixed strategy polytope, and hence contains
a pure equilibrium. Although their result applies to general games and not just
congestion games, it is weaker than ours in two key respects: it assumes a stronger
stability property (that need not hold at the weakly stable fixed points considered
in our analysis) and derives a weaker conclusion (the asymptotically stable set
contains a pure Nash equilibrium but may also contain other equilibria).
3.2 Model and Preliminaries
Congestion games. Congestion games [83] are non-cooperative games in which
the utility of each player depends only on the player’s strategy and the number of
other players that either choose the same strategy, or some strategy that “overlaps”
with it. Formally, a congestion game is defined by the tuple (N ;E; (Si)i∈N ; (ce)e∈E)
where N is the set of players, E is a set of facilities (also known as edges or bins),
and each player i has a set Si of subsets of E (Si ⊆ 2E). Each pure strategy
Si ∈ Si is a set of edges (a path), and ce is a cost (negative utility) function
associated with facility e. Given a pure strategy profile S = (S1, S2, . . . , SN), the
cost of player i is given by ci(S) =
∑
e∈Si ce(ke(S)), where ke(S) is the number
of players using e in S. Congestion games admit a potential function Φ(S) =∑
e∈E
∑ke(S)
j=1 ce(j), which captures each player’s incentive to change his strategy
[83]. Specifically, given pure strategy profile S = (S1, S2, . . . , SN), and strategy S
′
i
of player i: ci(S
′
i, S−i)− ci(S) = Φ(S ′i, S−i)−Φ(S). The set of pure Nash equilibria
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can be found by simply locating the local optima of Φ(S).
Multiplicative updates algorithm (Hedge) and the AMS dynamic. An
online learning algorithm is an online algorithm for choosing a sequence of elements
of some fixed set of actions, in response to an observed sequence of cost functions
mapping actions to real numbers. The t-th action chosen by the algorithm may
depend on the first t− 1 observations but not on any later observations; thus the
algorithm must choose an action at time t without knowing the costs of any actions
at that time. The regret of an online learning algorithm is defined as the maximum
over all input instances of the expected difference in payoff between the algorithm’s
actions and the best action. If this difference grows sublinearly with time, we say
it is a no-regret learning algorithm or that it is Hannan consistent [48].
The family of regret minimizing algorithms that we study in this paper are
called aggregate monotonic selection (AMS) dynamics [81, 89], and they consti-
tute a generalization of the weighted majority algorithm introduced by Littlestone
and Warmuth [63] and the Hedge algorithm of Freund and Schapire [43]. These
algorithms maintain a vector of n probabilities for the n available actions, and
at each round they choose an action according to this probability. (Initially, the
probabilities are all equal.) At the end of each round, AMS dynamics updates the
weights multiplicatively, favoring actions that exhibit low cost. The update is gov-
erned by a global parameter ε > 0, and a state-dependent parameter β = β(i, p)
which is determined by the player, i, and by the profile of mixed strategies, p, rep-
resenting the current state of every player’s learning algorithm. We can interpret
the parameter εβ(i, p) as the learning rate of player i. If the cost of action a at
time t is ca(t) then the weights are updated by multiplying with (1− εβ)ca(t) and
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then normalizing to keep the probability distribution:
pt+1a =
pta(1− εβ)ca(t)∑
j p
t
j(1− εβ)cj(t)
(3.1)
We will assume throughout that ∀i, p 0 < β(i, p) ≤ 1. For example, the algorithm
Hedge(ε) is obtained by setting β(i, p) = 1 for all i, p. Hedge() is not a no-regret
algorithm, but it is an ε-regret algorithm, and well known tricks (halving ε as the
algorithm proceeds) can be employed so that it becomes Hannan consistent.
3.3 Analysis of the Continuous-Time Process
In this section we define and analyze the continuous version of the Hedge (multi-
plicative weights) algorithm. We start with understanding the algorithm’s update
rule for probabilities, and we derive the limit as ε → 0, a first-order differential
equation (ODE) known as the replicator dynamic.
Setting up the differential equation. The continuous-time process we want to
analyze in this section arises as the limit of the update rule (3.1) as ε→ 0. The cost
of a strategy Si for a player i is a random variable C
i(Si) =
∑
e∈Si ce(1 + Ki(e)),
where Ki(e) denotes |{j : j 6= i, e ∈ Sj}|, the number of players other than i
that use edge e. Taking the derivative of the above update with respect to ε, and
substituting ε = 0, we get a differential equation using the random variables Ci(Si).
Taking expectation, and using the notation ci(e) = E(ce(1+Ki(e)) for the expected
cost of edge e for player i, we get that the expected cost is ci(R) = E(Ci(R)) =∑
e∈R c
i(e) and the expected update in the probabilities is the following differential
equation, p˙ = ξ(P ), where:
ξiR = β(i, p)piR
(∑
R¯
piR¯(c
i(R¯)− ci(R))
)
. (3.2)
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Fixed points and convergence to fixed points. It is not hard to establish
what are the fixed points of the differential equation. They are all the probabil-
ity distributions where all players are mixing between equal (but not necessarily
smallest) cost options.
Theorem 3.3.1 Probability distributions pi for i ∈ N form a fixed point of the
ODE (3.2) if and only if for all players i, all of the strategies R ∈ Si with piR > 0
have the same expected cost ci(R) for player i.
Before we study fixed points further, we want to establish that the solutions
of the differential equation converge to fixed points (e.g., do not cycle). To do
this we will consider the standard potential function Φ of the congestion game.
This is analogous to the proof of Monderer and Shapley [73] who show that in
games when players have identical interest (and also in potential games that are
strategically equivalent to such games for fictitious play and also for the AMS
dynamic), repeated play with fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Recall that the standard potential function of a congestion game is defined as∑
e
∑Ke
k=1 ce(k), where we use the notation Ke = |{j : e ∈ Sj}| for a pure strategy
profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn) We will use the expected value of this function as our
potential function. Using linearity of expectation, this expectation is
Ψ = E(Φ) =
∑
e
∞∑
k=1
ce(k) Pr(Ke ≥ k)
Theorem 3.3.2 The time derivative Ψ˙ of the potential function is 0 at fixed
points, and negative at all other points. In fact, −Ψ˙ ≥ ||ξ||21
2β1..i(p)
, where β1..i(p)
denotes
∑n
i=1 β(i, p).
Proof: Let Φ−i denote the potential function of the game without player i, i.e.
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Φ−i(S−i) =
∑
e∈E
∑ke(S−i)
j=1 ce(j), where ke(S−i) denotes the number of players using
edge e in strategy profile S−i. It is well known that the actual potential function
Φ satisfies Φ(S) = Φ−i(S−i) + Ci(Si) for all strategy profiles S. Note that
Ψ = E[Φ−i(S−i)] + E[Ci(Si)] = E[Φ−i(S−i)] +
∑
R
piRc
i(R).
The terms E[Φ−i(S−i)] and ci(R) don’t depend on player i’s mixed strategy, so
∂Ψ/∂piR = c
i(R). Now,
Ψ˙ =
∑
i,R
(
∂Ψ
∂piR
)
p˙iR
=
∑
i
β(i, p)
∑
R,R¯
piRpiR¯
(
ci(R)ci(R¯)− ci(R)2)
= −
∑
i
β(i, p)
∑
R<R¯
piRpiR¯
(
ci(R)− ci(R¯))2 .
The second line is produced by substituting ∂Ψ
∂piR
and p˙iR and rearranging the
resulting terms. In deriving the last line, we have assumed that the strategy set
of player i is totally ordered, and we have paired the terms on the preceding line
corresponding to R, R¯ and R¯, R. Finally, to bound −Ψ˙ from below in terms of
‖ξ‖1 (which is needed for the discrete-time analysis) we use the Cauchy Schwartz
inequality:
(−2β1..i(p))Ψ˙ = β1..i(p)
∑
i,R,R¯
β(i, p)piRpiR¯(c
i(R)− ci(R¯))2
=
∑
i,R,R¯
β(i, p)piRpiR¯
∑
i,R,R¯
β(i, p)piRpiR¯(c
i(R)− ci(R¯))2

≥
∑
i,R,R¯
β(i, p)piRpiR¯
∣∣ci(R)− ci(R¯)∣∣
2 ≥ ‖ξ‖21
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Unstable fixed points and the Jacobian We will use the notion of stability
from dynamical systems. In the neighborhood of a fixed point p0 the ODE can be
approximated by p˙ ≈ J(p − p0), where J is the matrix of partial derivatives, the
Jacobian. A fixed point of a dynamical system is said to be unstable (see in [78])
if the Jacobian matrix has an eigenvalue with positive real part.
For an ODE represented by a vector field ξ(x) the entry Jij of the Jacobian is
the partial derivative of the i-th coordinate ξi(x) in the direction of xj. Our ODE
has coordinates piR corresponding to a player i and a strategy R, and our vector
field ξ is defined in (3.2). Observe in (3.2) that ξiR is the product of β(i, p) with
a term that vanishes at a fixed point. When we take the partial derivative in any
direction, using the product rule we find that the derivative of β(i, p) vanishes,
as it is multiplied by 0 at a fixed point. Now let us examine the entries of the
Jacobian matrix case by case. For directions corresponding to the same player we
get
∂ξiR
∂piR
= β(i, p)
∑
R¯
piR¯(c
i(R¯)− ci(R)); ∂ξiR
∂piR¯
= β(i, p)piR(c
i(R¯)− ci(R));
where the sum in the partial derivative should be for R¯ 6= R, but can equally well
be understood to be for all R¯. The second expression is for R¯ 6= R.
Finally, taking a derivative in the direction pjQ for j 6= i involves understanding
how the cost ci(R) depends on the probability pjQ. We get that mc
ij
e := E(ce(2 +
Kij(e))) − E(ce(1 + Kij(e))) is the coefficient of q in the cost ci(e). Using the
notation mcij(A) =
∑
e∈Amc
ij
e we get that the marginal cost for player i for
increasing probability pjQ is
∂ξiR
∂pjQ
= β(i, p)piR
∑
R¯
piR¯(mc
ij(R¯ ∩Q)−mcij(R ∩Q))
Note that the marginal cost depends on the probability distributions of players
other than i and j, but does not depend on those two players. In particular
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mcije = mc
ji
e for every edge e.
Theorem 3.3.3 The Jacobian matrix is expressed by the equations above.
Lemma 3.3.4 A fixed point p that is stable corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a fixed point p of the ODE that is not a Nash equilibrium. If a
fixed point is not a Nash equilibrium, than there is a player i and a strategy R
with piR = 0 that has β(i, p)
∑
R¯ piR¯(c
i(R¯)− ci(R)) = λ > 0. The unit vector wiR
with a 1 in the (i, R) coordinate is a left eigenvector of J with wiRJ = λwiR, hence
J has a positive eigenvalue.
At a fixed point p that is a Nash equilibrium, let J be the submatrix of the
Jacobian restricted to the subset of strategies played with positive probability
(piR > 0).
Lemma 3.3.5 For any right eigenvector w of the matrix J that satisfies Jw =
λw, the vector w◦ extending w with 0 values to the remaining coordinates is an
eigenvector of the full Jacobian, J , with eigenvalue λ.
First note that the trace of J is 0, which follows directly from the definition of
fixed point, and definition of J, as all diagonal entries are 0. To help establish that
the submatrix J has an eigenvalue with positive real part we will prove that the
trace of J2 is nonnegative. This will follow from a matrix inequality of independent
interest, that can be derived from Steele’s non-symmetric version of the Efron-Stein
inequality [98].
36
Theorem 3.3.6 Consider a fixed point of the ODE, and let J be the submatrix of
the Jacobian defined above. Then Tr(J2) ≥ 0, and in fact it is equal to
∑
i,j
β(i, p)β(j, p)
∑
R<R¯,Q<Q¯
piRpiR¯pjQpjQ¯(M
R,R¯,Q,Q¯
i,j )
2,
where MR,R¯,Q,Q¯i,j is defined to be mc
ij(R ∩ Q) − mcij(R ∩ Q¯) − mcij(R¯ ∩ Q) +
mcij(R¯ ∩ Q¯).
Proof of Theorem 3.3.6 To prove that the trace of J2 is nonnegative we use
a matrix inequality. For any matrix A we use A · A as matrix obtained by taking
the square of each term of A. The following inequality compares the square of
the expectation of M and the expectation of the square with taking expectation
on rows (or columns) squaring the result and then taking expectation. It may be
useful to think of this inequality as a variational inequality on the expectation of
squares.
Lemma 3.3.7 For any matrix M and any probability distributions pi and pj on
the rows and columns respectively, we have the following inequality
0 ≤ (pTi Mpj)2 − pTi ((Mpj) · (Mpj))− ((pTi M) · (pTi M))pj + pTi (M ·M)pj.
In fact this value equals
∑
R,R¯,Q,Q¯ piRpiR¯pjQpjQ¯(mQR −mQ¯R −mQR¯ +mQ¯R¯)2
To prove this one may simply check that each term of the form mQRmQ¯R¯
occurs in the two expression with the same multiplier. Alternatively, the inequality
stated in the lemma follows from Steele’s non-symmetric version of the Efron-Stein
inequality [98].
Theorem 3.3.6 follows by applying this inequality with mRQ = mc
ij(R ∩Q) to
establish that Tr(J2) ≥ 0.
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We are ready to show that if a fixed point is stable, then J must have 0 as its
only eigenvalue.
Theorem 3.3.8 For a stable fixed point p, all eigenvalues of the submatrix J of
the Jacobian corresponding to the coordinates with piR > 0 are zero. Also, for
all players i, j and all strategies R, R¯,Q, Q¯ played with positive probability by the
players i and j respectively, we must have mcij(R ∩Q)−mcij(R ∩ Q¯)−mcij(R¯ ∩
Q) +mcij(R¯ ∩ Q¯) = 0.
Proof: For any fixed point the sum of the eigenvalues, Tr(J), is zero, hence if
J has no eigenvalues with positive real part then all eigenvalues must be pure
imaginary. But in this case Tr(J2) is nonpositive, as it is the sum of squares of
pure imaginary numbers. We know that Tr(J2) ≥ 0 and hence it must equal zero.
Hence all eigenvalues of J must equal zero, as claimed.
Using the condition derived in the above theorem for stable fixed points of the
ODE, we can connect the notion of stable for the dynamical system to our game
theoretic notion of weakly stable, in the sense defined in the introduction, that each
player i remains indifferent between the strategies in the support of σi whenever
any other single player j modifies its mixed strategy to any pure strategy in the
support of σj.
Theorem 3.3.9 If a Nash equilibrium is stable for the dynamical system then it
is a weakly stable Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We have proved that if a Nash equilibrium is stable for the dynamical
system, then for all players i, j and all strategies R, R¯,Q, Q¯ played with positive
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probability by the players i and j, respectively, mcij(R ∩ Q) − mcij(R¯ ∩ Q) =
mcij(R∩ Q¯)−mcij(R¯∩ Q¯). Using j’s mixed strategy σj to take a weighted average
over all Q¯, we get the claim that if i is indifferent between two of its strategies
R,R′ when j randomizes, he remains indifferent when j plays purely strategy Q.
We have seen the solution of the ODE converges, and that fixed points of the
dynamic system that are not weakly stable Nash equilibria are unstable for the
dynamic system. Using the theory of differential equations [78], we can conclude
that starting from a generic initial condition, the ODE converges to weakly stable
Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3.3.10 From all but a measure 0 set of starting points, the solution of
the ODE (3.2) converges to weakly stable Nash equilibria.
3.4 Weakly Stable Equilibria
If one fixes the set of players and facilities, and the strategy sets of each player of
a congestion game — which we collectively denote as the game’s “combinatorial
structure” — the game itself is determined by the vector of edge costs ~c, i.e., the
vector whose components are the numbers ce(k) for every edge e and every possible
load value k on that edge. One can thus identify the set of congestion games having
a fixed combinatorial structure with the vector space RN where N is equal to the
number of pairs (e, k) for which ce(k) is defined. If one imposes other constraints
such as non-negativity and monotonicity on the edge costs, then the set of games
is identified with a convex subset of RN rather than RN itself.
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Our goal in this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1 For almost every congestion game, every weakly stable equilib-
rium is a pure Nash equilibrium. In other words, the set of congestion games
having non-pure weakly stable equilibria is a measure-zero subset of RN .
In fact, we will prove the following stronger version of Theorem 3.4.1.
Theorem 3.4.2 There is a non-zero multivariate polynomial W , defined on RN ,
such that for every game with a non-pure weakly stable equilibrium, its edge costs
satisfy the equation W (~c) = 0.
This strengthening implies, for example, that among all the congestion games
with a fixed combinatorial structure and with cost functions taking integer values
between 0 and B, the fraction of such games having a non-pure weakly stable
equilibrium tends to zero as B →∞.
Define an equilibrium to be fully mixed if it satisfies piR > 0 for every player
i and every strategy R in that player’s strategy set. Every mixed equilibrium ~p
of a game is a fully mixed equilibrium of the subgame obtained by deleting the
strategies that satisfy piR = 0. Since there are only finitely many such subgames,
we can establish Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 by proving the corresponding statements
about fully mixed weakly stable equilibria. Theorem 3.4.1 then follows because a
finite union of measure-zero sets has measure zero, and Theorem 3.4.2 follows
because the union of the zero-sets of polynomials W1,W2, . . . ,Wk is the zero-set of
their product W1W2 . . .Wk.
Let X be the set of pairs (~p,~c) such that ~p is a fully mixed weakly stable
equilibrium of the game with edge costs ~c, let f : X → RN be the function that
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projects such a pair (~p,~c) to its second component, ~c, and let Y ⊆ RN be the
set f(X), i.e. the set of games having a fully mixed weakly stable equilibrium.
To prove that Y has measure zero and is contained in the zero-set of a nontrivial
polynomial, we will first prove a “local, linearized version” of the same statement.
Lemma 3.4.3 below asserts, roughly5, that for every point x ∈ X, with tangent
space TxX, the projection of TxX to RN has dimension strictly less than N . (And
thus, the image of TxX in RN has measure zero and is contained in the zero-set
of a nontrivial linear function.) Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are then obtained us-
ing general theorems that allow global conclusions to be deduced from these local
criteria. To obtain Theorem 3.4.1 we work in the category of differentiable man-
ifolds and apply Sard’s Theorem [70]: the set of critical values of a differentiable
function has measure zero. To obtain Theorem 3.4.2 we work in the category of
algebraic varieties and apply an “algebraic geometry version” of Sard’s Theorem
([93], Lemma II.6.2.2): if X
f→ Y is a regular map of varieties defined over a
field of characteristic 0, and f is surjective, then there exists a nonempty open set
V ⊆ X such that the differential dxf is surjective for all x ∈ V .6 As an aid to
the reader unfamiliar with algebraic geometry we present a concise exposition of
standard definitions in section 3.6.
Linearized version of Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. Each of the expressions
ci(R),mcij(R ∩ Q) used in Section 3.3 actually refers to a polynomial — in fact,
a multilinear polynomial — in the variables p∗∗ and c∗(∗), because the probability
5The actual statement is more complicated because X may have singularities, so the tangent
space TxX may be ill-defined. To deal with this, what we actually show is that X can be parti-
tioned into finitely many nonsingular subsets X1, X2, . . . , Xk — possibly of different dimensions
— such that for every x ∈ Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ k), the projection of TxXi to RN has dimension strictly
less than N .
6Actually the Lemma as stated in [93] requires the field to be algebraically closed, and it
requires the variety X to be nonsingular. We describe how to work around these technical
difficulties in the proof of Theorem 3.4.2.
41
of any given pure strategy profile being sampled is a multilinear polynomial in the
p∗∗ variables, and the cost of any edge, in any given pure strategy profile, is one
of the variables c∗(∗). Let the polynomial equation AR,R′i = 0 express the fact that
player i is indifferent between strategies R and R′, i.e. ci(R) − ci(R′) = 0. By
definition of a weakly stable equilibrium we must have mcij(R ∩ Q) −mcij(R′ ∩
Q) =
∑
Q¯ pjQ¯(mc
ij(R ∩ Q¯)−mcij(R′ ∩ Q¯)) for any Q, hence we get MR,R′,Q,Q′i,j =
mcij(R∩Q)−mcij(R′ ∩Q)−mcij(R∩Q′) +mcij(R′ ∩Q′) = 0 for all R,R′, Q,Q′.
Finally let Pi = 0 encode
∑
R∈Si piR = 1. In earlier sections of this paper, we
have seen that all of these equations must hold when ~p is a fully mixed weakly
stable equilibrium of the game with edge costs ~c. In other words, if I denotes
the polynomial ideal generated by {AR,R′i } ∪ {MR,R
′,Q,Q′
i,j } ∪ {Pi}, then the set of
fully mixed weakly stable equilibria, X, is contained in the algebraic variety V (I)
defined by the vanishing of all the polynomials in I.
Lemma 3.4.3 The ideal I contains a polynomial F ∈ R[~p,~c] that satisfies:
1. ∂F/∂piR ∈ I for all variables piR.
2. ∂F/∂ce(k) 6∈ I for at least one variable ce(k). In fact, there exists an edge
e such that the sum of the partial derivatives in directions ce(k), for k =
1, . . . , n, is in 1 + I.
Proof: Fix any player i, and fix any two strategies R,R′ for that player. For all
players j 6= i fix a strategy Q0j ∈ Sj. Consider the polynomial
F = AR,R
′
i +
∑
j 6=i
[
mcij(R′ ∩Q0j)−mcij(R ∩Q0j)
]
Pj.
We will show that ∂F/∂pjQ = M
R,R′,Q,Q0j
i,j if j 6= i and Q 6= Q0j , and otherwise
∂F/∂pjQ = 0. This confirms property (1).
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As before, ci(e), ci(R) denote the expected cost for i for using e, R respectively,
whereas Ki(e) is a random variable expressing the number of players other than
i using e. Similarly, Kij(e) is a random variable expressing the number of player
other than i, j using e. We can express ci(e), ci(R) as follows:
ci(e) = E [ce(1 +Ki(e))]
= E [pjece(2 +Kij(e)) + (1− pje)ce(1 +Kij(e))]
= pjeE [ce(2 +Kij(e))− ce(1 +Kij(e))] + E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]
= pjemc
ij(e) + E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]
where as before mcij(e) = E [ce(2 +Kij(e))− ce(1 +Kij(e))].
ci(R) =
∑
e∈R
[pjemc
ij(e) + E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]]
=
∑
e∈R
∑
Q3e
pjQmc
ij(e) +
∑
e∈R
E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]
=
∑
Q∈Sj
pjQmc
ij(R ∩Q) +
∑
e∈R
E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]
The Nash equilibrium condition AR,R
′
i for player i and strategies R,R
′ can be
expressed as:
AR,R
′
i =
∑
Q∈Sj
pjQ[mc
ij(R ∩Q)−mcij(R′ ∩Q)] +
∑
e∈R
E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]−
−
∑
e∈R′
E [ce(1 +Kij(e))]
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Finally, by taking partial derivatives we get:
∂AR,R
′
i
∂pjQ
= mcij(R ∩Q)−mcij(R′ ∩Q) (3.3)
The equation Pi = 0 can be written as
∑
Q∈Sj piR − 1 = 0. By taking partial
derivatives we get:
∂Pi
∂pjQ
=

1 if i = j
0 otherwise.
(3.4)
Recall that F = AR,R
′
i −
∑
j 6=i
[
mcij(R′ ∩Q0j)−mcij(R ∩Q0j)
]
Pj. The product
rule for partial derivatives implies that if A,B are two polynomials and A ∈ I
then
∂(AB)
∂pjQ
=
∂A
∂pjQ
B + A
(
∂B
∂pjQ
)
≡
(
∂A
∂pjQ
)
B (mod I).
We may apply this rule (using the fact that P` ∈ I for every player `) to compute
the partial derivative of F with respect to pjQ modulo I:
∂F
∂pjQ
≡ ∂A
∂pjQ
−
∑
6`=i
[
mcij(R′ ∩Q0j)−mcij(R ∩Q0j)
] ∂P`
∂pjQ
(mod I)
= mcij(R ∩Q)−mcij(R′ ∩Q)−mcij(R′ ∩Q0j) +mcij(R ∩Q0j)
= M
R,R′,Q,Q0j
ij ≡ 0 (mod I).
Property (2) follows from the formula
∀e ∈ R \R′
n∑
k=1
∂F
∂ce(k)
=
∏
j 6=i
(Pj + 1) +
+
∑
j 6=i
[
n∑
k=1
(
∂mcij(R ∩Q0j)
∂ce(k)
− ∂mc
ij(R′ ∩Q0j)
∂ce(k)
)]
Pj (3.5)
This equation follows from a direct calculation.
n∑
k=1
∂F
∂ce(k)
=
n∑
k=1
∂AR,R
′
i
∂ce(k)
+
n∑
k=1
∂
∂ce(k)
{∑
j 6=i
[
mcij(R′ ∩Q0j)−mcij(R ∩Q0j)
]
Pj
}
=
n∑
k=1
∂AR,R
′
i
∂ce(k)
+
∑
j 6=i
[
n∑
k=1
(
∂mcij(R ∩Q0j)
∂ce(k)
− ∂mc
ij(R′ ∩Q0j)
∂ce(k)
)]
Pj,
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where the last line follows because ∂Pj/∂ce(k) = 0 for all j, e, k.
Now it remains to show that
∑n
k=1
∂AR,R
′
i
∂ce(k)
=
∏
j 6=i(Pj + 1). We compute:
∂AR,R
′
i
∂ce(k)
=

∑
σ−i pσ−i1[Ki(e) = k − 1] if e ∈ R \R′
−∑σ−i pσ−i1[Ki(e) = k − 1] if e ∈ R′ \R
0 otherwise
(3.6)
and then sum over k for any e ∈ R \R′:
n∑
k=1
∂AR,R
′
i
∂ce(k)
=
n∑
k=1
∑
σ−i
pσ−i1[Ki(e) = k − 1]
=
∑
σ−i
(
pσ−i
n∑
k=1
1[Ki(e) = k − 1]
)
=
∑
σ−i
pσ−i1[0 ≤ Ki(e) ≤ n− 1]
=
∑
σ−i
pσ−i
=
∑
σ−i
(∏
j 6=i
pj,σ(j)
)
=
∏
j 6=i
(∑
Q
pjQ
)
=
∏
j 6=i
(Pj + 1).
Measure-theoretic and algebraic conclusions. In order to apply Sard’s The-
orem, we need to work with a smooth manifold, whereas the set X of fully mixed
weakly stable equilibria may have singularities. However, we know that X is con-
tained in the affine algebraic variety V (I), so we may use the following standard
fact whose proof appears in section 3.6.
Lemma 3.4.4 If I ⊆ R[x1, x2, . . . , xn] then the variety Z = V (I) is the union of
finitely many subsets Z1, Z2, . . . , Zm, each of which is a nonsingular quasi-affine
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algebraic variety7, and therefore also a smooth manifold. For any polynomial P ∈ I
and any point z ∈ Zj (1 ≤ j ≤ m), the gradient vector ∇P at z is orthogonal to
the entire tangent space TzZj of the manifold Zj.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1 By Lemma 3.4.4, the set X of fully mixed weakly sta-
ble equilibria can be covered by finitely many smooth manifolds X1, . . . , Xm, so it
suffices to prove that each of them projects to a measure-zero subset of RN . If F
is the polynomial defined in Lemma 3.4.3, then for every x ∈ Xj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and
every tangent vector v ∈ TxXj, we have ∇F (x) · v = 0, by Lemma 3.4.4. Recalling
that X is a subset of the vector space RM+N , where M is the combined number
of strategies in all players’ strategy sets, and N is the combined number of pairs
(e, k) such that the edge cost ce(k) is well-defined, then we may write v = (vp, vc),
where vp denotes the first M components of v (corresponding to the “probability
coordinates”) and vc denotes the last N components of v (corresponding to the
“edge cost coordinates”). Recalling that every polynomial in I vanishes at x, prop-
erties (1)-(2) of Lemma 3.4.3 imply that the first M coordinates of ∇F (x) vanish
whereas the last N coordinates do not. Thus, the equation ∇F (x) · v = 0 imposes
a nontrivial linear constraint on the vector vc. This implies that the tangent space
TxXj projects to a proper linear subspace of RN . Since x was arbitrary, we have
proven that the differential of the projection map Xj → RN has rank less than
N at every point of Xj. By Sard’s Theorem, the image of Xj in RN has measure
zero.
In fact, the technique used to prove Theorem 3.4.1 actually allows us to es-
tablish a stronger theorem, in which we consider congestion games whose edge
7A quasi-affine algebraic variety is any variety isomorphic to an open subset of an affine
algebraic variety
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cost functions are drawn from a specified class of cost functions. Let us define
a smooth, monotonically parameterized class of cost functions to be a collection
of functions cγ : {1, 2, . . . , n} → R parameterized by a vector of real numbers
γ = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γd) ∈ U for some open subset U ⊆ Rd+1, satisfying the following
two properties: (1) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the function γ 7→ cγ(k) is a smooth
function, which we will denote by hk(γ); (2) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and all γ ∈ U ,
the partial derivative ∂cγ(k)/∂γ0 is strictly positive. For example, edge costs that
are specified by degree-d polynomials ce(k) = γ0 + γ1k + . . . + γdk
d constitute a
smooth, monotonically parameterized class of cost functions. The following gen-
eralization of Theorem 3.4.1 is proven using essentially the same technique.
Theorem 3.4.5 Suppose that for each edge e of a congestion game we are given
a smooth, monotonically parameterized class of cost functions with parameter γe ∈
Ue. The set of congestion games having non-pure weakly stable equilibria is a
measure-zero subset of
∏
e Ue.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.5 There is a natural smooth function h : U∗ → RN
which maps the parameter vector Γ to the vector of edge costs (ce(k))e,k deter-
mined by these parameters. Letting RM denote the vector space spanned by the
probability variable piR, we have the map H : RM × U∗ → RM ×RN which maps
a pair (~p,Γ) to (~p, h(Γ)). Let X] = H−1(X) ⊆ RM × U∗. We aim to show that
the projection of X] to U∗ has zero measure. As before, we can accomplish this by
covering X] with finitely many smooth manifolds X]j and using Sard’s Theorem
on each of these pieces. The necessary ingredient in this argument, as before, is
a smooth real-valued function F ] which vanishes on X]j , such that at every point
x ∈ X]j the gradient ∇F ](x) is a nonzero vector whose first M components vanish.
We can obtain such a function by composing F and H: F ] = F ◦ H. Using the
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fact that H is the identity map on the first M coordinates, and on the last N
coordinates is given by the map Γ 7→ (ce(k))e,k, we obtain the following formulas:
∂F ]
∂piR
=
∂F
∂piR
= 0 (3.7)
∂F ]
∂γe`
=
n∑
k=1
(
∂F
∂ce(k)
)(
∂ce(k)
∂γe`
)
. (3.8)
This proves that the first M components of ∇F ] vanish. Now recall that
∂ce(k)/∂γ
e
0 > 0 by the definition of a smooth, monotonically parameterized class
of cost functions. Fix any edge e ∈ R \ R′ and let v = (0, w) be the vector whose
first M components are 0 and whose last N components are given by
ve,` =

1
∂ce(k)/∂γe0
if ` = 0
0 otherwise.
We have
∇F ] · v =
n∑
k=1
∂F ]/∂γe0
∂ce(k)/∂γe0
=
n∑
k=1
∂F
∂ce(k)
= 1,
by part (2) of Lemma 3.4.3, and this clearly shows that ∇F ] 6= 0. Applying Sard’s
Theorem as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, it follows that the image of X]j in RN
has measure zero.
Turning now from measure-theoretic statements to algebraic ones, we will
present the proof of Theorem 3.4.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2 We work over the field C of complex numbers in order
to apply theorems about varieties over an algebraically closed field; in the last
sentence of the proof we will translate the result back to the field R. Let I be
the ideal defined in Section 3.4, and let XC = V (I), the zero-set of I over C. By
Lemma 3.4.4, XC can be covered by finitely many nonsingular varieties X1, . . . , Xm.
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We will prove that each of them projects to a proper closed subset of the affine
space CN . If F is the polynomial defined in Lemma 3.4.3, then as in the proof of
Theorem 3.4.1, the equation ∇F (x) · v = 0 implies8 that rank(dxf) < N, where
f denotes the projection map Xj → CN . However, if the set f(Xj) were dense in
CN then by ([93], Lemma II.6.2.2) we would have rank(dxf) = N for all x in a
nonempty open subset of Xj. It follows that f(Xj) is contained in a proper closed
subset of CN for all j, hence f(XC) = ∪jf(Xj) is also contained in a proper closed
subset of CN . This means there is a nonzero polynomial P ∈ C[c1, c2, . . . , cN ] that
vanishes on f(XC). If P¯ denotes the complex conjugate of P , then W = PP¯ is a
polynomial in R[c1, c2, . . . , cN ] that vanishes on f(X).
3.5 The Discrete-Time Process
In this section we give an approximate version of our main result using the discrete-
time learning process with a small amount of added noise. The added noise is
a useful artifact for proving general convergence guarantees in the discrete time
setting.
Let p′(t) denote the mixed strategy profile at time t before we introduce the
noise and let p(t) express the resulting distribution. The original strategy distribu-
tion p′(t) is scaled down by a factor of 1−ε2 and then shifted by mixing it with the
uniform distribution. The updated vector has the form (1− ε2)p′(t) + ε2~1. Next,
a player is chosen at random (i.e. player i) who in turns chooses uniformly and
independently two of her strategies R and R¯. If both piR, piR¯ are greater than ε
then the player proceeds to move ε/2 from the first strategy to the second. If that
8See Lemma 3.6.2 in section 3.6 for a rigorous derivation of this step using the standard
algebraic-geometry definitions of tangent spaces and differentials.
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is not the case, then she proceeds to move merely ε2/2 . This update is always
possible because of our first mixing step.
Approximately Stable Equilibria We need to extend the definitions of stable
and unstable fixed points to approximate stability. For the dynamical systems
definition, we define a ν-stable fixed point, for any real number ν ≥ 0, to be a fixed
point at which the Jacobian has no eigenvalues whose real part is greater than ν.
For simplicity, we assume in this section that β(i, p) = 1 for all players i and
all probability distributions p. This section outlines a proof of the following result.
Theorem 3.5.1 The discrete-time learning process with a small amount of added
noise satisfies the following guarantee for all congestion games with and non-
decreasing cost functions.
For all ν > 0 there exists an  > 0, and for all  < 0 there exists T0, so
that when all players are using Hedge() to optimize their strategies,
then for all times T > T0 with probability at least 1 − ν, the mixed
strategy profile is a ν-stable equilibrium point in all but νT of the first
T steps of the history of play.
To use this theorem in the context of games, we need to relate our game-
theoretic notion of weak stability to this notion of ν-stable fixed points. We say
that a Nash equilibrium p is ν¯-weakly stable, if the following holds for each pair
of players i and j. Suppose we randomly sample a strategy of j with probability
distribution pj, and assume that j plays this sampled strategy Q and all other
players k 6= i, j play with the given probability distribution pk. Now sampling two
strategies R and R¯ of i with probability distribution pi, the expected difference of
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payoffs of player i between strategies R and R¯ is at most ν¯. Note that 0-weakly
stable is exactly our definition of weakly stable. We will show that the learning
process spends almost all the time near a ν-stable equilibrium point. To conclude
the same for ν¯-weakly stable Nash equilibrium, we need to show that ν-stable
implies ν¯-weakly stable.
Theorem 3.5.2 For every ν¯ > 0 there is a ν > 0 so that if a Nash equilibrium p
is ν-stable for the dynamical system, then it is a ν¯-weakly stable Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Assume p is ν-stable, that is, for all eigenvalues λ of the Jacobian J we
have <(λ) ≤ ν. If there are N players and a total of M strategies, this implies
Tr(J2) ≤ ν2M . We know from Theorem 3.3.6 that this trace is equal to
∑
i,j
∑
R<R¯,Q<Q¯
piRpiR¯pjQpjQ¯(M
R,R¯,Q,Q¯
i,j )
2 (3.9)
where MR,R¯,Q,Q¯i,j = mcij(R ∩Q)−mcij(R ∩ Q¯)−mcij(R¯ ∩Q) +mcij(R¯ ∩ Q¯), and
recall that we are assuming here that β(i, p) = 1 for all i and p for simplicity.
Now consider the change in the cost of strategy R for player i when player
j selects a strategy Q. This change is mcij(R ∩ Q) −
∑
Q¯ pjQ¯mcij(R ∩ Q¯). The
difference in cost between strategies R and R¯ is then∑
Q¯
pjQ¯(mcij(R ∩Q)−mcij(R ∩ Q¯)−
−mcij(R¯ ∩Q) +mcij(R¯ ∩ Q¯)) =
∑
Q¯
pjQ¯M
R,R¯,Q,Q¯
i,j .
Taking the expectation defining the ν¯-weakly stable Nash equilibrium, the sum
that we need to bound is ∑
R,R¯,Q,Q¯
piRpiR¯pjQpjQ¯M
R,R¯,Q,Q¯
i,j . (3.10)
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Restricting the sum of squares in (3.9) to only the (i, j) pair and using the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality we can bound the sum in (3.10) by 2ν
√
M , which establishes
the theorem with ν¯ = 2ν
√
M .
3.5.1 Overview of the Discrete Analysis
In deriving Theorem 3.5.1 from the foregoing continuous-time analysis, we must
address several sources of error: the noise introduced by the players’ random
sampling, the evolution of mixed strategies in discrete jumps rather than along
continuous flow lines, and the approximation error resulting from treating ε as in-
finitesimally small when estimating the coefficients of the vector field ξ. Resolving
these issues requires careful manipulations of Taylor series, but it is also possible
to distinguish a few main ideas which constitute a road map for this stage of the
proof.
Amortizing unstable-fixed-point steps against potential-diminishing
steps. Our analysis of the stochastic process p(t) distinguishes three types of
time steps: potential-shrinking steps in which the expected decrease in Ψ is at
least Ω(ε2), stable steps in which p(t) is near a ν-stable equilibrium point, and
unstable steps in which p(t) is near an equilibrium point which is not ν-stable. To
deal with unstable steps, we show that a sufficiently long time window starting
at an unstable step t will contain (with high probability) many more potential-
shrinking steps than unstable steps. Amortizing the change in Ψ over the entire
time window, we can show that the expected potential decrease is Ω(ε2). Thus,
the entire time history t = 1, 2, . . . can be broken up into good stages consisting
of a single stable step, and bad stages of bounded length such that the expected
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potential decrease during a bad stage is Ω(ε2). Since Ψ can only decrease by a
bounded amount over the entire history of play, we may easily conclude that with
high probability, the good stages vastly outnumber the bad stages in any suffi-
ciently long time history. We omit most details of the proof from this extended
abstract, and for the remainder of this section we focus on one of the most crucial
steps.
Balancing error terms by completing the square. The most involved step in
the preceding outline is the proof that every sufficiently long time window which
begins with an unstable step is likely to contain many more potential-shrinking
steps than unstable steps. The difficulty is as follows: the rate at which an unstable
fixed point p0 repels points at distance ρ from p0 (along an unstable direction) is
O(ρ2). This second-order effect is offset by a second-order correction term arising
from our approximation of the multiplicative-update rule by the vector field ξ. To
compare these two effects we use an analogue of “completing the square”: instead
of basing a Taylor expansion at the fixed point p0 we choose a nearby basepoint p1,
resulting in a Taylor expansion whose leading-order term has an unambiguous sign
reflecting the system’s tendency to move away from p1 in the repelling direction.
3.5.2 Details of the Discrete-time analysis
Throughout this section we normalize the edge costs (multiplying each cost func-
tion by a scalar if necessary) so that the cost of each path is bounded above by 1
even if every edge of the path experiences a load of n.
We present a noisy variant of the multiplicative updates algorithm. The added
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noise is a useful artifact for proving general convergence guarantees in the discrete
time setting. Going back to the replicator dynamics analogy, the added noise
introduces mutations which allows the system to fully explore the strategy space
and recover even from very unlikely configurations.
Let p′(t) denote the mixed strategy profile at time t before we introduce the
noise and let p(t) express the resulting distribution. The original strategy distri-
bution p′(t) is scaled down by a factor of 1− ε2 and then shifted by mixing it with
the uniform distribution. The updated vector has the form (1 − ε2)p′(t) + ε2~1.
Next, a player is chosen at random 9 (i.e. player i) who in turns chooses uniformly
and independently two of her strategies R and R¯. If both piR, piR¯ are greater than
ε then the player proceeds to move ε/2 from the first strategy to the second. If
that is not the case, then she proceeds to move merely ε2/2 . This update is al-
ways possible because of our first mixing step. We refer to the process of adding
this noise as “wiggling” henceforth. Let’s denote by NiR(t) the random variable
piR(t)− p′iR(t). It is easy to verify that for each i and R E(NiR(t)) = O(ε2) for all
t, since the expected drift of the second step is zero.
The random variables p(t) constitute a Markov chain on the state space Σ, the
set of all mixed profiles. We will represent the state change that takes place at
time t by a random vector qˆ(t) = p(t + 1)− p(t) whose distribution depends only
on the value of p(t). Hence for every mixed strategy profile p there is a well-defined
“expected state change” vector q(p). For any player i and path R, if p(t) = p then
9Our results hold regardless of the numbers players that perform this update. In other words,
there is no need for communication between the players to decide who performs the update.
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p(t+ 1)iR =
(1− ε)cost(R,t)piR∑
Q(1− ε)cost(Q,t)piQ
+NiR(t)
= piR
1− cost(R, t)ε+ 1
2
cost(R, t)(cost(R, t)− 1)ε2 +O(ε3)
1−
(∑
Q cost(Q, t)piQ
)
ε+ 1
2
(∑
Q cost(Q, t)(cost(Q, t)− 1)piQ
)
ε2 +O(ε3)
+NiR(t)
= piR +
(∑
Q
(cost(Q, t)− cost(R, t)) piRpiQ
)
ε+O(piR)ε
2 +NiR(t)
Therefore ‖qˆ(t)‖1 = O(nε) for all t, and for all p there is a vector η(p) (depending
on ε) such that ‖η(p)‖1 = O(n) and
q(p) = E(p(t+ 1)− p(t) | p(t) = p) = ξ(p)ε+ η(p)ε2. (3.11)
We now proceed to estimate the expected change in potential when p(t) = p,
using ∇Ψ(p) and HΨ(p) to denote the gradient and the Hessian matrix of Ψ at p,
respectively. These are given by the formulas
∇Ψ(p)iR = ci(R) (3.12)
HΨ(p)iR,jQ = mc
ij(R ∩Q), (3.13)
from which it follows that ‖∇Ψ(p)‖∞ ≤ 1 and |HΨ(p)|max ≤ 1. Using the fact that
|uTAv| ≤ ‖u‖1|A|max‖v‖1 for any vectors u, v and matrix A such that the product
uTAv is well-defined, we obtain the bound
|qˆ(t)THΨ(p(t))qˆ(t)| = O(n2ε2). (3.14)
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Now applying Taylor’s Theorem to the function Ψ, we obtain
E(Ψ(p(t+ 1))−Ψ(p(t)) | p(t) = p) = ∇Ψ(p)Tq(p) + E(qˆ(t)THΨ(p)qˆ(t) | p(t) = p)+
+O(n3ε3) (3.15)
= ∇Ψ(p)Tξ(p)ε+O(nε2) +O(n2ε2)
= O(nε2)− Ω
(
1
n
‖ξ(p)‖21ε
)
, (3.16)
where the last line was derived using Theorem 3.3.2. When p(t) is far from the
fixed point set of ξ, i.e. ‖ξ(p(t))‖21 > Cn3ε for a sufficiently large constant C,
equation (3.16) ensures that we are in a potential-shrinking state.
Furthermore we will justify that condition (3.16) coupled with the fact that we
keep decreasing the ε in the multiplicative update algorithms10 implies convergence
to fixed points of ξ. Indeed, for any (congestion) game, there exists a function
f : R→ R such that limx→0 f(x) = 0 such that all κ-approximate fixed points (in
the sense ‖ξ‖1 ≤ k) are at most f(k) distance away from a Nash. Assume that this
is not the case. Let’s define for any κ the set of such κ-approximate Nash as Nκ.
We denote the max min distance between a set of points S in our strategy space
and the set of Nash equilibrium points as dN(S). Since Nκ is compact and dN is
continuous, dN attains its supremum over Nκ for every κ > 0 and by hypothesis
it is greater than 0. However the sequence of dN(Nκ) must have a converging
subsequence, and since it is decreasing it has a limit. By hypothesis the limit
would have a non-zero value and hence we reach a contradiction.
Next, we will proceed to show that our process will not converge to an unstable
fixed point. To analyze the behavior of the discrete-time process near an unstable
fixed point p0, we will need to use Taylor’s Theorem applied to the vector field
ξ. A fact which aids in the analysis is the following lemma, which bounds the
10which we must in order to ensure no-regret in the discrete time setting
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magnitude of each term of the Taylor series for ξ(p0 + r) in terms of ‖r‖1 rather
than the customary bounds in terms of ‖r‖2.
Lemma 3.5.3 For any vectors p0, r such that both p0 and p0 + r belong to Σ, we
have
ξ(p0 + r) = ξ(p0) + J(p0)r +O(‖r‖21)r˜, (3.17)
where ‖r˜‖1 ≤ 1. Moreover, ‖J(p0)r‖1 = O(n‖r‖).
Proof: Write r = ar0, where a = ‖r‖1 and ‖r0‖1 = 1. Now apply Taylor’s Theorem
with remainder to the vector-valued univariate function ζ(x) = ξ(p0 + xr0).
ζ(a) = ζ(0) + aζ ′(0) +
1
2
a2ζ ′′(b), for some b ∈ [0, a]. (3.18)
Now
ζ ′(0)iR =
∑
j,Q
(
∂ξiR
∂pjQ
)
p=p0
(r0)jQ =
(
J(p0)r0
)
iR
, (3.19)
and
ζ ′′(b)iR =
∑
j,Q
∑
j′,Q′
(
∂2ξiR
∂pjQ∂pj′Q′
)
p=p0+br0
(r0)jQ(r0)j′Q′ . (3.20)
In (3.20), the partial derivative in each term of the sum is O(piR), except when
(j,Q) = (i, R) or (j′, Q′) = (i, R), and in those cases it is O(1).
If there is a ν-unstable fixed point p0 near p(t), then the Jacobian matrix
J = J(p0) has an eigenvalue λ ∈ C and left eigenvector wT such that wTJ = λwT
and <(λ) ≥ ν. We rescale w if necessary so that ‖w‖∞ = 1. To show that p0 has
a tendency to repel p(t), let r(t) = p(t)− p0 and we estimate the expected change
in the quantity |wTr(t)|2 = r(t)Tw¯wTr(t). For notational convenience, we abbre-
viate q(t), qˆ(t), r(t), ‖r(t)‖1 by q, qˆ, r, ρ, and we use E(· · · ) to denote conditional
expectation given p(t) = p. Note that r(t+ 1) = r + qˆ.
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E
(|wT(r + qˆ)|2) = E(wT(r + qˆ)wT(r + qˆ)) (3.21)
= E
(
wT(r + qˆ)wT(r + qˆ)
)
(3.22)
= E
(
wTrwTr + wTqˆwTr + wTrwTqˆ + wTqˆwTqˆ
)
(3.23)
= E
(
wTrwTr + wTqˆwTr + wTrwTqˆ + wTqˆwTqˆ
)
(3.24)
= |wTr|2 + 2<(w¯Tr¯wTq) + E (|wTqˆ|2) (3.25)
= |wTr|2 + 2<(w¯Tr¯wTq) + E (|wTqˆ|2) (3.26)
= |wTr|2 + 2< [w¯Tr¯wT (ξ(p)ε+ η(p)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2) (3.27)
= |wTr|2 + 2<[w¯Tr¯wT((ξ(p0) + J(p0)r +O(‖r‖21)r˜)ε+
+ η(p)ε2)] + E
(|wTqˆ|2) (3.28)
= |wTr|2 + 2< [w¯Tr¯wT ((J(p0)r +O(‖r‖21)r˜) ε+ η(p)ε2)]+
+ E
(|wTqˆ|2) (3.29)
= |wTr|2 + 2< [w¯Tr¯wT (J(p0)rε+ η(p)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(ερ3) (3.30)
= |wTr|2 + 2< [w¯Tr¯wT (Jrε+ η(p0)ε2 + (η(p)− η(p0))ε2)]+
+ E
(|wTqˆ|2)±O(ερ3) (3.31)
= |wTr|2 + 2< [w¯Tr¯wT (Jrε+ η(p0)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(ε2ρ2)±O(ερ3) (3.32)
= |wTr|2 + 2< [w¯Tr¯wT (λrε+ η(p0)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(ερ2(ρ+ ε)). (3.33)
The expression λrε+ η(p0)ε2 is problematic because it is unclear which term is
of leading order (it depends on the relative magnitudes of ρ, ε) and the two terms
could even have opposite signs and cancel each other. To deal with this, we let
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p1 = p0 − (λ)−1η(p0)ε and s(t) = p(t) − p1. By proving that we diverge from this
nearby point p1, we will have that we diverge from p0 as well. Let σ be ‖s(t)‖1 :
E
(|wT(s+ qˆ)|2) = E(wT(s+ qˆ)wT(s+ qˆ)) (3.34)
= . . . (3.35)
= |wTs|2 + 2<(w¯Ts¯wTq) + E (|wTqˆ|2) (3.36)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [w¯Ts¯wT (ξ(p)ε+ η(p)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2) (3.37)
= |wTs|2 + 2<[w¯Ts¯wT((ξ(p0) + J(p0)r +O(‖r‖21)r˜)ε+
+ η(p)ε2)] + E
(|wTqˆ|2) (3.38)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [w¯Ts¯wT ((J(p0)r +O(‖r‖21)r˜) ε+ η(p)ε2)]+
+ E
(|wTqˆ|2) (3.39)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [w¯Ts¯wT (J(p0)rε+ η(p)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(εσρ2) (3.40)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [w¯Ts¯wT (Jrε+ η(p0)ε2 + (η(p)− η(p0))ε2)]+
+ E
(|wTqˆ|2)±O(εσρ2) (3.41)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [w¯Ts¯wT (Jrε+ η(p0)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(ε2σρ)±O(εσρ2) (3.42)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [w¯Ts¯wT (λrε+ η(p0)ε2)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(εσρ(ρ+ ε)) (3.43)
= |wTs|2 + 2< [λεw¯Ts¯wT (r + (λ)−1η(p0)ε)]+ E (|wTqˆ|2)±
±O(εσρ(ρ+ ε)) (3.44)
= |wTs|2 + 2<(λεw¯Ts¯wTs) + E (|wTqˆ|2)±O(εσρ(ρ+ ε)) (3.45)
= (1 + 2<(λ)ε)|wTs|2 + E (|wTqˆ|2)±O(εσρ(ρ+ ε)). (3.46)
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However, we have by the definition of σ that: σ = ‖s(t)‖1.
s(t) = p(t)− p1
= p(t)− p0 + p0 − p1
= r(t) + (λ)−1η(p0)ε
From the above equation, we derive that σ = ρ+O( ε
ν
). Our analysis depends on
the effective ratio between ε, ν. Namely, we need to define a relation ε = f(ν) such
that for every ν > 0, the gameplay diverges from ν-stable equilibria, if ε ≤ f(ν).
Any such relation must fit the requirement that ε
ν
converges to zero as ε goes to
zero, so that p1 is a true approximation to p0. Here, we set ν = Θ(ε0.05). By
combining this with (3.46), we derive that:
E
(|wT(s+ qˆ)|2 | p(t) = p) ≥ (1+2<(λ)ε)|wTs|2+E (|wTqˆ|2)±O(ερ(ρ+ε)(ρ+ε0.95))
(3.47)
In the range ρ = O(ε0.4), the error term is of size O(ε2.2). On the other hand,
as we will show E
(|wTqˆ|2) = Ω(ε2.1) when we are near an unstable fixed point.
Lemma 3.5.4 Let Jp be the Jacobian of our game at a mixed Nash equilibrium
p and let wT be a left eigenvector corresponding to an eigenvalue with a positive
real part, then there exists player i and strategies R, R¯ with piR, piR¯ > 0 such that
wiR 6= wiR¯.
First, we will prove that any vector wT such that for each player i and strategies
R, R¯ of that player wiR = wiR¯ holds, is a left eigenvector of Jp with eigenvalue of
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zero. We will prove this by showing that for each column jQ of the jacobian the
sum of the terms corresponding to strategies played by any player i is equal to
0.The sum of all the terms of column jQ corresponding to player i is the partial
derivative of
∑
R ξiR with respective to pjQ . However
∑
R ξiR = 0 since ξ is a
tangent vector to the mixed strategy polytope. Hence, each partial derivative of
it will be zero as well, implying the desired
∑
iR
∂ξiR
∂pjQ
= 0
Starting from such a vector let’s examine what happens to the vector wTJp
when we alter some wiR entry of w such that piR = 0. However, on the iR row
of Jp there is at most one non zero element. That is the element of the diagonal
whose entry is
∑
R¯ piR¯(c
i(R¯) − ci(R)) ≤ 0, since p is a Nash equilibrium. Any
such change on w only affects the iR entry of wTJp whereas all other remain zero.
Therefore for any vector w with the property for each player i and strategies R, R¯
with piR, piR¯ > 0 wiR = wiR¯, we have that every jQ coordinate of w
TJp with
pjQ > 0 remains equal to 0. Hence, for such a vector w to be an eigenvector with
an nonzero eigenvalue it has to be the case that wiR = 0 for each piR > 0. In such
a case though, the only terms of Jp that come into play are the nonpositive terms
on the diagonal. The corresponding eigenvalue cannot have a positive real part.
Hence if Jp has an eigenvalue with a positive real then there must exist player i
and strategies R, R¯ with piR, piR¯ > 0 such that wiR 6= wiR¯.
Lemma 3.5.5 Let Jp be the Jacobian of our game at a mixed Nash equilibrium p
and let wT be a left eigenvector corresponding to an eigenvalue λ with positive real
part <(λ) ≥ ν > 0. Assume ‖w‖∞ = 1. Then for some constant c depending only
on the number of players and strategies, there exists a player i with strategies R, R¯
satisfying piR, piR¯ > 0 and |wiR − wiR¯| > cν.
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Proof: Let us partition the pairs of strategies (i, R) such that i is a player and R
is a strategy in Si into two sets A and B: A consists of the pairs such that piR > 0
and B consists of the pairs such that piR = 0. Consider the matrix Jp as composed
of blocks JAA, JAB, JBA, JBB, where, for instance, an entry ∂ξiR/∂pjQ belongs to
the submatrix JAB if (i, R) ∈ A and (j,Q) ∈ B.
Jp =
 JAA JAB
JBA JBB

By inspection of the formulas for ∂ξiR/∂pjQ, we see that JBA = 0 and JBB is a
diagonal matrix. Moreover, the diagonal entries of JBB are non-positive because
of our assumption that p is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Let us partition the components of our eigenvector w according to the partition
A,B, obtaining vectors wA, wB. We first claim that
‖wA‖∞ ≥ 1/M (3.48)
where M denotes the combined number of (player,strategy) pairs, i.e. the number
of rows and columns in the matrix Jp. If the largest component of w belongs to wA,
then (3.48) follows trivially from our assumption that ‖w‖∞ ≥ 1. Let (j,Q) ∈ B
be the index such that |wjQ| = 1, and let J∗,jQ denote the (j,Q) column of J . The
equation wTJ = λwT implies
wTAJA,jQ + w
T
BJB,jQ = λwjQ
wTAJA,jQ = (λ− JjQ,jQ)wTB
‖wTA‖∞‖JA,jQ‖1 ≥ ν − JjQ,jQ ≥ ν,
and the claim follows immediately because each entry of J lies in [−1, 1], hence
‖JA,jQ‖1 ≤M.
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Now for each player i let Ai be the subset of A consisting of pairs (i, R). Note
that Ai is nonempty for every i because not every probability piR can be equal to
zero. Let zi denote the average of the numbers wiR, (i, R) ∈ Ai, i.e.
zi =
1
|Ai|
∑
(i,R)∈Ai
wiR.
Define a vector v as follows:
viR =

zi if (i, R) ∈ Ai
0 otherwise.
Observe that vAJAA = 0 because for any (j,Q) ∈ A,
∑
(i,R)∈A
viRJiR,jQ = zj
JjQ,jQ + ∑
Q¯6=Q,(j,Q¯∈A)
JjQ¯,jQ
+∑
i 6=j
zi
 ∑
(i,R)∈A
JiR,jQ

and each of the terms in parentheses on the right side vanishes, using the formula
for the entries of J .
Now consider the equation
(wA − vA)TJAA = wTAJAA = λwTA. (3.49)
If (j,Q) ∈ A is such that |wjQ| ≥ 1/M then (3.49) implies
‖wA − vA‖∞‖JA,jQ‖1 ≥ ν/M,
hence ‖wA− vA‖∞ ≥ ν/M2. If (i, R) is such that |wiR− zi| ≥ ν/M2, it means that
wiR differs from the average of the numbers {wiR¯ | (i, R¯) ∈ A} by at least ν/M2.
Consequently there exists (i, R¯) ∈ A such that wiR − wiR¯ ≥ ν/M2.
We proceed to bound the term Ei,R,R¯
(|wTqˆ|2). We have assumed that the state of
the game is at most distance ρ away from a unstable Nash equilibrium. However,
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all such unstable Nash are mixed, since otherwise they would be stable. If the
unstable point is at a distance Ω(ε1/3) from its nearest pure strategy profile, then
any strategy profile within distance ρ = O(ε0.4) has players that choose at least 2
strategies with probability Ω(ε). As a result, during the wiggling step we wiggle
by ε/2 with probability at least 1/(nmaxi |Si|2). Let’s Γ denote |(1−ε2)|wT(p′(t+
1)− p(t)) + ε2wT(~1− p(t)) and let W express the wiggling size.
Ei,R,R¯
(|wTqˆ|2) = E[(|(1− ε2)|wT(p′(t+ 1)− p(t)) + ε2(~1− p(t)) +
+ W (wiR − wiR¯)
)2]
≥
(
Γ + ε
2
(wiR − wiR¯)
)2
+
(
Γ + ε
2
(wiR¯ − wiR)
)2
nmaxi |Si|2
= Ω((εν)2)
= Ω(ε2.1)
therefore the E
(|wTqˆ|2) term dominates the error term in (3.47) and since it is
positive (3.47) turns into:
E
(|wT(s+ qˆ)|2 | p(t) = p) ≥ (1 + 2<(λ)ε)|wTs|2 (3.50)
Equation (3.50) allows to conclude that with probability at least 1/2, start-
ing from an unstable time t0 we reach a state in which ρ = Θ(ε
0.4) after
no more than u = O((νε)−1 log(ρ/ε2)) = O(ε−1.05 log(1/ε)) time steps. We
have that cε0.4 ≤ ∑t0+u−1t=t0 ‖qˆ(t)‖1 (where c suitable constant). We will argue
that ξ(p(t))ε approximates the expectation of qˆ(t) close enough so as obtain
c¯ε0.4 ≤ ∑t0+u−1t=t0 ‖ξ(p(t))ε‖1 for some other constant c¯. The terms that we are
not taking in consideration in this summation are O(ε2) order terms plus the pos-
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sible O(ε) shifting of probabilites in the wiggling. The O(ε2) terms are negligible
since in the allowed time period can only add up to 0(ε0.95). Furthermore, the
shifting probability steps on each coordinate constitute a random walk with zero
drift and step size at most ε/2. The expectation of the translation of such a ran-
dom walk is equal to O(εu1/2) = 0(ε0.475), which is again dominated by ρ. Finally,
we can use Cauchy-Schwartz to lower bound
∑t0+u−1
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21. We have that
(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
ε2)(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21) ≥ (
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))ε‖1)2 ≥ c¯2ε0.8 (3.51)
uε2(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21) ≥ c¯2ε0.8 (3.52)
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21/2n ≥ c′
ε−0.15
log(1/ε)
(3.53)
Finally, we can prove that we are escape from the attraction of unstable point
p0 by moving to a point with significantly lower potential.
E(Ψ(p(t0 + u− 1))−Ψ(p(t0))) = E(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
(Ψ(p(t+ 1))−Ψ(p(t)))) (3.54)
=
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
E(Ψ(p(t+ 1))−Ψ(p(t))) (3.55)
=
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
(O(nε2)− Ω
(
1
n
‖ξ(p)‖21ε)
)
(3.56)
= O
( ε
ν
log(1/ε)
)
− Ω
(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
1
n
‖ξ(p)‖21ε
)
(3.57)
= O(ε0.95 log(1/ε))− Ω( ε
0.85
log(1/ε)
) (3.58)
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The foregoing discussion proves that if the state of the discrete-time process
wanders sufficiently close to a mixed Nash equilibrium that is not ν-weakly stable,
then the potential function Ψ will decrease by at least Ω(ε0.85/ log(1/ε)) in expec-
tation during a period lasting no longer than O(ε−1.05 log(1/ε)) steps. It remains
for us to prove a similar statement in case the discrete-time process wanders suf-
ficiently close to a fixed point p0 of ξ that is not even a ν-Nash equilibrium. In
that case there is some player i and strategy R ∈ Si such that ci(R¯) − ci(R) ≥ ν
for all R¯ such that p0
iR¯
> 0. We use a logarithmic potential function to prove that
the discrete-time process is repelled from p0. Specifically, let Yt = ln(p(t)iR). We
wish to estimate E[Yt+1 − Yt|p(t)]. We have
p(t+ 1)iR =
(1− ε)cost(R,t)piR∑
Q(1− ε)cost(Q,t)piQ
+NiR(t).
Let Zt denote the denominator of the first term on the right side of this equation.
Taking the logarithm of both sides and using the identity ln(x+ y) > ln(x) + y
x+y
,
we obtain
Yt+1 = ln
(
(1− ε)cost(R,t)piR∑
Q(1− ε)cost(Q,t)piQ
+NiR(t)
)
> ln(1− ε)cost(R, t) + Yt − ln(Zt) + NiR(t)
p(t+ 1)iR
.
We move Yt over to the left side and take the conditional expectation of both sides
with respect to p(t). For notational convenience, we omit the conditioning on p(t)
from all expectation operators.
E[Yt+1 − Yt] > ln(1− ε)E[cost(R, t)]− E[lnZt] + E
[
NiR(t)
p(t+ 1)iR
]
≥ ln(1− ε)E[cost(R, t)]− E[lnZt],
where the second line follows because E[NiR] ≥ 0 whenever piR is sufficiently small.
Now, to bound E[lnZt] we use the following derivation that is familiar from the
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analysis of the Hedge algorithm.
E[Zt] = E
[∑
Q
(1− ε)cost(Q,t)piQ
]
≤ E
[
1− ε
∑
Q
cost(Q, t)piQ
]
= 1− εE
[∑
Q
cost(Q, t)piQ
]
= 1− εci(t),
where ci(t) denotes the expected cost experienced by player i on the path it ran-
domly samples at time t. Taking the logarithm of both sides of the inequality
above, and using Jensen’s inequality,
E[lnZt] ≤ lnE[Zt] ≤ ln(1− εci(t)) ≤ −εci(t).
Plugging this bound on E[lnZt] into the lower bound for E[Yt+1 − Yt] from above,
we obtain
E[Yt+1 − Yt] ≥ ln(1− ε)ci(R, t) + εci(t)
≥ ε(ci(t)− ci(R, t))−O(ε2)
≥ εν −O(ε2),
using the fact that ci(R¯, t)− ci(R, t) ≥ ν for all R¯ such that p(t)iR¯ > 0.
Starting from any state in which piR(t) < ε
2, it must be the case that piR(t +
1) ≥ ε2 because we mix in ε2 times the uniform distribution after performing the
multiplicative update, and when piR = O(ε
2) it is not large enough to be eligible
for the Ω(ε) wiggling. So we may assume without loss of generality that we start
at time t0 such that Yt0 ≥ 2 ln(ε). The stochastic process Yt for t = t0, t0 + 1, . . .
experiences a constant positive drift bounded below by 1
3
εν, which persists as long
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as ci(t)− ci(R, t) ≥ ν/2. Since ci(t)− ci(R, t) is a Lipschitz function of the mixed
strategy profile p, we see that p must traverse a distance of Ω(ν) before the positive
drift bounded below by Ω(εν) ceases. It must cease after at most O(log(1/ε)/εν)
steps in expectation, because and Yt0 ≥ 2 ln(ε) and Yt is never a positive number.
Thus, as above, for some u = O(log(1/ε)/εν) we have
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖qˆ(t)‖1 = Ω(ν).
We may argue, as above, that replacing
∑ ‖qˆ(t)‖1 with ∑ ‖ξ(p(t))‖1 introduces
error terms of order O(ε0.475), which is of lower order than the Ω(ν) term on the
right side. Now, using Cauchy-Schwartz,
(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
ε2)(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21) ≥ (
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))ε‖1)2 ≥ c2ε0.1 (3.59)
uε2(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21) ≥ c2ε0.1 (3.60)
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
‖ξ(p(t))‖21/2n ≥ c′
ε−0.85
log(1/ε)
(3.61)
Finally, we can prove that we are escape from the attraction of unstable point
p0 by moving to a point with significantly lower potential.
E(Ψ(p(t0 + u− 1))−Ψ(p(t0))) = E(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
(Ψ(p(t+ 1))−Ψ(p(t)))) (3.62)
=
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
E(Ψ(p(t+ 1))−Ψ(p(t))) (3.63)
=
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
(O(nε2)− Ω
(
1
n
‖ξ(p)‖21ε)
)
(3.64)
= O
( ε
ν
log(1/ε)
)
− Ω
(
t0+u−1∑
t=t0
1
n
‖ξ(p)‖21ε
)
(3.65)
= O(ε0.95 log(1/ε))− Ω( ε
0.15
log(1/ε)
) (3.66)
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3.6 Standard Facts from Algebraic Geometry
In this section, we prove some standard facts from algebraic geometry that are
needed in Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.6.1 If I ⊆ R[x1, x2, . . . , xn] then the variety Z = V (I) is the union of
finitely many subsets Z1, Z2, . . . , Zm, each of which is a nonsingular quasi-affine
algebraic variety11, and therefore also a smooth manifold. For any polynomial
P ∈ I and any point z ∈ Zj (1 ≤ j ≤ m), the gradient vector ∇P at z is orthogonal
to the entire tangent space TzZj of the manifold Zj.
Proof: To prove the existence of the decomposition Z1, Z2, . . . , Zm, we induct on
the dimension of Z. Every algebraic variety is the union of finitely many irreducible
varieties ([93], Theorem I.3.1.1), so it suffices to prove the statement when Z is
irreducible. A zero-dimensional irreducible variety is a point, so the base case is
trivial. Assuming now that the theorem holds for all varieties of dimension less
than d, let Z be an arbitrary irreducible variety of dimension d. The nonsingular
points of Z form an open, hence quasi-affine, subset Z1 ([93], Section II.1.4) and the
singular points of Z form a closed proper subvariety ([93], Section II.1.4), whose
dimension is strictly smaller than d because Z is irreducible ([93], Theorem I.6.1.1).
By the induction hypothesis, the set of singular points of Z is the union of finitely
many nonsingular quasi-affine algebraic varieties Z2, . . . , Zm. This completes the
induction.
A nonsingular quasi-affine algebraic variety over R is a smooth manifold ([93],
Section II.2.3). For any z ∈ Zj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and any tangent vector v ∈ TzZj,
11A quasi-affine algebraic variety is any variety isomorphic to an open subset of an affine
algebraic variety
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let γ : [−1, 1] → Zj be any smooth parameterized curve in Zj such that γ(0) =
z, γ′(0) = v. Letting h(t) = P (γ(t)), we have
h′(0) = ∇P (γ(0)) · γ′(0) = ∇P (z) · v.
But h(t) = 0 for all t because P vanishes on Zj. Thus h
′(0) = 0, which establishes
that ∇P (z) · v = 0 as claimed.
We now present some definitions about tangent spaces and differentials, leading
up to Lemma 3.6.2 below, which presents a rigorous proof of one of the steps in
the proof of Theorem 3.4.2.
If k is a field and I ⊂ k[x1, . . . , xn] is an ideal, then the affine algebraic variety
X = V (I) is the set of points x ∈ kn such that P (x) = 0 for all P ∈ I. (In
algebraic geometry it is customary to denote kn by Ank and to call if affine n-
space over k.) The coordinate ring k[X] is the quotient ring k[x1, . . . , xn]/I. Note
that every P ∈ k[X] determines a well-defined function on X, because if P ≡ Q
(mod I) then P (x) = Q(x) for all x ∈ X. Functions from X to k defined in this
way are called regular functions on X.
An m-tuple of n-variate polynomials f1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , fm(x1, . . . , xn) collec-
tively determine a regular map f : Ank → Amk that sends every point (x1, . . . , xn)
to the point (f1(~x), . . . , fm(~x)). Note that a regular map uniquely determines a
homomorphism from k[y1, . . . , ym] to k[x1, . . . , xn] by mapping the polynomial yi
to fi for each i. If X = V (I), Y = V (J) are two affine algebraic varieties in Ank ,Amk ,
respectively, a regular map from X to Y is a mapping from the points of X to the
points of Y obtained by restricting a regular map f : Ank → Amk to X. A regular
map from X to Y uniquely determines a homomorphism from k[Y ] to k[X].
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If p ∈ X = V (I) ⊆ Ank , then the degree-1 polynomials x1 − p1, . . . , xn − pn
generate a maximal ideal of k[X] denoted by mp. Every function in k[X] that
vanishes at p belongs to mp. If m
2
p denotes the ideal generated by all products of
pairs of elements of mp (i.e., all the regular functions on X that vanish to second
order at p) then the quotient mp/m
2
p is a k-vector-space called the cotangent space
of X at p. The dual vector space TpX = (mp/m
2
p)
∗ is called the tangent space of
X at p.
If f : X → Y is a regular map and f(p) = q, then the induced homomorphism
h : k[Y ]→ k[X] sends mq to a subset of mp, hence it induces a well-defined linear
transformation from mq/m
2
q to mp/m
2
p. The dual of this linear transformation is
denoted by dpf : TpX → TqY.
It’s useful to consider how these ideas play out in the case of the projection
map that sends Ar+sk to Ask by mapping an (r + s)-tuple to its last s coordinates.
Denoting the coordinate rings of Ar+sk and Ask by k[x1, . . . , xr, y1, . . . , ys] = k[~x, ~y]
and k[y1, . . . , ys] = k[~y], respectively, then the projection map induces the ho-
momorphism k[~y] → k[~x, ~y] that simply includes k[~y] as a subring of k[~x, ~y]. If
X = V (I) ⊆ Ar+sk is an affine algebraic variety, then the regular map f defined
by the function composition X ↪→ Ar+sk → Ask induces the ring homomorphism
k[~y] → k[~x, ~y]/I that maps a polynomial in the variables y1, . . . , ys to its equiva-
lence class modulo I.
If a = (b, c) is a point of Ar+sk then a polynomial P ∈ k[~x, ~y] belongs to ma if
and only if it vanishes at a, and P belongs to m2a if and only if its Taylor expansion
at a has vanishing degree-0 and degree-1 terms, i.e. P (a) = 0 and ∇P (a) = 0. If
X = V (I) ⊆ Ar+sk and a = (b, c) is a point of X, then we can also consider ma and
m2a as ideals in k[X] — unfortunately, the notation doesn’t distinguish between
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these two meanings. In the case of ma the distinction is insignificant: an element
of ma in k[X] is an equivalence class (modulo I) of polynomials that vanish at a.
But with m2a we need to be more careful: a polynomial P represents an element of
m2a in k[X] if and only if it is equivalent (modulo I) to another polynomial Q that
satisfies Q(a) = 0 and ∇Q(a) = 0.
So, for example, suppose that the gradient ∇F (a) of a polynomial F ∈ I at a
point a = (b, c) ∈ X is a vector of the form (0, 0, . . . , 0, w1, . . . , ws) whose first r
components are 0 and whose last s components constitute a nonzero vector w. Let
P denote the degree-1 polynomial
∑s
j=1wj(yj − cj) ∈ k[y1, . . . , ys]. Then P ∈ m2a
because P is congruent, modulo I, to the polynomial Q = P − F , and Q satisfies
Q(a) = 0 and
∇Q(a) = ∇P (a)−∇F (a) = (0, ~w)− (0, ~w) = 0.
Thus, P is a nonzero element of mc/m
2
c that maps to zero in ma/m
2
a; i.e. the
induced map of cotangent spaces mc/m
2
c → ma/m2a is not one-to-one. Dualizing
this statement, we conclude that the differential daf is not surjective, i.e. its rank
is strictly less than s. Thus we have established the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6.2 Suppose X = V (I) ⊆ Ar+sk is an affine algebraic variety and f :
X → Ask is the composition of the inclusion and projection maps X ↪→ Ar+sk → Ask.
If F ∈ k[x1, . . . , xr, y1, . . . , ys] is a polynomial in I whose gradient ∇F (a) at a is
a vector of the form (0, ~w) for some nonzero w ∈ ks, then the differential daf :
TaX → TcAsk is a linear transformation of rank strictly less than s.
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CHAPTER 4
LOAD BALANCING WITHOUT REGRET IN THE BILLBOARD
MODEL
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we studied the performance of the multiplicative weights
learning algorithm in atomic congestion games. We showed that in almost all
such games, the multiplicative-weights learning algorithm results in convergence
to pure equilibria. Our setting was the standard full information one, where all
players have access to an accurate model of the underlying game. In this chapter,
we will be shifting away from the full information model and moving closer to the
reality of distributed systems.
Traditional learning theory assumes that after playing a round of a game, each
player can discover the cost of each possible strategy they could have used given
the actions of their opponents. This is a reasonable assumption in games with
infinitesimally small players, when actions of a single player have (essentially) no
effect on the system. It is also reasonable when the underlying game is well-defined
and common knowledge amongst all players. In distributed systems, however, this
assumption is rather unnatural. Indeed, different subsystems only need to share
some common functionality, whereas their inner workings can vary widely and even
be updated seamlessly, and every single process can have significant impact on the
behavior of the system.
Here, we take a significant additional step towards modeling distributed sys-
tems, by moving away from the standard full information setting. We consider load
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balancing in the so-called “bulletin board model” (similar to the ones in [10, 72]).
In this model players can find out the delay on all machines, but do not have
information on what their experienced delay would have been if they had selected
another machine. Namely, players can query the current state of the system but
cannot reliably predict the effect of their actions on it.
Although this change in the players’ information might appear benign at first
glance, it significantly alters the system behavior. Most importantly, the sys-
tem becomes symmetric because all players observe the same feedback signal and
respond to it using identical algorithms. Thus, at any point in time the play-
ers will sample their strategies from identical distributions, and our analysis only
needs to focus on how this distribution evolves over time. This is quite differ-
ent from our analysis of the full information setting in [58], which focused on the
symmetry-breaking that inevitably occurs when atomic players use the Hedge al-
gorithm in that setting. The symmetric setting that we study here allows for a
significantly simpler analysis, incorporating techniques that are standard in the
analysis of multiplicative-weight algorithms in learning theory (such as the use of
KL-divergence as a potential function) as well as some new techniques specific to
our setting (such as the martingale argument used to analyze the random walk in
Lemma 4.2.7). Another benefit of this analysis, in addition to its simplicity, is the
considerably better dependence of the convergence time on the number of players
and congestible resources.
Our Results and Techniques We show that a natural and simple multiplica-
tive weights algorithm achieves exponential improvement over the worst correlated
equilibrium, for a class of load-balancing games. Our main result is that using the
Hedge algorithm [43] in the bulletin board model, the expected makespan of the
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outcome is bounded byO(log n), exponentially better than the known lower bounds
for generic no-regret algorithms. We also show that Hedge continues to satisfy the
no-regret property even in the bulletin board model.
We utilize KL-divergence to express the distance between the mixed strategy
employed by a player at time t and her projected strategy at the symmetric Nash
equilibrium of the non-atomic version of the game. We show that when this dis-
tance is large enough, then it has a tendency to shrink. As a result we can predict
the evolution of the system by analyzing a random walk, that has negative drift
only when we are far away from the origin, an analysis that is of independent
interest.
Prior work The theory of learning in games has a long history; see [44] for an
extensive exposition of the literature in this field, which has primarily focused on
analyzing the convergence behavior of various classes of learning processes and
relating this behavior to Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and their re-
finements. See [18] for a more recent survey. The relationship between regret
minimization, calibrated forecasting, and correlated equilibrium has been studied
by [39, 38], and the connection between these topics and the price of anarchy was
first made in [15, 16]. Whereas these papers use regret bounds to establish static
equilibrium properties of the limiting distribution of play, our work requires directly
analyzing the dynamics of the stochastic process induced by these algorithms.
There has been considerable research in algorithmic game theory on under-
standing the behavior of adaptive procedures in load-balancing games and other
congestion games, including best-response dynamics [46] and replication proto-
cols [33]. These simple distributed protocols are well motivated, but they lack
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desirable learning-theoretic properties such as the no-regret property. An excep-
tion is [35], which analyzes a continuous-time process in non-atomic congestion
games that can be regarded as the continuum limit of the multiplicative-weights
learning process studied here. The shift from atomic to non-atomic congestion
games eliminates the distinction between the solution quality of correlated, mixed
Nash, and pure Nash equilibria, thus eliminating the motivating question in our
work while also evading most of the technical difficulties we address in analyzing
the discrete-time process in atomic congestion games. In the context of atomic
congestion games, Roughgarden [87] has recently shown that for a wide class of
games, including congestion games that satisfy a natural smoothness condition,
bounds on the price of anarchy automatically extend to the total price of anarchy,
when the global quality is defined to be the average cost.
In the previous chapter we introduced the study of the multiplicative weights
learning algorithm in atomic congestion games. Our setting was the standard
full information one, where all players have access to an accurate model of the
underlying game. We show that in almost all such games, the multiplicative-
weights learning algorithm results in convergence to pure equilibria. As discussed
earlier, shifting from the full information setting to the more realistic bulletin board
model invalidates the results of [58]; in particular this shift falsifies the prediction
of convergence to pure equilibria and necessitates an analysis of the dynamics using
completely different tools.
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4.2 System Analysis
In this section we study the performance of learning algorithms in load-balancing
games, i.e. congestion games on parallel links using the “bulletin board model”
in which players assess edge costs according to the actual cost incurred on that
edge, and not the hypothetical cost if the player had used it. We demonstrate
that using the Hedge algorithm in the “bulletin board model” the process remains
close to the symmetric fully mixed equilibrium of the non-atomic version of the
game. As a result, its performance is exponentially better than the worst correlated
equilibrium of the game.
In this section we first present the definition of the games we will be focusing on
(section 4.2.1). Next, we introduce the multiplicative updates algorithm and the
bulletin board model in section 4.2.2, where we prove that the no-regret property
persists in the bulletin board model. The main part of the analysis is in section
4.2.3, while we defer a few technical lemmas to section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Defining the Game and the Social Cost
The congestion game we consider in this section is an atomic congestion game with
a set of n players, each having weight wi = 1/n, and n edges with cost functions
ce(x). In each period t = 1, 2, . . ., each player chooses one edge e. We define ft(e)
to be the total amount of flow on edge e in period t, i.e. ft(e) = j/n where j
is the number of players choosing e in period t. We make the following standing
assumptions: for the edge e, the function ce(x) is twice continuously differentiable,
satisfies ce(0) = 0 and ce(1) ≤ 1, and for some positive constants A,B it satisfies
c′e(x) ≥ A and 0 ≤ c′′e(x) ≤ B for all x ∈ [0, 1]. In section 4.2.4, lemma 4.2.8 proves
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that these hypotheses imply the following inequalities for all x ∈ [0, 1]:
Ax ≤ ce(x) ≤ (B + 1)x (4.1)
As a measure of social cost, we adopt the maximum edge cost, maxe ce[fe(t)].
Interpreting players as jobs and edges as machines, this interpretation of the social
cost is equivalent to the makespan. The inequality Ax ≤ ce(x) ≤ (B + 1)x implies
that for any flow vector f the social cost maxe ce(fe) lies between A‖f‖∞ and
(B + 1)‖f‖∞. In particular, the social optimum is Θ(1/n). As we have mentioned
in the introduction, even for the extremely simple case in which ce(x) = x for all
e, x — i.e., a load-balancing game in which players schedule n jobs on n machines,
and the cost experienced by player i is proportional to the number of jobs on its
machine — the correlated equilibria of the game can be exponentially worse than
any Nash equilibrium.
4.2.2 The Learning Algorithm and the Bulletin Board
Model
To define the learning algorithm used by each player, we let ε be a small posi-
tive number (we’ll need to have ε ≤ 1/n3 for the analysis) and we introduce the
following notations.
ce[t] = ce(ft(e)), ce[1 : t] =
t∑
r=1
ce[r]
Z(t) =
∑
e∈E
exp(−εce[1 : t− 1]).
In period t, each player samples a random edge e with probability
P (e, t) =
exp(−εce[1 : t− 1])
Z(t)
, (4.2)
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i.e., to obtain P (e, t) from P (e, t− 1) we multiply it by exp(−εce[t− 1]) and then
renormalize all probabilities so that they sum to 1. At the first time step, the
algorithm samples an edge uniformly at random. This algorithm for specifying a
mixed strategy in period t is a version of the Hedge algorithm [43], modified so
that players assess edge costs according to the actual cost ce[t−1] incurred on that
edge, and not the hypothetical cost ce(ft−1(e) + 1) if the player had used it for
players that do not use the edge in this iteration. This model is usually referred
to as the bulletin board model. Using the well-known fact that Hedge itself is
a no-regret learning algorithm1 first we prove that the bulletin board variant of
Hedge is also a no-regret learning algorithm.
Proposition 4.2.1 The bulletin board variant of Hedge in any load-balancing
game with non-decreasing cost functions retains the -regret property.
Proof: Hedge is known to have the -regret property even in settings when the
cost functions of the edges can vary with time[43]. For the proof, let us consider
such a setting, where the actual cost/latency of each edge at period t as cte(x
t
e),
where xte is the load of the edge in question at period t. Naturally, all cost functions
cte are non-decreasing functions of xe. Now, we will define a new cost function C
t
e
as follows:
Cte(x) =

cte(x) if x ≤ xte
cte(x
t
e) otherwise.
Let us examine what this new cost function expresses. Under these cost functions,
the latency of any edge observed at time t is actually the worst possible and any
further increase on the load of any edge would have no effect on its latency. If this
1provided that ε converges to zero at an appropriate rate depending on t, e.g. ε(t) =
O(1/n3
√
t)
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optimistic view of the cost of the edges were actually true, then the algorithm we
have proposed would perform exactly as the Hedge algorithm. Hedge is known to
have the no-regret property, hence, the expected performance of the algorithm as
t goes to infinity is roughly as good as that of the best edge/strategy in hindsight
under this modified costs C. However, the actual cost of any strategy under the
real cost functions c, when taking into account the effect of the deviating player,
would be at least as bad as that under the optimistic costs C. As a result the
performance of our algorithm is also of -regret in regards to the best strategy in
hindsight under the true cost evaluations.
Although the proposition above in its current form will suffice for our purposes,
it can be straightforwardly extended to any no-regret algorithm and all congestion
games with non-decreasing cost functions.
4.2.3 Main Theorems
The main result of this section is the following bound on the distribution P (t)
determined by the Hedge algorithm (4.2).
Theorem 4.2.2 If all players sample their strategies at time t using the distri-
bution P (t) determined by the Hedge algorithm (4.2), then there exist positive
constants α, β0 such that for all times t and all β > β0 it holds with probability at
least 1− exp(−αβ) that maxe |P (e, t)| < 2β/n.
Combining this theorem with Chernoff bounds leads to a price-of-anarchy type
result — the long-run average social cost exceeds the social optimum by a factor
of at most O(log n). More precisely:
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Corollary 4.2.3 In the setting of Theorem 4.2.2, there exist constants c1, c2 such
that for all t, with probability at least 1− 1/nc1, the flow ft sampled by the players
satisfies
max
e
ce(ft(e)) ≤ c2 log n
n
.
The proof of Theorem 4.2.2 rests on analyzing a stochastic process KL(t) de-
fined as the KL-divergence between the Nash equilibrium and P (t). Let Q be the
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the non-atomic congestion game (where all players
play the same strategy) with edge set E and cost functions (ce)e∈E. KL-divergence
between P and Q is defined as
KL(t) =
∑
j∈E
Q(j) log (Q(j)/P (j, t)) .
KL-divergence measures the distance2 between the distributions Q(j) and P (j, t).
It is zero if they are equal and positive otherwise. We will show that when this
distance is large enough, then it has a tendency to shrink (Lemma 4.2.6). This
reduces the analysis of KL(t) to exploring the behavior of a kind of random walks,
which face negative drift only when they are far away from the origin. Lemma
4.2.7 provides this analysis.
Theorem 4.2.2 will follow from proving an exponential tail bound for KL(t).
Theorem 4.2.4 There exist positive constants α, β0 such that Pr(KL(t) > β/n) <
e−αβ for all β > β0.
We next sketch the proof of this tail bound. In all of the following arguments,
“log” denotes the natural logarithm function. We’ll need the following technical
lemma.
2although it is not a true distance metric since it is not symmetric
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Lemma 4.2.5
logZ(t+ 1)− logZ(t) ≤ (exp(−ε)− 1)
∑
e
P (e, t)c(e, t).
Proof: We will use the fact that if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, then exp(−εy) ≤ 1+y(exp(−ε)−1);
this can be verified by checking that the left side is a convex function, the right side
is a linear function, and the left and right sides are equal when y is an endpoint of
the interval [0, 1].
Z(t+ 1)
Z(t)
=
∑
e e
−εce[1:t−1]e−εce[t]
Z(t)
≤
∑
e e
−εce[1:t−1] [1 + ce[t](e−ε − 1)]
Z(t)
= 1 +
(
e−ε − 1)∑
e
P (e, t)ce[t].
The lemma follows by taking the logarithm of both sides and using the identity
log(1 + y) ≤ y.
We denote the difference KL(t+ 1)−KL(t) as ∆t.
Lemma 4.2.6 The stochastic process KL(t) satisfies
E[∆t |P (t)] ≤ −(ACε/n)KL(t) + Cε/n2. (4.3)
In particular, KL(t) drifts to the left at a rate of Ω(ε/n2) whenever it is greater
than 2/(An).
Proof: A simple calculation using equation (4.2) using Lemma 4.2.5 justifies the
bound
log
(
P (e, t)
P (e, t+ 1)
)
≤ εce[t]−
(
1− e−ε)∑
e′∈E
P (e′, t)ce′ [t].
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Taking a weighted average of the above inequalities, weighted by Q(e), we
obtain
∆t =
∑
e
Q(e)
(
log
P (e, t)
P (e, t+ 1)
)
≤ ε
∑
e
Q(e)ce[t]− (1− exp(−ε))
∑
e
P (e, t)ce[t].
Now, using c¯e[t] to denote E[ce[t] | P (t)] and using ce[f¯(t)] denote ce(P (e, t)/n),
we may take the conditional expectation of both sides and apply the identity
1− exp(−ε) > ε− 1
2
ε2 to obtain:
E [∆t | P (t)] ≤ ε
∑
e
[Q(e)− P (e, t)]c¯e[t] + ε
2
2
∑
e
P (e, t)c¯e[t]
≤ ε(Q− P (t)) · c[f¯(t)] + ε(Q− P (t)) · (c¯[t]− c[f¯(t)]) + ε
2
2
.
We denote the usual convex potential function
∑
e
∫ xe
0
ce(y) dy as Φ(~x). As a result,
we have for the first term above that
ε(Q− P (t)) · ∇Φ(P (t)) ≤ ε [Φ(Q)− Φ(P (t))] ≤ −Aε‖P (t)−Q‖22,
where the last inequality uses the fact the Q minimizes Φ, combined with our
assumption that c′e(y) ≥ A for all y. It is not hard to prove that for some constant
C, the additional inequalities
‖P (t)−Q‖22 ≥
C
n
KL(t), (4.4)
ε(Q− P (t)) · (c¯[t]− c[f¯(t)]) + 1
2
ε2 ≤ Cε/n2 (4.5)
hold (Lemmas 4.2.11 and 4.2.12 in section 4.2.4), implying that the stochastic
process KL(t) satisfies
E[∆t |P (t)] ≤ −(ACε/n)KL(t) + Cε/n2, (4.6)
as claimed.
83
Next we give the submartingale argument to show that the fact that KL(t) has
negative drift when its large implies that the probability of KL(t) > β/n is expo-
nentially small in β as claimed by Theorem 4.2.4.
Lemma 4.2.7 Let (Yt)t≥0 be a random walk satisfying the following for some con-
stant M ≥ 1:
bounded differences: |Yt+1 − Yt| ≤ 1;
negative drift: E(Yt+1 − Yt |Yt) ≤ −1/M whenever Yt ≥M.
Then there exist constants α, λ0 such that for all λ > λ0 and t ≥ 0, we have
Pr(Yt > λM) < e
−αλ.
Proof: For t ∈ N, r ∈ R+, let E(r, t) denote the event that Yt > M + r + 1. For
0 ≤ s ≤ t let E(r, t, s) denote the event
E(r, t, s) = {Ys−1 ≤M} ∩ {Ys, Ys+1, . . . , Yt−1 > M}
∩ {Yt > M + r + 1}.
Note that the events E(r, t, s) (s = 0, 1, . . . , t) are disjoint and their union is E(r, t).
Our upper bound on Pr(E(r, t)) will be established by proving separate upper
bounds on each probability Pr(E(r, t, s)).
To this end, for a specified value of s, define a random variable q = min{i ≥
s |Yi ≤M} and a stochastic process
Zi =

MYi + i if s ≤ i ≤ q
MYq + q if i > q.
Our negative drift assumption for the stochastic process (Yi)i≥0 implies that the
process (Zi)i≥0 is a supermartingale:
E [Zi |Zs, . . . , Zi−1] ≤ Zi−1.
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Also, the bound |Zi+1 − Zi| ≤M + 1 holds with probability 1. Applying Azuma’s
supermartingale inequality, for every γ > 0 we have
Pr (Zt − Zs > γ) < exp
(
− γ
2
2(M + 1)2(t− s)
)
.
If event E(r, t, s) occurs, then we have
Zt = MYt + t > M(M + r + 1) + t
= M2 +Mr +M + t
Zs = MYs + s ≤M(Ys−1 + 1) + s
≤M2 +M + s
Zt − Zs > Mr + (t− s).
Therefore,
Pr(E(r, t, s)) < exp
(
− [Mr + (t− s)]
2
2(M + 1)2(t− s)
)
.
Summing over s, we obtain
Pr(E(r, t)) <
t∑
s=0
exp
(
− [Mr + (t− s)]
2
2(M + 1)2(t− s)
)
.
Let k = br(M + 1)/2c, and break up the sum into terms in which t − s ≤ k and
85
those in which t− s > k.
Pr(E(r, t)) <
k∑
u=0
exp
(
− [Mr + u]
2
2(M + 1)2u
)
+
∞∑
u=k+1
exp
(
− [Mr + u]
2
2(M + 1)2u
)
<
k∑
u=0
exp
(
− M
2r2
2(M + 1)2k
)
+
∞∑
u=k+1
exp
(
− u
2
2(M + 1)2u
)
< (k + 1) exp
(
− r
2
8k
)
+
∫ ∞
k
exp
(
− x
2(M + 1)2
)
dx
≤ (k + 1) exp
(
− r
2
4r(M + 1)
)
+ 2(M + 1)2 exp
(
−
1
2
r(M + 1)− 1
2(M + 1)
)
≤
[
1+
r(M + 1)
2
+2(M + 1)2e1/4
]
e−
r
4(M+1)
For r > e1/4 the last line implies that Pr(E(r, t)) < [1 + 3r(M + 1)2] e−r/8M .
By setting r = λM −M − 1 > e1/4 and c = 1
8
+ 1
8M
, we obtain
Pr(Yt > λM) <
[
1 + 3(λM −M − 1)(M + 1)2] e−λ8 +c,
which shows that the lemma holds whenever α < 1/8 and λ0 is a sufficiently large
constant depending on α and M .
Proof of Theorems 4.2.2 and 4.2.4:
Let Yt = KL(t)/ε. We can show that for all t ≥ 0, |Yt+1−Yt| ≤ 1. Indeed, since
KL(t+ 1)−KL(t) = ∑j∈E Q(j) log (P (j, t)/P (j, t+ 1)) and each of the terms of
the form P (j, t)/P (j, t+ 1) lies in the [e−ε, eε] interval, Yt satisfies the property of
bounded difference of Lemma 4.2.7.
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We apply Lemma 4.2.7 with M = (A + C)n2/AC. Moreover, the inequality
E[∆t |P (t)] ≤ −(ACε/n)KL(t) + Cε/n2 implies that there exist positive con-
stants α, β0 such that Pr(KL(t) > β/n) < e
−αβ for all β > β0. This proves
Theorem 4.2.4. The bound on maxe |P (e, t)| in Theorem 4.2.2 now follows by
combining the KL-divergence bound in Theorem 4.2.4 with Lemma 4.2.9 below,
which bounds the infinity-norms of two distributions P,Q in terms of their corre-
sponding KL-divergence.
4.2.4 Technical Lemmas
The following technical lemmas complete the analysis the performance of Hedge:
Lemma 4.2.8 Let ce(x) be a function in C
2([0, 1]) satisfying
• ce(0) = 0, ce(1) ≤ 1;
• for all x ∈ [0, 1], c′e(x) ≥ A;
• for all x ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ c′′e(x) ≤ B.
Then Ax ≤ ce(x) ≤ A(B + 1)x for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: For all x we have ce(x) =
∫ x
0
c′e(y) dy ≥
∫ x
0
Ady, which establishes that
Ax ≤ ce(x). To establish the upper bound on ce(x), we first use the mean value
theorem to deduce that there exists some x ∈ [0, 1] such that
c′e(x) =
ce(1)− ce(0)
1− 0 ≤ 1.
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If there exists y ∈ [0, 1] such that c′e(y) > B + 1, then a second application of the
mean value theorem would imply the existence of z ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
|c′′e(z)| =
∣∣∣∣c′e(y)− c′e(x)y − x
∣∣∣∣ > B,
contradicting our hypothesis about ce. Hence c
′
e(y) ≤ B + 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
Now, for all x ∈ [0, 1], ce(x) =
∫ x
0
c′e(y) dy ≤
∫ x
0
B + 1 dy, which establishes that
ce(x) ≤ (B + 1)x.
Lemma 4.2.9 If P,Q are two probability distributions on a finite set S, satisfying
‖P‖∞ ≥ 2‖Q‖∞, then KL(Q;P ) ≥ ‖P‖∞16 .
Proof: Let s0 be a point at which P (s0) = ‖P‖∞. Let a = Q(s0), b = P (s0). Then
KL(Q;P ) = Q(s0) log(
Q(s0)
P (s0)
) +
∑
s 6=s0
Q(s) log(
Q(s)
P (s)
)
= a log(
a
b
) + (1− a)
∑
s 6=s0
Q(s)
1− a
[
− log P (s)
Q(s)
]
Since
∑
s 6=s0 Q(s)/(1 − a) = 1, the sum on the right side can be interpreted as a
weighted average of value of the convex function − log(x) at the points P (s)/Q(s).
Using Jensen’s inequality, we see that this is greater than or equal to − log(x)
evaluated at the point
x =
∑
s 6=s0
(
Q(s)
1− a
)
P (s)
Q(s)
=
∑
s 6=s0
P (s)
1− a =
1− b
1− a.
Hence we have derived the first line of the following series of bounds.
KL(Q;P ) ≥ a log
(a
b
)
+ (1− a) log
(
1− a
1− b
)
=
∫ b
a
x− a
x(1− x) dx
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The integrand is a strictly increasing function of x for 0 < x < 1, so letting
c = (a+ b)/2 we have
∫ b
a
x− a
x(1− x) dx ≥
∫ b
c
x− a
x(1− x) dx
≥ (b− c) c− a
c(1− c) =
1
4
(b− a)2
c(1− c)
≥ (b− a)
2
4b
.
The assumption that ‖P‖∞ ≥ 2‖Q‖∞ implies a ≤ b/2, and the lemma follows
immediately.
Lemma 4.2.10 In a non-atomic load balancing game3 with n edges whose cost
functions satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.2.8, the Nash equilibrium Q satisfies
for every edge e:
A
(B + 1)n
≤ Q(e) ≤ B + 1
An
Proof: Since Q is a Nash equilibrium, there exists4 a z > 0 such that ce(Q(e)) = z
for all e. Since there is some e0 such that Q(e0) ≤ 1/n, we have z ≤ (B + 1)/n.
Now for any edge e, the relations AQ(e) ≤ ce(Q(e)) and ce(Q(e)) = z ≤ (B+ 1)/n
together imply that Q(e) ≤ (B + 1)/(An). Similarly, the existence of an edge e1
such that Q(e1) ≥ 1/n implies that z ≥ A/n from which it follows that Q(e) ≥
A/((B + 1)n) for all e.
3i.e. a non-atomic parallel-links congestion game
4Since ce(0) = 0 for all e, in the symmetric Nash Q of the non-atomic congestion game we
have that Q(e), ce(Q(e) > 0 for all e. Otherwise, players could decrease their expected latency
by utilizing the empty resource.
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Lemma 4.2.11 For any distributions P,Q on an n-element set S, if C/n ≤
Q(s) ≤ 1/2 for all s ∈ S, then
‖P −Q‖22 ≥
C
n
KL(Q;P ).
Proof: Let x(s) = P (s)−Q(s). We have
KL(Q;P ) = −
∑
s
Q(s) log
P (s)
Q(s)
= −
∑
s
Q(s) log
(
1 +
x(s)
Q(s)
)
.
Using the identity log(1 + x) ≥ x− x2, valid for −1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1, we obtain
KL(Q;P ) ≤ −
∑
s
Q(s)
[
x(s)
Q(s)
− x(s)
2
Q(s)2
]
≤
∑
s
x(s)2
Q(s)
≤ n
C
‖x‖22,
from which the lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 4.2.12 Let P be any probability distribution on edges and let f = (fe)e∈E
be the random flow vector obtained by letting n players each sample an edge in E
according to P and send 1/n units of flow on that edge. Let c¯, c denote the vectors
c¯e = E(ce(fe)), ce = ce(E(fe)) = ce(P (e)),
respectively. There is a constant C such that
ε(Q− P ) · (c¯− c) + 1
2
ε2 ≤ Cε
n2
.
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Proof: Let us fix our attention on one edge e and let x0 = P (e). Taylor’s theorem
with remainder ensures that for all x ∈ [0, 1],
c′e(x0)(x− x0) ≤ ce(x)− ce(x0) ≤ c′e(x0)(x− x0) +
B
2
(x− x0)2
This holds, since 0 ≤ c′′e(y) ≤ B for all y. Plugging the random variable fe into
this bound, we find that
ce ≤ c¯e ≤ ce + c′e(x0)E(fe − x0) +
B
2
E((fe − x0)2)
0 ≤ c¯e − ce ≤ B
2
Var(fe).
If zi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) denotes a collection of independent Bernoulli random variables
with Pr(zi = 1) = P (e), then the random variable fe has the same distribution as
1
n
∑n
i=1 zi, so its variance is
Var(fe) =
1
n2
· n · Var(zi) = P (e)(1− P (e))
n
.
To bound the dot product (Q − P ) · (c¯ − c) from above, we first note that when
Q(e) < P (e) we have (Q(e)− P (e))(c¯e − ce) ≤ 0. The remaining terms of the dot
product according to lemma 4.2.10 satisfy Q(e) − P (e) ≤ Q(e) ≤ (B + 1)/(An),
and P (e)(1 − P (e))/n ≤ P (e)/n ≤ Q(e)/n ≤ (B + 1)/(An2). Hence the dot
product is bounded above by B
2
∑
e
B+1
An
· B+1
An2
= B
2
(
B+1
An
)2
. Recalling that ε ≤ 1/n2,
we see that the inequality in the statement of the lemma is satisfied by setting
C = 1
2
+ B
2
(
B+1
A
)2
.
4.3 Summary
Given that online learning is quite thoroughly understood in the setting of a single
learner [19], it is rather natural to hope for a thorough understanding of systems
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consisting of multiple learners, but the characterization of such systems in existing
work is far from thorough. Several recent papers have pursued this direction in the
context of no-regret learning [15, 16, 87], but their findings have been limited to
games in which the no-regret property by itself suffices to establish bounds on the
overall system performance. Our work establishes that in many cases of interest
— and specifically in settings closely related to the reality of distributed systems
— this optimistic view does not materialize. Two systems consisting of no-regret
learners can exhibit huge performance differences. Nevertheless, our result is in
essence a positive result. It shows that “natural” candidates (e.g. Hedge) of no-
regret algorithms perform well. An interesting direction for future research is the
question of how much we can extend the family of allowable no-regret algorithms
while still allowing for strong provable performance bounds on the overall system
behavior.
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CHAPTER 5
LEARNING INSPIRED EQUILIBRIA AND COMPUTATION
5.1 Introduction
One of the main goals of game theory is to predict the behavior of self-interested
agents that interact with each other. The proposed solution concepts usually come
in the form of equilibrium notions. Nash equilibrium constitutes the most predom-
inant such concept. Defined as (possibly mixed) strategy profiles against which no
profitable deviation exists, Nash equilibria are both natural and convincing as a so-
lution concept. Furthermore, in his much celebrated paper [76], John Nash showed
that Nash equilibria are universal, in the sense that every finite game exhibits at
least one.
Within the CS community, however, it is widely accepted that a solution con-
cept should also be efficiently computable[77]. The CS sentiment is accurately
captured in Kamal Jains quote: “If your laptop cant find it then neither can the
market”. In recent years there has been a lot of work on characterizing the compu-
tational complexity of finding Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, most results in this
area tend to be negative [27],[24] and currently the attention of the research com-
munity is mostly focused on approximation algorithms and identifying tractable
special cases. Although the importance of these current approaches is beyond
doubt, if we take a step back we see that incorporating learning theory into this
framework can lead us to new insights.
Looking back at the desirable properties of a solution concept, we see that
universality and computational efficiency are well-defined, whereas what it means
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for a solution concept to be convincing is largely open to interpretation. Learning
theory can actually provide us with an elegant solution to this predicament. The
legitimacy of a solution concept can be characterized by its robustness to multiple
learning dynamics. In fact, under this interpretation Nash (or even correlated)
equilibria can be cast into doubt since there exist simple games in which most
natural dynamics (or even their averages) tend to not to converge not to converge
to any single point[88]. In such games any single-point behavioral solution is bound
to fail.
A more promising approach would be to consider the set of all (coarse) cor-
related equilibria, since they are closely connected with the behavior of no-regret
dynamics (see Chapter 2). Unfortunately, correlated equilibria offer no insights
on the behavior of some rather common dynamics such as best-response dynam-
ics. Sink equilibria[46] on the other hand are specifically tailored to capture the
long-run behavior of best response dynamics, but are inconsistent with any other
learning behavior (e.g. AMS-dynamics).
However, there exist set-valued fundamental solution concepts, whose predic-
tions can be shown to be closely attuned to the actual behavior of several natural
learning dynamics. CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) sets, introduced by
Basu and Weibull [11] and CUBR (Closed Under Better Responses) sets [81], in-
troduced by Ritzberger and Weibull, are both set-wise extensions of strict Nash
equilibria. A CURB (CUBR) set is a cartesian product of pure strategy sets such
that each player’s component contains all best (weakly better replies) replies to it-
self given any product of mixed actions of his opponents with support within their
CURB sets. A CURB (CUBR) set is said to be minimal if it does not contain any
proper subset that is also a CURB (CUBR) set.
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Several plausible learning processes eventually settle down in a minimal CURB
set (see the works of Hurkens[56], Sanchirico[90] , Young[107] and Fudenberg and
Levine[44]). Moreover, there exist learning procedures that eventually settle down
in minimal CUBR sets but not necessarily to minimal CURB sets (see [56] and[57]).
CUBR sets are asymptotically stable for the class of payoff-positive selection dy-
namics (which contains replicator dynamics as well as AMS-dynamics)[81]. Finally,
(minimal) CURB sets can be computed in polynomial time in the case of extensive
games[79] as well as two player canonical forms games [13].
These solution concepts are based on the assumption that each player’s belief
about the strategies of the other players are independent. However this assumption
can be put into question. Indeed, the choices of all players depend on the common
history of play. History, therefore may very well act as a correlation mechanism
and self-interested players have an incentive to keep track of such correlations and
exploit them. In the next section we will be discussing solution concepts which
allow for correlated beliefs about opponents’ play.
5.1.1 Strong CURB and CUBR Sets
In this chapter, we will look into learning inspired solution concepts such as strong
CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) and CUBR (Closed Under weakly Better
Replies) sets. A strong CURB (CUBR) set is a cartesian product of pure strategy
sets such that each player’s component contains all best (weakly better) responses
to itself given any joint probability distributions of its opponents over the set. A
strong CURB (CUBR) set is said to be minimal if it does not contain any proper
subset that is also a strong CURB (CUBR) set. Such minimal sets exist in all
finite games and are asymptotically stable for a great number of natural learning
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dynamics. Both strong CURB (CUBR) sets are refinements of the notion of the
CURB set and every minimal CURB set is contained in a minimal strong CURB
set as well as a minimal strong CUBR set, so stability properties for CURB sets
(for any learning procedure) carry over to strong CURB (CUBR) sets as well. In
finite games CUBR and strong CUBR sets coincide, but the definition of strong
CURB sets will he helpful to provide a unified treatment of strong CURB and
CUBR sets. Moreover, there exist learning procedures that eventually settle down
in minimal strong CURB (CUBR) sets but not necessarily to minimal CURB sets
(see [56] and[57]). Furthermore, we prove that we can also compute all minimal
strong CURB (as well as CUBR) sets for any normal form game with a constant
number of players in polynomial time. As a result, these concepts are shown to be
universal, robust to different learning dynamics and efficiently computable for any
normal form game with a constant number of players.
The algorithms for computing minimal strong CURB (CUBR) sets are based
on the ideas presented in [13] for the computation of CURB sets in the case of
two player normal form games. The strong CURB set solution concept has also
appeared under the names of primitive formations (Harsanyi and Selten[50] for the
case of finite extensive-form games) and in independent working papers by Klimm
and Weibull[59] (as sCURB sets) and by Zapechelnyck [108](as strict curb sets).
In [59], Klimm and Weibull also extend Benisch etal algorithm to one that finds
strong CURB sets in finite games and runs in polynomial time if the number of
players is a constant. Their algorithm involves an initialization phase that leads to
better performance than the original Benisch algorithm when applied to random
two player games, where the notions of CURB and strong CURB sets coincide.
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5.2 Preliminaries
Let G = {N,S1, S2, . . . , Sn, u1, u2, . . . , un} be a finite game with a set of players
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We also extend the player’s utilities over probability distribu-
tions in the usual multilinear manner. Let m = maxi |Si|. Also, let S = Πni=1Si
and S−i = Πj 6=iSi. For a given set X, we denote as ∆(X) the set of probability
distribution over X. For a distribution p ∈ ∆(S), we denote as pi ∈ ∆(Si) the
marginal distribution of player i on Si. Similarly, we denote as p−i the marginal
of ∆(S−i). Specifically,
pi(si) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i) for si ∈ Si
p−i(s−i) =
∑
si∈Si
p(si, s−i) for s−i ∈ S−i
For p ∈ ∆(S), let BRi(p−i) denote the set of pure best replies to the distribution
p−i. Also, if x ∈ ∆(Si), let BTRi(x, p−i) denote the set of pure weakly better
replies to (possibly mixed) strategy x of player i, given the distribution p−i of
his opponents. Finally, if F ⊂ ∆(S), we denote as BRi(F ) = ∪p−i∈F−iBRi(p−i)
and BR(F ) = Πni=1BRi(F ). Similarly, for F ⊂ ∆(S) and X ⊂ Si, we denote
as BTRi(X,F ) = ∪x∈∆(X) ∪p−i∈F−i BTRi(x, p−i) and BTR(X1, X2, . . . , Xn, F ) =
Πni=1BTRi(Xi, F ).
Definition: A (non-empty) cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is a CURB set iff
BR(Πni=1∆(Pi)) ⊂ P .
Definition: A (non-empty) cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is a strong CURB
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set iff BR(∆(Πni=1Pi)) ⊂ P .
Definition: A (non-empty) cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is a CUBR set iff
BTR(P1, P2, . . . , Pn,Π
n
i=1∆(Pi)) ⊂ P .
Definition: A (non-empty) cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is a strong CUBR
set iff BTR(P1, P2, . . . , Pn,∆(Π
n
i=1Pi)) ⊂ P .
5.3 Algorithms for Computing Strong Minimal CURB and
CUBR Sets
The algorithms for computing minimal strong CURB (CUBR) sets are based on
the observation that if a cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is not a strong CURB
(CUBR) set, then this can be verified efficiently by solving a linear feasibility
problem (LFP). The main idea behind both these algorithms is to start from a
random pure strategy profile s1 × s2 × · · · × sn and keep iteratively increasing the
sets Pi, by adding the violating strategies qi until we reach a fixed point. The
resulting set will be the minimal CURB (CUBR) set which contains the strategy
profile s1× s2× · · ·× sn. From that point on, finding truly minimal (set inclusion-
wise) CURB (CUBR) sets is trivial and can be accomplished even by pairwise
comparison of all the mn resulting strong CURB (CUBR) sets. However, we will
also discuss ways to expedite this process.
Since both algorithms for finding minimal strong CURB sets as well as minimal
strong CUBR sets are rather similar to each other, we will focus on analyzing one
of the two (i.e. the one for strong CUBR sets). We will also describe how this
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algorithm can be transformed into one that returns all minimal strong CURB sets.
We begin, by providing an alternate characterization of strong CUBR sets.
Proposition 5.3.1 A (non-empty) cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is not a
strong CUBR set iff there exist player i ∈ N and strategies pi ∈ Pi, qi ∈ Si \ Pi
and strategy distribution r−i ∈ ∆(Πj 6=iPi) s.t. ui(qi, r−i) ≥ ui(pi, r−i).
Proof: A (non-empty) cartesian product P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is a strong CUBR set
iff BTR(P1, P2, . . . , Pn,∆(Π
n
i=1Pi)) ⊂ P . Equivalently, P is a strong CUBR set iff
for all players i ∈ N , BTR(Pi,∆(Πni=1Pi)) ⊂ Pi.
Next, we will show that BTRi(X,F ) = ∪x∈∆(X) ∪p−i∈F−i BTRi(x, p−i) is
equivalent to ∪x∈X ∪p−i∈F−i BTRi(x, p−i). Indeed, for any p−i ∈ F−i, there
exists a pure strategy in X such that it experiences minimal utility amongst
all strategies x ∈ ∆(X). We denote that strategy as w(X, p−i). Hence,
BTRi(X,F ) = ∪p−i∈F−i ∪x∈∆(X) BTRi(x, p−i) = ∪p−i∈F−iBTRi(w(X, p−i), p−i) =
∪p−i∈F−i ∪x∈X BTRi(x, p−i) = ∪x∈X ∪p−i∈F−i BTRi(x, p−i).
As a result, P = Πni=1Pi ⊂ S is a strong CUBR set iff for all players i ∈
N , ∪x∈Pi ∪p−i∈∆(P−i) BTRi(x, p−i) ⊂ Pi. However, the negation of this condition
implies exactly that there exist strategy pi ∈ Pi, and distribution r−i ∈ ∆(Πj 6=iPi)
and strategy qi ∈ Si \ Pi s.t. ui(qi, r−i) ≥ ui(pi, r−i).
In fact, it suffices to check for strategy distributions r−i ∈ Πj 6=iPi, which implies
the equivalence between strong CUBR sets and CUBR sets, but for consistency
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between the treatments of strong CURB and CUBR sets we will utilize character-
ization 5.3.1.
Below follows the process for finding given a set P = Πni=1Pi, the set of strategies
Qi which can be cast as weakly better replies to some strategy pi ∈ Pi, as a result of
a possibly correlated probability distribution of his opponents actions over Πj 6=iPi.
Input: set Pi, set Si, set Πj 6=iPj, ui
Output: set Qi of weakly-better-replies
Qi = ∅;
foreach strategy qi ∈ Si \ Pi do
foreach strategy pi ∈ Pi do
if exists r−i ∈ ∆(Πj 6=iPj) such that ui(qi, r−i) ≥ ui(pi, r−i) then
Qi = Qi ∪ qi;
end
end
end
return Qi;
Algorithm 1: Procedure Find-Weakly-Better-Replies
We will show that this process runs in polynomial time in normal form games
with a constant number of players. Indeed, the line exists r−i ∈ ∆(Πj 6=iPj) such
that ui(qi, r−i) ≥ ui(pi, r−i), corresponds to a linear feasibility problem since both
conditions are linear relations over |Πj 6=iPj| ≤ mn−1 many variables. Linear fea-
sibility problems as easier than LPs (they are LPs with no objective) and can be
solved in low-order polynomial time that we denote as LFP(). The two outer loops
can lead at most to m2 calls to the LFP problem, so the overall complexity of the
algorithm is O(m2LFP (mn−1)).
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The main routine finds for each pure strategy profile the minimal strong CUBR
that contains it. In order to do so it iteratively executes the procedure Find-
Weakly-Better-Replies to examine whether its current cartesian product of pure
strategies is closed under weakly better replies.
Input: outcome s1 × s2 × · · · × sn, action sets S1, S2, . . . , Sn, utilities
u1, u2, . . . , un
Output: Minimal CUBR set Πni=1Pi containing outcome s1 × s2 × · · · × sn
foreach i ∈ N do
Pi = {si};
end
converged=false;
while (¬ converged) do
foreach i ∈ N do
Qi=Find-Weakly-Better-Replies(Pi, Si, Πj 6=iPj, ui);
Pi = Pi ∪Qi;
end
if ∪ni=1Qi = ∅ then
convergence=true;
end
end
return Πni=1Pi;
Algorithm 2: Finding Minimal Strong CUBR set containing outcome s1 ×
s2 × · · · × sn
Theorem 5.3.2 Algorithm 2 terminates in time O(n2m3LFP (mn−1)).
Proof: The while loop will terminate after at most nm iterations since, each time
is called it either terminates or it increases the size of at least one set Pi. This
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can be repeated at most nm times. Furthermore, each while loop performs n
calls to the Find-Weakly-Better-Replies procedures, which has running time of
O(m2LFP (mn−1)). Putting all these together we derive, the above running time.
Theorem 5.3.3 The cartesian product returned by algorithm 2 is the minimal
strong CUBR set that includes the outcome s1 × s2 × · · · × sn.
Proof: We will argue that the returned cartesian product Πni=1Pi is a strong CUBR
set and does not contain any strong CUBR subset, which includes the outcome
s1 × s2 × · · · × sn.
We have already argued that the algorithm terminates. At that point, for all
strategies pi ∈ Pi, qi ∈ Si \ Pi and strategy distribution r−i ∈ ∆(Πj 6=iPi) we have
that ui(qi, r−i) < ui(pi, r−i). By proposition 5.3.1, we derive that the returned
cartesian product Πni=1Pi is a strong CUBR set.
We will prove that the returned product is indeed minimal by induction on the
number of iterations of the while loop that it takes for the program to terminate.
Base Case: If the program terminates after one while loop, this implies that
the starting strategy profile is a pure Nash eq and indeed the absolutely minimum
strong CUBR set including the outcome s1 × s2 × · · · × sn.
Inductive step: The strategies added in the k-th iteration of the loop cannot
be removed without breaking the strong CUBR property. Indeed, all of these
strategies are weakly better responses to some preexisting strategy pi in the current
Pi, given some possibly correlated probability distribution of his opponents of the
current Πj 6=ipj. Since, no strategies are removed from the set Pi, in future iterations
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of the while loop, all these strategies will remain necessary so as for our returned
cartesian product be a strong CUBR.
Using each strategy profile as a starting configuration, we find a super-set of all
truly minimal strong CUBR sets, since not all pure strategy profiles are included in
a minimal strong CUBR set, but every minimal CUBR set includes (at least) one
pure strategy profile. By pairwise comparison of these mn, in terms of set-inclusion,
we can discard all returned CURB sets for which there exist subsets within our
set. All remaining strong CUBR sets are indeed minimal. Indeed, if that was
not the case, there would exist a strategy profile within one surviving (but not
minimal) strong CUBR set C, whose minimal strong CUBR that included it was
indeed minimal and specifically a strict subset of strong CUBR set C. However,
this would imply that the strong CUBR set C would have already been discarded.
Although this algorithm is polynomial, when the number of players is consid-
ered a constant, one can improve its performance by reducing the number of calls
to algorithm 2. Instead of trying all starting configurations, it suffices to examine a
starting set of cartesian products of strategies with the property that each minimal
strong CUBR contains at least one of them. The set of all minimal strong CURB
sets has this property and as we will discuss can be computed in polynomial time.
Another such starting set is the set of all minimal weak CURB sets[59]. Weak
CURB sets sets are cartesian products of strategies such that they contain all best
responses to any pure strategy profile within the weak CURB sets and can be
computed in polynomial time 1, which is proposed by Klimm and Weibull [59] as
a method to speed up the computation of minimal strong CURB sets.
Given the presentation of the algorithm for finding minimal strong CUBR sets,
1if the number of players is a constant
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it is pretty straightforward to transform it into one that finds minimal strong
CURB sets. Specifically, we merely need to substitute the call to procedure
Find-Weakly-Better-Replies(Pi, Si,Πj 6=iPj, ui) to a call to the following Find-Best-
Reply(Pi, Si,Πj 6=iPj, ui) procedure. This procedure given a set P = Πni=1Pi, finds
the set of strategies Qi with the following two properties: i) Qi ∩ Pi = ∅ ii) each
strategy in Qi can be cast as best reply to some possibly correlated probability
distribution of his opponents actions over Πj 6=iPi.
Input: set Pi, set Si, set Πj 6=iPj, ui
Output: set Qi of best-replies
Qi = ∅;
foreach strategy qi ∈ Si \ Pi do
if exists r−i ∈ ∆(Πj 6=iPj) such that ∀ strategy si ∈ Si
ui(qi, r−i) ≥ ui(si, r−i) then
Qi = Qi ∪ qi;
end
end
return Qi;
Algorithm 3: Procedure Find-Best-Replies
The runtime and correctness analysis of this algorithm is directly analogous to
the one for finding minimal strong CUBR sets.
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CHAPTER 6
NO REGRET LEARNING IN OLIGOPOLIES: COURNOT VS
BERTRAND
6.1 Introduction
Oligopoly theory deals with the fundamental economic problem of competition
between two or more firms. In this work we study the conditions under which an
oligopoly arrives at stability. We focus on the two most notable models in oligopoly
theory: Cournot oligopoly[25], and Bertrand oligopoly[14]. In the Cournot model,
firms control their production level, which influences the market price. In the
Bertrand model, firms choose the price to charge for a unit of product, which
affects the market demand.
Competition among firms in an oligopolistic market is a setting of strategic
interaction, and is therefore analyzed within a game theoretic framework. Cournot
and Bertrand oligopolies are modeled as strategic games, with continuous action
sets (either production levels or prices). In both models the revenues of a firm are
the product of the firm’s part of the market times the price; In addition, a firm
incurs a production cost, which depends on its production level.
In the most simple oligopoly model, the firms play a single game, where they
all take actions simultaneously. All the firms produce the same good; the demand
for this product is a linear in the total production; the cost of production is fixed
per unit of production. In this oligopolistic market, a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies exists in both Cournot and Bertrand models. Interestingly, despite the
strong similarity between these models, the Nash equilibrium points are very dif-
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ferent: in Bertrand oligopoly, Nash equilibrium drives prices to their competitive
levels, that is, the price equals the cost of production, while in Cournot oligopoly,
the price in the unique Nash equilibrium is strictly above its competitive level. Liu
[64] showed that the uniqueness of equilibrium in the linear demand, linear cost
model, carries on to correlated equilibrium. Yi [105] have extended Liu’s work
to the case of Cournot oligopoly where firms produce different products, that are
strategic substitutes, and to the case of weakly convex production cost functions.
Equilibrium analysis alone, however, cannot capture the dynamic nature of
markets. In the real world, trading is performed over long periods of time, which
gives firms the chance to adjust their actions e.g, their prices or production levels.
If we assume that the essential market attributes remain unchanged, then this
situation gives rise to a repeated game, obtained by repeated play of the original
simultaneous, one shot game.
One approach for analyzing the repeated oligopolistic game, is through studying
the Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. This models a situation where the firms
“commit” to a strategy, and their joint commitment forms an equilibrium (see
[66], Chapter 12.D). In practice however, an important feature of an oligopolistic
market is that different firms are not perfectly informed about different aspects of
the market, e.g., the attributes of the other participants, and cannot pre-compute,
or agree on a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game before they begin interacting.
A more pragmatic approach for studying such repeated interactions is through
the analysis of adaptive behavior dynamics (see, [44, 106]). The goal here is to
investigate the evolution of the repeated game, when the agents (firms) play in
accordance to some “natural” rule of behavior. In the setting of an oligopolistic
market, we would want a natural behavior to comply with “rationality” and hope-
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fully give rise to some sort of profit maximization on the side of a firm. Another
natural aspiration is that our behavior rules should be “distributed”, which means
that firms should be able to make their choices in each period based only on their
own payoffs, and independently of other firms (in most markets, a firm cannot
tell with certainty what are the payoffs, and costs of other firms). The central
question, in such a setting, is whether the behavior dynamics finally converge, as
this would imply long term stability of the market.
Dynamic behavior in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies have been studied be-
fore. Cournot [25] considered the simple best response dynamics, where at every
step of the repeated game, firms react to what happened in the market on the
previous step. Cournot showed that in the case of a duopoly, the simultaneous
best response dynamics converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of the one shot
game, i.e., after sufficiently many steps the two firms will play their Nash equilib-
rium strategies on every subsequent step. However, this result does not generalize
to an arbitrary number of firms, as shown by Theocharis [100].
Milgrom and Roberts [68, 69] were the first to explore connections between
Cournot competition and super-modular games as a way to show convergence re-
sults for learning dynamics. In their work (as well as in followup papers [4, 101])
Cournot duopolies as well as specific models of Cournot oligopolies are shown to
exhibit strategic complementarities. This identifying property of supermodular
games is shown to imply convergence to Nash equilibrium for a specific class of
learning dynamics, known as adaptive choice behavior. This class of learning dy-
namics encompasses best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning but is generally
orthogonal to the class of dynamics that we will be focusing on.
In this work we are interested in dynamic behaviors where firms minimize their
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long term regret1. Regret compares the firm’s average utility to that of the best
fixed constant action (e.g., constant production level in Cournot, and constant price
in Bertrand). Having no-regret means that no deviating action would significantly
improve the firm’s utility (see [20]). Several learning algorithms [109], [54],are
known to offer such guarantees, as their average regret bounds are o(T ), where T
is the number of time steps.
Regret minimization procedures prescribe to some rather desirable require-
ments in regards to modeling market behavior. Firstly, they are rational, in the
sense that an agent is given guarantees on her own utility regardless of how the
other agents act. Moreover, they are distributed, since an agent needs to be aware
only of her own utility. Many of the no regret procedures[42] are rather intuitive,
as they share the idea that agents increase the probability of choosing actions that
have been performing well in the past. Several learning procedures are known
to be of no-regret, but more importantly, the assumption is not tied to any spe-
cific algorithmic procedure, but merely captures successful long-term behavior.
Lastly, no-regret guarantees can be achieved even in the “multi-armed bandit”
setting[7, 36, 1], where the input for the algorithm consists only of the payoffs
received. This feature is important in the case that firms are not fully aware of the
market structure (i.e., demand function), and are maybe even uncertain regarding
their own production costs.
In the most relevant result to our work, Even-Dar et al.[31] study no regret
dynamics in a class of games that includes Cournot competition with linear inverse
market demand function, and convex costs functions. They show that the average
production level of every firm, as well as it’s average profits, converge to the ones
in the unique Nash equilibrium of the one shot game.
1Regret is sometimes also referred to as external regret.
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Table 6.1: Overview of results
Bertrand Cournot with
perfect substi-
tutes
Cournot with
product differ-
entiation
Nash equilibria Infinite,
Unique prices,
Unique profits
Unique Unique
Correlated equilibria Infinite2 Unique Unique
No Regret Infinite, Dif-
ferent prices,
Different
profits
Infinite,
Unique
prices, Dif-
ferent profits
Unique
6.1.1 Our Results
In this work we examine the behavior of no regret dynamics in Cournot and
Bertrand oligopoly models.
In the classic model of Bertrand oligopoly [14], it is well known that oligopolies
with more than two firms exhibit several trivial Nash equilibria but in all of them
the prices are equal to the marginal costs and all players make zero profit (Bertrand
paradox). This phenomenon has been verified for correlated equilibria only for the
case of a duopoly2, where correlated equilibria are unique[68]. In our work, we
show that under no-regret behavior the zero-profit postulate does not hold even
in the case of two players. In fact, we show that not only does the market not
2In [104] it is claimed that the correlated equilibria of Bertrand games are unique under some
special cases.
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necessarily converge to zero profit outcomes, but that the players can actually
enjoy significant profits. In summary, our main results for Bertrand oligopolies
under no-regret have as follows:
1. The Bertrand paradox does not hold anymore; firms enjoy non-zero profits
under no-regret behavior.
2. Moreover, the identified profits can be rather significant when the number of
players is small (e.g. 17% of optimal profits in the case of a duopoly). Profits
however, tend to go to zero quickly as the number of firms increases.
Our observations about no-regret behavior in Bertrand oligopolies agree to a
large extent both with experimental work [29], as well as with empirical observa-
tions about real world oligopolistic markets [95].
The study of correlated equilibria [64, 105] as well as of no-regret dynamics in
[31] in Cournot oligopolies, has been an area of interest in both economics as well
as computer science. In our work, we analyze a model of Cournot equilibria, which
is a strict generalization of all the previously examined models, under no-regret
dynamics. In fact, our results can be extended to all dynamics, in which each
player’s average payoff dominates the one they would receive if they always devi-
ated to their respective Nash equilibrium strategy. This is a strict generalization
of no-regret dynamics, since no-regret dynamics must fare well against all fixed
strategies. In a novel approach in this line of work, we consider the evolution of
the market not only from the perspective of the firms (individual production lev-
els, profits), but also from the consumers’ perspective (aggregate production level,
prices) which leads to new insights. As a result, we can prove a single unifying
message for all models examined: the daily prices converge to their level at Nash
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equilibrium.
In summary, our main results for Cournot oligopolies under no-regret have as
follows:
1. In Cournot oligopoly with linear inverse demand function, and weakly convex
costs, when every firm experiences no-regret, the empirical distribution of the
daily overall production level, as well as of the daily prices, converges to a
single point that corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the one shot game.
2. When the firms produce products that are not perfect substitutes i.e., when
even the tiniest of product differentiation is introduced, the empirical distri-
butions of all market characteristics including the daily production levels of
every firm converge to their levels in Nash equilibrium.
3. Some product differentiation is necessary in order to alleviate the nondeter-
minism of the day-to-day behavior on the side of the firms.
Table 6.1 summarizes what is known about equilibrium, and no-regret in
Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies.
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Models of Oligopoly
We formally define Cournot oligopoly, and Bertrand oligopoly, as strategic games,
with continuous action space.
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Definition: A Cournot oligopoly is a game between n firms, where the strat-
egy space Si of firm i is the span of its production level qi. Typically, Si is de-
fined to be the interval [0,∞). The utility function for firm i is ui(q1, . . . , qn) =
Pi(q1, . . . , qn)qi − ci(qi), where Pi is the market inverse demand function for the
good of firm i, which maps the vector of production levels to a market clearing
price in R+.
Our focus is on the case of linear inverse demand function. The utility of a firm
i as a function of the firms’ production levels is ui(q1, . . . , qn) = (a− bQ)qi− ci(qi),
where a and b are positive constants, and Q =
∑
i qi denotes the total product
supply. In Section 6.4 we consider an extension of Cournot oligopoly with perfect
substitutes, to the case of product differentiation, where the price of firm i depends
in an asymmetric manner on his own production level, and the production levels
of the other firms. In this case the market inverse demand function P i(q) is given
by P i(q) = ai − biqi − biγiQ−i = ai − bi(1 − γi)qi − biγiQ, where γi denotes the
degree of product differentiation between products, 0 < γi ≤ 1, bi > 0.
Definition: A Bertrand oligopoly is a strategic game between n firms, where the
strategy space Pi of firm i is its declared price pi, which lies in the interval of all
possible prices [0,∞), and its utility function is
ui(p1, . . . , pn) = Di(p1, . . . , pn)pi − ci(Di(p1, . . . , pn)), where Di is the market de-
mand function of firm i, that maps from the vector of firms prices to a demand in
R+.
We consider Bertrand oligopoly with a linear demand function, in which the
market demand is equally shared among the firms with the least price:
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Di(p1, . . . , pn) =

0 pi > pj, for some j
a−pi
b(m+1)
pi ≤ pj for all j, and m = |{j 6= i|pj = pi}|
Intuitively, this means that the market demand goes down linearly as the mini-
mal announced price increases. If the minimal price has been offered by more than
one firms, these firms share the market demand equally.
6.2.2 Regret Minimization
We will merely apply the general definitions of Chapter 2 to our setting.
The regret of a firm in a repeated oligopoly game: Consider the case
of n firms that engage in a repeated Cournot (alternatively Bertrand) oligopoly
game, and suppose that {xt}∞t=1 is a sequence of vectors, where xt represents the
production levels (alternatively, prices), set by the firms at time t. The regret of
firm i at time T is defined as Ri(T ) = maxy∈Si
∑T
t=1 ui(y, x
t
−i) −
∑T
t=1 (ui(x
t)),
where ui is the utility function of firm i, and Si is the strategy set of i.
6.3 Bertrand Oligopolies
We will be focusing on the case where are the all firms share the same linear cost
function (i.e. Ci(x) = cx for all i). The set of Nash equilibria of this game consists
of all price vectors such that the prices of at least two firms are equal to c, whereas
all others are greater than c. Although there exist multiple Nash equilibria, all
of them imply the same market prices where the firms sell at marginal cost and
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hence no profit is being made. On the contrary, we will show that firms can
achieve positive payoffs while experiencing no-regret. Moreover, we will show that
infinitely many positive profit vectors are sustainable under no-regret guarantees.
We will show that by producing a probability distribution on outcomes of
Bertrand oligopolies such that when the market outcomes are chosen according
to this distribution, then each player’s expected payoff is at least as large as the
expected payoff of her best deviating strategy, given that all other players follow
the distribution. More formally, we will produce a probability measure F on (P ,
Σ),4 such that for all i, p′i∫
P
[ui(pi, p−i)− ui(p′i, p−i)]dF (p) ≥ 0
Such probability distributions are referred to as coarse correlated equilibria (CCE)
[106]. It is straightforward to check that, any market history whose empirical
distribution of outcomes converges to a CCE imposes no regret on the involved
players. Indeed, the average profits of the players, will converge to their expected
values, which by definition of the CCE exhibit no-regret. Conversely, any CCE
can give rise to such a history, merely by infinitely choosing outcomes according
to it. Therefore it suffices to prove that we can achieve positive payoffs in a CCE.
Our constructions are inspired by observations regarding the structure of Nash in
Bertrand games made in [12].
Theorem 6.3.1 All symmetric linear Bertrand games exhibit coarse correlated
equilibria (CCE) in which all players exhibit positive profits.
Proof: We denote (p− c)(a− p)/b by pi(p), which is equal to the utility function
when the winning player is unique. This function in strictly increasing in [c,
4P is the set of all strategy (price) profiles and Σ is the Borel σ-algebra on it
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(a+c)/2]. As a result, we can define the following distribution:
F0(p) =

0 p ≤ β
1− (pi(β)
pi(p)
)
1
n−1 β < p < γ
1 p ≥ γ
(6.1)
where β > c and γ ≤ (a + c)/2. Before, we construct the CCE, we will examine
some properties of the mixed strategy profile where each player chooses a strategy
according to F0(p). We will show that each action in the support of the mixed
strategy F0(p) is optimal
3 except from β.
The probability distribution F0(p) sets p = γ with probability (
pi(β)
pi(γ)
)
1
n−1 . The
rest of the probability distribution is atomless, that is Pr(p = x|x < γ) = 0.
Suppose that the rest n-1 players play according to this distribution. The expected
payoff for playing price β ≤ p < γ would be equal to:
E[u] = [1− F0(p)]n−1pi(p) = pi(β)
Next, we will compute the expected payoff for playing β. The only way for
someone to win when playing β is for everyone else to be playing β. However, in
this case they share the pot. So,
E[u] = [(
pi(β)
pi(γ)
)
1
n−1 ]n−1
pi(γ)
n
=
pi(β)
n
Also, just to complete the picture, the expected cost for playing p > γ is 0 and
the expected profit for playing p < β is less than pi(β). Lastly, let us compute
3given that all players play according to F0(p)
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the expected utility of the players when all of them play according to this strategy
distribution. In this case and if we denote (pi(β)
pi(γ)
)
1
n−1 as ρ, we have that:
E[u] = (1− ρ)pi(β) + ρpi(β)
n
= (1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)
Now, we will define a probability distribution over outcomes of the Bertrand
games and we will prove that it is a CCE. we will be using three prices α, β, γ such
that c < α < β < γ ≤ (a+ c)/2. With probability 1/2 all players play α and with
probability 1/2 all players play according to F0. Regarding the expected payoff for
each player, we have that with probability 1/2 they all share the profit at price α
and with probability 1/2 they gain the precomputed payoff of the defined mixed
strategy profile. Specifically,
E[u] = 1/2
pi(α)
n
+ 1/2[(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)]
In order for this to be a CCE it must be the case any deviating player cannot
increase his payoff by deviating to a single strategy given that the rest of the
players keep playing according to this distribution. Let us examine what are the
best deviating strategies for a player. First a player can deviate and play α−  for
some small  > 0. Her expected payoff in that case is essentially pi(α) since she
will always be winning the competition. It is obvious that any strategy less than
that is clearly worse for him since pi is increasing in the range [0, α] ⊂ [0, (a+c)/2].
Another good deviating strategy for the player is to play a strategy in [β, γ) since
this is a best response to the second probability distribution. Actually, given that
a player deviates to a price which is greater than α her best choice is to deviate
to any price in the [β, γ) range. This is true because the only way to incur payoff
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at this point is to maximize her payoff when her opponents play according to
F0(p). As we have seen, the player achieves a maximum expected payoff of pi(β)
when playing within that range. So, the best deviating strategy is either α−  or
something in the range [β, γ). If our current expected payoff exceeds the payoffs
at these points then our distribution is a CCE. So, we wish to have:
1/2
pi(α)
n
+ 1/2[(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)] ≥ pi(α)
and
1/2
pi(α)
n
+ 1/2[(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)] ≥ 1/2 pi(β) .
Let us try to analyze each relation separately:
1/2
pi(α)
n
+ 1/2[(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)] ≥ pi(α) ⇔
1/2[(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)] ≥ (1− 1
2n
)pi(α) ⇔
(1− n− 1
n
ρ)
n
2n− 1 ≥
pi(α)
pi(β)
Similarly, from the second inequality we have:
1/2
pi(α)
n
+ 1/2[(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)] ≥ 1/2 pi(β) ⇔
pi(α)
n
+ [(1− n− 1
n
ρ)pi(β)] ≥ pi(β) ⇔
pi(α)
n
≥ n− 1
n
ρpi(β) ⇔
pi(α)
pi(β)
≥ (n− 1)ρ
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So, in order for our probability distribution over outcomes to be a CCE, it
suffices that we choose α, β so that:
(n− 1)ρ ≤ pi(α)
pi(β)
≤ (1− n− 1
n
ρ)
n
2n− 1
However pi(α), pi(β) are positive payoffs in the range (0, (a−c)
2
4b
] with pi(α) <
pi(β). So, by choosing proper α, β we have reproduce any number in the range
(0, 1). Hence, all we have to do is show that we can choose ρ appropriately such
that:
(n− 1)ρ ≤ (1− n− 1
n
ρ)
n
2n− 1
as well as (n− 1)ρ < 1 and 0 < (1− n−1
n
ρ) n
2n−1 . Again, by manipulating the given
inequality we get:
(n− 1)ρ ≤ (1− n− 1
n
ρ)
n
2n− 1 ⇔ (n− 1 +
n− 1
2n− 1)ρ ≤
n
2n− 1
It suffices to choose ρ = 1
2n−1 and
pi(α)
pi(β)
= n−1
2n−1 to satisfy all inequalities. How-
ever, ρ = (pi(β)
pi(γ)
)
1
n−1 . So, we have that we need to choose β and γ such that
pi(β)
pi(γ)
= ( 1
2n−1)
n−1. So, given any pi(γ) ∈ (0, pi(a+c
2
)] = (0, (a−c)
2
4b
], we can define β, α
such that the distribution we have defined is a CCE. The expected payoffs of all
players are positive in this CCE and can vary widely. Hence, no regret behavior
can support infinitely many different positive average payoff profiles, in contrast
to Bertrand’s paradox. Finally, this construction establishes that increased com-
petition is necessary for converging to marginal cost pricing.
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Figure 6.1: Profit decrease
As we see in the figure 6.1, the profitability of the families of Bertrand no-
regret histories we have identified, decreases much faster than the profitability of
the no-regret histories in the Cournot oligopolies as the number of agents (firms)
increases. In fact, for n = 4 players we see that essentially the prices reach the
level of marginal costs as profitability drops to zero. This theoretical projection is
in perfect agreement both with experimental work in the case of Bertrand games
[29], as well as with empirical observations about real world oligopolistic markets
[95]. Specifically, “the rule of three”, as is presented in [95], states that in most
markets three major players will emerge (e.g. ExxonMobil, Texaco and Chevron
in petroleum). In order for the smaller companies to be successful they need to
specialize and address niche markets. Our works suggests a possible quantitative
explanation behind this phenomenon, as a result of the steep drop in profitability
in the case of Bertrand markets.
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6.4 Cournot Oligopolies
We will be analyzing a generalization of the Cournot model with product differ-
entiation that was introduced by Yi[105]. By exploring ideas from that work, we
will show how we can generalize its results and prove tight convergence guarantees
in the case of no-regret algorithms. Our model will be the Cournot competition
in the case of linear demand functions with symmetric product differentiation,
where the inverse demand function P i(q) is given by P i(q) = ai− biqi− biγiQ−i =
ai − bi(1 − γi)qi − biγiQ, where γi denotes the degree of product differentiation
between products, 0 < γi ≤ 1, bi > 0 and Q =
∑
i qi denotes the total product
supply. We will assume that the cost functions are convex and twice continuously
differentiable. We denote by q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n) a pure Nash equilibrium of the one-
shot game, which is known to exist by [82]. Finally, Q∗ denotes the aggregate
production level at the Nash.
Lemma 6.4.1 Let qτi , Q
τ denote respectively the production level of company i and
the aggregate production level in period τ of a differentiated Cournot market with
differentiation levels γi for each product. If each player’s regret converges to zero,
then
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(
γi − 1
γi
∑
i
(qτi − q∗i )2 − (Qτ −Q∗)2
)
= 0
Proof: By assumption, we have that each player i experiences vanishing regret
against any deviating action si ∈ Si. Specifically, we can apply this to their
respective Nash equilibrium actions q∗i .
1
t
t∑
τ=1
ui(q
τ ) = max
si∈Si
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(
ui(si, q
τ
−i)−Ri(t)
)
≥ 1
t
t∑
τ=1
ui(q
∗
i , q
τ
−i)−
Ri(t)
t
(6.2)
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Let us denote the difference ui(q
τ )−ui(q∗i , qτ−i) as ∆(uτi ). Equation 6.2 allows us
to bound
∑t
τ=1 ∆(u
τ
i ) from below. Next, we will work on bounding this quantity
from above.
t∑
τ=1
∆(uτi ) =
t∑
τ=1
(
P i(qτ )qτi − Ci(qτi )−
(
P i(q∗i , q
τ
−i)q
∗
i − Ci(q∗i )
))
=
t∑
τ=1
(
P i(qτ )qτi − P i(q∗i , qτ−i)q∗i − (Ci(qτi )− Ci(q∗i ))
)
=
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q∗i )
(
P i(qτ )− C ′i(q¯τi )− biq∗i
)
(6.3)
The last line is derived from the mean value theorem 3 and the fact that
P i(q∗i , q
τ
−i) = P
i(qτi , q
τ
−i) + bi(q
τ
i − q∗i ).
t∑
τ=1
∆(uτi ) =
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q∗i )
(
P i(qτ )− C ′i(q¯τi )− biq∗i
)
≤
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q∗i )
(
P i(qτ )− P i(q∗)− (C ′i(q¯τi )− C ′i(q∗i ))
)
=
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q∗i )
(
bi(γi − 1)(qτi − q∗i )− biγi(Qτ −Q∗)−
− C ′′i (q˜τi )(q¯τi − q∗i )
)
where the inequality in the second line follows by the fact at a Nash equilibrium
q∗, we have that
∂ui(q
∗)
∂qi
= P i(q∗)− biq∗i − C ′i(q∗i ) ≤ 0.
Finally, the last line is derived by another application of the mean value theorem4
3There exists q¯τi between q
τ
i , q
∗
i such that Ci(q
τ
i )− Ci(q∗i ) = C ′i(q¯τi )(qτi − q∗i ).
4There exists q˜τi between q¯
τ
i , q
∗
i such that C
′
i(q¯
τ
i )− C ′i(q∗i ) = C ′′i (q˜τi )(qτi − q∗i ).
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and the definition of the demand functions P i. Now, we will take the following
weighted sum of the resulting inequalities over all players i ∈ N .
∑
i
1
biγi
t∑
τ=1
∆(uτi ) ≤
t∑
τ=1
(
γi − 1
γi
∑
i
(qτi − q∗i )2 − (Qτ −Q∗)2 −
−
∑
i
C ′′i (q˜
τ
i )
biγi
(qτi − q∗i )(q¯τi − q∗i )
)
By dividing the above inequality with t and combining with 6.2 we conclude that:
−
∑
i
Ri(t)/biγi
t
≤ 1
t
t∑
τ=1
(
γi − 1
γi
∑
i
(qτi − q∗i )2 − (Qτ −Q∗)2 −
−
∑
i
C ′′i (q˜
τ
i )
biγi
(qτi − q∗i )(q¯τi − q∗i )
)
(6.4)
Given the definition of regret minimizing behavior we have that for all i,
lim supt→∞
Ri(t)
t
≤ 0, therefore the lim supt→∞ of the second terms will greater
or equal to 0. If the cost functions are weakly convex all three terms in the sum-
mand are less or equal to 0. As a result, we have that:
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(
γi − 1
γi
∑
i
(qτi −q∗i )2−(Qτ−Q∗)2−
∑
i
C ′′i (q˜
τ
i )
biγi
(qτi −q∗i )(q¯τi −q∗i )
)
= 0
(6.5)
The lemma follows immediately.
Depending on the details of the Cournot model, we have the following cases:
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A) Perfect Substitutes
This is to the simplest case of Cournot competition and was the model analyzed
by Even-Dar et. al. in [31]. We have that γi = 1 and C
′′
i (qi) ≥ 0 for all i, qi.
Equation 6.5 implies that:
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(Qτ −Q∗)2 = 0
Intuitively, this equation suggests that if we exclude a statistically insignificant
(sublinear) number of periods for the history of our no-regret play, then for the
rest of the history the overall production levels converge to Qτ (and therefore the
prices (P i(q) = ai − biQ, )) converge to their levels at the Nash equilibrium Q∗.
Theorem 6.4.2 Suppose that n firms participate in a homogeneous Cournot
oligopoly game of perfect substitutes with linear demand (P i(q) = ai − biQ, ) and
convex cost functions. If all firms experience no-regret as t grows to infinity, then
given any  > 0, for all but o(t) periods τ in [1, t] we have that |Qτ −Q∗| < .
Proof: We will prove this by contradiction. Indeed, suppose that this did not
hold, then there would exist  > 0 such that it would not be the case that for
all but o(t) periods τ in [1, t] we have that |Qτ − Q∗| < . Namely, if we define
st = {τ |τ ∈ [1, t] and |Qτ − Q∗| ≥ } then there exists c > 0 such for all k there
exists t ≥ k such that |st| ≥ ct. Hence, we can define an infinite subsequence
t0, t1, . . . such that for all k, |stk | ≥ ctk. Hence for this subsequence, we have that
for all k, 1
tk
∑tk
τ=1(Q
τ −Q∗)2 ≥ c2 > 0. Therefore, we reach a contradiction, since
lim supt→∞
1
t
∑t
τ=1(Q
τ −Q∗)2 = 0.
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We should stress here that this is a statement about the day-to-day behavior (i.e.
aggregate production levels) instead of average behavior as in [31](Theorem 3.1.).
In particular, this statement implies that the average action vector and the average
utility of each player converge to their respective levels at the Nash equilibrium,
a result that has been shown in [31]. Given the convergence of the day-to-day
characteristics of the market prices and total supply, it is rather tempting to try to
prove a similar statement about the convergence of the action vector and utilities
of the firms and not merely of their averages. Here, we show that this cannot be
the case by providing sufficient conditions for a market history to be of no-regret.
This is essentially a negative result, so it suffices to prove that this holds for
as simple a model as possible. Therefore, we will focus on the special case of the
fully symmetric Cournot oligopoly (ai = a and bi = b) with linear cost functions.
It is well known that these games exhibit a unique Nash q∗ = (q∗1, q
∗
2, . . . , q
∗
2) where
q∗i = (a− (n+ 1)ci −
∑
j∈N cj)/((n+ 1)b).
Theorem 6.4.3 Suppose that n firms participate in a homogeneous Cournot
oligopoly game with linear demand (P i(q) = a − bQ, ) and linear cost functions
and let q∗ denote the unique Nash of this game. Any market history, where for all
time periods τ , Qτ = Q∗ and where the time average qˆi of each player’s actions
converges to her Nash strategy q∗i does not induce regret to any player.
Proof: As we have shown in equation 6.3 for all deviating strategies q′i we have
that:
t∑
τ=1
(
ui(q
τ )− ui(q′i, qτ−i)
)
=
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i)
(
P i(qτ )− C ′i(q¯τi )− bq′i
)
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where q¯ between qτi , q
∗
i is such that Ci(q
τ
i ) − Ci(q∗i ) = C ′i(q¯τi )(qτi − q∗i ). However,
in this case we have that since Ci(x) = cix, C
′
i(x) = ci for all x. We can also
substitute P i(qτ ) with a− bQτ . As a result, we derive that
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(
ui(q
τ )− ui(q′i, qτ−i)
)
=
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i) · (a− bQτ − ci − bq′i)
=
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i) (a− bQ∗ − ci − bq′i) (6.6)
=
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i)
(
a− na−
∑
i ci
n+ 1
− ci − bq′i
)
(6.7)
=
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i)
(
a+
∑
i ci − (n+ 1)ci
n+ 1
− bq′i
)
=
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i)b(q∗i − q′i) (6.8)
=
b(q∗i − q′i)
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q′i)
= b(q∗i − q′i)(qˆi − q′i)
where line 6.6 is derived by hypothesis. Also, lines 6.7, 6.8 follow from the fact
that the unique Nash q∗ = (q∗1, q
∗
2, . . . , q
∗
2) of these games is of the form
q∗i =
a− (n+ 1)ci −
∑
j∈N cj
(n+ 1)b
.
Lastly, since by hypothesis we have that limt→∞ qˆi = q∗i , we derive that for each
player i and all deviating actions q′i we have that:
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(
ui(q
τ )− ui(q′i, qτ−i)
)
= b(q∗i − q′i)2 ≥ 0
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Hence in any such market history no players experience regret.
An immediate corollary of the above theorem is that one cannot hope to prove
convergence of the day-to-day action profiles in any model that generalizes the
basic linear Cournot model. Surprisingly, if we introduce product differentiation
in the market, then we can actually prove convergence of all attributes (i.e. action
profiles, profits, prices e.t.c) of the market.
B) Symmetric Product Differentiation
In this case, we have that 0 < γi < 1 and C
′′
i (qi) ≥ 0 for all i, qi. Equation 6.5
implies that for all firms i,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=1
(qτi − q∗i )2 = 0
Theorem 6.4.4 Suppose that n firms participate in a differentiated good Cournot
oligopoly game with linear demand (P i(q) = ai − qi − γQ, 0 < γ < 1). If all
firms experience no-regret, then given any  > 0, as t grows to infinity, for all
but o(t) periods τ in [1, t] we have that |qτi − q∗i | < , where q∗ is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: We will prove this by contradiction. Indeed, suppose that this did not
hold, then there would exist  > 0 such that it would not be the case that for
all but o(t) periods τ in [0, t] we have that |qτi − q∗i | < . Namely, if we define
st = {τ |τ ∈ [1, t] and |qτi − q∗i | ≥ } then there exists c > 0 such for all k there
exists t ≥ k such that |st| ≥ ct. Hence, we can define an infinite subsequence
t0, t1, . . . such that for all k, |stk | ≥ ctk. Hence for this subsequence, we have that
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for all k, 1
tk
∑tk
τ=1(q
τ
i − q∗i )2 ≥ c2 > 0. Therefore, we reach a contradiction, since
lim supt→∞
1
t
∑t
τ=1(q
τ
i − q∗i )2 = 0.
From the analysis above we have that in Cournot games, the market partici-
pants can derive a reasonable estimate of their long-term average (and sometimes
their daily) profits by focusing on the unique Nash equilibrium of these games. In
the next chapter, we will argue how market producers can exploit such knowledge
and try to improve their position by dynamically forming coalitions with the other
market participants.
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CHAPTER 7
COALITION FORMATION AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY IN
COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES
7.1 Introduction
It is a basic tenet of algorithmic game theory that agents act not maliciously
or cooperatively, but in their own self-interest. Borrowing from economics, the
literature purports that these agents will take actions which collectively form a
Nash equilibrium (or a related solution concept). Hence the actions could be
potentially far from the social optimal. For example, in a road network, each
driver, observing traffic patterns, selects the route which minimizes his own delay.
The resulting total delay can be much greater than that of the optimal flow.
In a seminal paper in 1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [62] initiated the
investigation of the so-called price of anarchy which measures the ratio of the social
value in the worst-case equilibrium to the optimal social value. Recent years have
seen a profusion of results exploring the price of anarchy of various non-cooperative
games. The traffic example mentioned above, known as selfish routing in the
literature, has a bounded price of anarchy of 4/3 for linear latency functions [86].
This can be viewed as a positive result. However, many settings have a drastically
large price of anarchy, e.g., Cournot oligopoly games, which model competition
between firms, have a linear price of anarchy for certain production functions [60].
As shown by Hayrapetyan, Tardos and Wexler [53], the price of anarchy can
degrade even further in the presence of collusion. When agents collude, they
effectively act as a super-player whose strategy is a vector consisting of a single
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strategy for each member. The utility of the super-player is then the aggregate
utility of its members. In such settings, the authors demonstrate that, although
the price of anarchy clearly drops to one if all agents collude, for inter mediate
partitions of agents into cooperative groups, the price of anarchy can actually
rise above that of the completely non-cooperative setting. In some instances (e.g.,
convex games), the price of anarchy is arbitrarily high in the presence of coalitions.
This is however a worst case result under the assumption that any partition of
players into coalitions is feasible.
The basic thesis of this chapter is that many such price of anarchy results are
overly pessimistic, because worst case instances of games do not arise in practice.
Intuitively, if the price of anarchy is high, agents can try to change the nature of
the game by forming coalitions. These coalitions will not be arbitrary, but rather
carefully selected ones that reduce the price of anarchy and at the same time are
sustainable, i.e., stable against deviations.
With this in mind, we define a coalition formation game to capture this selection
process and use Cournot oligopoly games to demonstrate our main point that price
of anarchy can be significantly reduced via such coalition formation processes. The
approach can be applied to other classes of games (which we leave for future work)
as long as certain conditions are satisfied (see Section 7.5) and we believe this to
be a promising path for alleviating negative price of anarchy results.
In our coalition formation game actions correspond to changes in the current
coalition structure. Specifically, a new coalition can be created by a merger between
two or more existing coalitions. An existing coalition can also be destroyed due to
a deviation of a subset of its current players who decide either to form a coalition
by themselves or join an existing coalition. For a new coalition to be formed, it
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must be the case that its creation benefits all its members.
Given a current coalition structure, we treat each coalition as a super-player
who, as in [53], acts on behalf of its members and tries to maximize its aggregate
utility. In the Cournot oligopolies that we consider, any such game between the
super-players (coalitions) has Nash equilibria and in fact we show that the utilities
of the super-players at Nash equilibria are unique. This is a crucial property that
allows us to assign a unique value to a coalition given the current partition, which
is reminiscent of the approach in [80]. Finally we divide this utility equally among
the members of a coalition since we are focusing on symmetric Cournot games
where all players have equal production costs.
Given the rules of the game described above, we are interested in stable coali-
tion configurations, i.e., partitions where no profitable deviating actions exist with
regard to the allowed actions we have defined. We analyze the social welfare of
the worst such stable partition and compare it to the cost of the optimum and
refer to this ratio as the price of anarchy of our coalition formation game. We find
that the price of anarchy of our coalition formation game for Cournot oligopolies is
Θ(n2/5), where n is the number of firms that participate in the market, implying a
significant improvement of the actual price of anarchy of Cournot oligopolies which
is Θ(n).
The value assignment to coalitions, as described in the previous paragraphs
relies on the assumption that if a coalition structure is stable and hence not per-
meable, then the super-players coalitions will reach a Nash equilibrium of the
underlying game. We show that we can weaken this assumption considerably in
the case of Cournot games. Specifically, we can show that if the coalitions partic-
ipate in the Cournot oligopoly repeatedly in a fashion that minimizes their long
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term regret then the average utility of the super-players (coalitions) will converge
to their levels at Nash equilibria. Regret compares a players average utility to
that of the best fixed constant action with hindsight. Having no-regret means that
no deviating action would significantly improve the firm’s utility. Several learning
algorithms ([20]). More importantly, the assumption is not tied to any specific al-
gorithmic procedure, but instead captures successful long-term behavior. Finally,
since the setting of oligopolies markets is in its nature repeated, this observation
significantly strengthens the justification of our model.
Chapter Structure. Section 7.2 offers the definition of Cournot oligopolies
as well as a detailed exposition of our coalition formation model. In Section 7.3
we prove tight bounds for the price of anarchy of the Cournot coalition formation
game. Finally, Section 7.4 extends our analysis to the case of no-regret behavior.
7.1.1 Related Work
Dynamic coalition formation problems have been studied extensively in the eco-
nomics and computer science literature. We refer the reader to [28], [21],
and [2][Section 5.1] as well as the numerous references therein. The main goals
of these works have been to provide appropriate game theoretic solution concepts
(both from a cooperative and noncooperative point of view) and to design intuitive
procedures that converge experimentally or theoretically to such solution concepts.
Quantifying the inefficiency of outcomes when coalitions are allowed to form
has been the subject of much recent work. In [53], the authors initiate the study of
the price of collusion, which is the worst case inefficiency over all possible partitions
of the set of players. Another interesting direction has been to analyze the price
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of strong anarchy, see [5], i.e. the inefficiency of Nash equilibria which are resilient
to deviations by coalitions1. The models above are static and any partition is
allowed to form. In contrast, we focus on a dynamic context, where we allow
only stable partitions, i.e., partitions where agents have no incentive to deviate,
as we define in Section 7.2. In [22], a different measure is introduced, namely
the price of democracy. This notion captures the inefficiency of a given coalition
formation process (e.g. a bargaining process) with respect to a cooperative game.
The authors study this notion in the context of weighted voting games for certain
intuitive bargaining processes. Hence the inefficiency is measured with regard
to the arising partitions in the subgame perfect equilibria of the corresponding
bargaining game.
Regarding Cournot games, it has been long known that the loss of efficiency at
Nash equilibria can be quite high. Earlier studies focused on empirical analysis [49]
whereas more recently, price of anarchy bounds have been obtained in [47, 60].
Collusion and cartel enforcement in Cournot games have been studied experimen-
tally, see e.g., [99]. There have also been mechanism design aspects of collusion,
see [26]. Conceptually the closest example to our approach that we know of is the
work of Ray and Vohra in [80]. The authors propose a solution concept (”bind-
ing agreement”) that allows for the formation of coalition structures and examine
the inefficiency of stable partitions. Unlike in our work, their deviations can only
make the existing coalition structure finer- never coarser. In the case of symmetric
Cournot games, it is shown that there always exists a stable partition with social
welfare O(
√
n) worse than the optimal. However, the social welfare of the worst
stable partition is always at least as bad as that of the worst Nash.
1Unfortunately, for several classes of games including Cournot equilibria strong Nash do not
exist.
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Finally, there has been some recent work on the behavior of no-regret algorithms
in Cournot oligopolies. In [31], [75] several convergence results are shown for
different classes of Cournot oligopolies. To our knowledge this work is the first to
consider the behavior of coalitions which are behaving in a no-regret fashion in
any kind of setting.
7.2 The Model
We will demonstrate the main point of our work in the context of Cournot games.
The definitions presented in this Section can be easily generalized and applied to
other contexts but we postpone a more general treatment for an extended version.
Cournot games describe a fundamental model of competition between firms.
They were introduced by Cournot in his much celebrated work [25]. In the Cournot
games, firms control their production levels and by doing so influence the market
prices. In the simplest Cournot model all the firms produce the same good; the
demand for this product is linear in the total production (i.e. the price decreases
linearly with total production); the unit cost of production is fixed and equal across
all firms. The revenues of a firm are the product of the firm’s part of the market
production times the price. Finally, the utility of a firm is equal to its revenue
minus its total production cost. Overproducing leads to low prices, while at the
same time an overly cautious production rate leads to a small market share and
reduced revenue. The balancing act between these two competing tendencies is
known to give rise to a unique Nash equilibrium. More formally:
Definition: A linear and symmetric Cournot oligopoly is a noncooperative game
between a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of players (firms), all capable of producing the same
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product. The strategy space of each firm is R+, corresponding to the quantity
of the product that the firm decides to produce. Given a profile of strategies,
q = (q1, ..., qn), the utility of firm i is ui(q) = qip(q)− cqi, where p(q) is the price of
the product, determined by p(q) = max{0, a − b∑i qi}, for some parameters a, b,
and c is a production cost, with a > c.
Proposition 7.2.1 ([25]) In the unique Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly
with n players, the production level is the same for all players and equal to qi =
q∗ = (a−c)
b(n+1)
. The utility of each player is ui =
(a−c)2
b(n+1)2
.
For more on Cournot games and their variants, we refer the reader to [65].
7.2.1 Cournot Games with a Fixed Partitioning of the
Players
Suppose now that the players are given the opportunity to form coalitions and sign
agreements with other firms, as a means of reducing competition and improving on
their welfare. Given a partition of the players into coalitions, we can think of the
new situation as a super-game whose super-players are the coalitions themselves.
The strategy for a coalition, or super-player, is now a vector assigning a strategy
to each of its members. The payoff to the super-player is the aggregate payoff its
members would achieve with their assigned strategies in the original game. This
definition can be used to model coalitions in general games as in [53].
Definition: Let G be a game of n players, with Aj being the set of available actions
and uGj (a1, . . . , an) the utility function for each player j. Given a partitioning
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Π = (S1, ..., Sk) of the players, then the corresponding super-game consists of the
following:
• k super-players
• The strategy set for super-player Si is the set of vectors −→a Si ∈
∏
j∈Si Aj.
• The utility of super-player Si is ui(−→a S1 , . . . ,−→a Sk) =
∑
j∈Si u
G
j (a1, . . . , an)
where aj is the strategy assigned to player j by his coalition Si in the coali-
tion’s strategy −→a Si .
Henceforth, when it is clear from the context, we will use game instead of
super-game and player instead of super-player.
The following Lemma demonstrates that for Cournot games, the super-game
with k super-players is essentially equivalent to a Cournot game with k players.
This allows us to use theorems regarding Cournot games to study the Nash equi-
libria and welfare of Cournot games with coalitions.
Lemma 7.2.2 Consider a Cournot oligopoly super-game for a fixed partitioning
Π = (S1, ..., Sk) of players. The social welfare in this game under any strategy
profile −→q S1 , . . . ,−→q Sk (where −→q Si ∈ R|Si|+ ) is equivalent to the social welfare of a
linear and symmetric Cournot game with k players where each player i produces the
aggregate production
∑
j∈Si(
−→q Si)j of the corresponding coalition Si. Furthermore,
a strategy profile for the super-game with the fixed partitioning is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if the k-tuple of the aggregate levels of productions for each coalition is
the unique Nash equilibrium for the Cournot game on k players (without coalitions).
Proof: Let’s denote by Q the total production level, i.e. Q =
∑N
i qi. Similarly, for
any coalition Si, we define as QSi =
∑
i∈Si qi. For each (super-)player Si, we have
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that uSi(
−→q ) = ∑i∈Si(a− c− bQ)qi = (a− c− bQ)QSi . In terms of social welfare
we have that, SW =
∑k
i=1 uSi =
∑k
i=1(a− c− bQ)QSi = (a− c− bQ)Q. Similarly,
in the case where, coalitions are replaced with single players with qi = QSi , we
derive the same formula for the social welfare by the definition of Cournot games
(i.e. ui(
−→q ) = (a− c− bQ)qi).
If −→q is a Nash equilibrium of the partition game, then for each i, uSi(−→q ) =
(a− c− bQ)QSi is maximal given the choices of all the players not in Si. Since, the
utility of Si depends only on the aggregate production level of the other coalitions,
we have that QSi maximizes uSi(
−→q ), given the rest QSj . Hence, (QS1 , . . . , QSk)
is a Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with k players. Similarly, if Q∗ =
(q1, . . . , qk) is a Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with k players, then any
vector −→q ∈ R|Si|+ whose aggregate production levels for each coalition agree with
their respective levels in Q∗ is also a Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game with
coalitions. Indeed, if that was not the case, there would exist a (super-)player with
a deviating strategy such that her resulting utility would increase her utility given
the strategies of the other (super-)players. Such a deviating strategy, must induce
a differentiated aggregate production for (super-)player Si, since all strategies with
the same aggregate utility lead to the same payoff (uSi(
−→q ) = (a − c − bQ)QSi).
Let’s define this new aggregate production level asQ′Si , then in the original Cournot
game Q′Si is a strictly better response for player i that her current strategy and we
reach a contradiction.
Lemma 7.2.2 implies that the social welfare is the same in all Nash equilibria
of the Cournot game with a fixed partitioning. Hence we can define the price of
anarchy as the ratio of this social welfare over the optimal social welfare, which is
realized when all agents unite into a single coalition. The following Lemma shows
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that the price of anarchy depends only on the number of coalitions in the partition.
Lemma 7.2.3 The price of anarchy of a Cournot oligopoly with a fixed partition
Π = (S1, ..., Sk) is
(k+1)2
4k
.
Proof: From lemma 7.2.2, we have that the social welfare of all Nash equilibria
of a Cournot oligopoly with a fixed coalition partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk), is equal to
the social welfare of the unique Nash of a Cournot oligopoly with k players. In the
case of symmetric Cournot oligopolies, this social welfare is equal to k
(k+1)2
(a−c)2
b
.
This is the case, because at the unique Nash the production level of all players
is equal to a−c
(k+1)b
. The optimal outcome arises when there is no competition (i.e.
there exists a single producing player or coalition). In this case, the optimal payoff
is equal to 1
4
(a−c)2
b
, since this is the global maximum of the function (a−c−Q)Q
b
. By
dividing the resulting social welfares we derive the price of anarchy.
As a consequence, the price of anarchy in the original noncooperative Cournot
oligopoly with n players is very high, namely linear in the number of players, as
has been observed previously [60].
Corollary 7.2.4 The price of anarchy in the original Cournot game with n play-
ers, where no coalitions are allowed to form is Θ(n).
7.2.2 Cournot Coalition Formation Games
Next, we move away from the fixed coalition structure assumption and instead we
will allow the players to dynamically form coalitions. We will call this game the
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Cournot coalition formation game. Given some initial partition, players or sets of
players can consider deviations according to the rules that we define below. As we
have seem by Lemma 7.2.2, for any resulting partition, say with k coalitions, the
utility of each coalition is unique in all Nash equilibria of the Cournot game with
fixed coalitions, and equal to the utility of a player in the unique Nash equilibrium
of a symmetric Cournot game with k players. In the coalition formation game,
each of the n players, when evaluating a possible action of hers, estimates her
resulting utility to be equal to her equiproportional share of the Nash equilibrium
utility of the coalition to which she belongs, given the resulting coalition structure.
More formally:
Definition: We define a coalition formation game on top of a symmetric Cournot
game to consist of the following:
• n players and a current partitioning of them into k coalitions Π = (S1, ..., Sk),
• Given the current partition Π, the allowed moves (deviations) that players
can use along with the consequences for the coalition left behind (i.e., the
non-deviators) are as follows:
Type 1: A strict subset S ′i of a current coalition Si decides to deviate and
form a new coalition. The rest of the members of the original coalition (i.e.
Si/S
′
i) dissolve into singletons.
2
Type 2: A strict subset S ′i of a current coalition Si decides to leave its current
coalition Si and join another coalition of Π, say Sj. The rest of the members,
if any, of the original coalition (i.e. Si/S
′
i) dissolve into singletons.
2This type of actions also includes the non-action option (i.e. the coalition structure remains
unaltered), when S′i = Si.
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Type 3: A set of coalitions of Π decide to unite and form a coalition. The
rest of the coalitions remain as they were.
• Given a partition Π and a player i in coalition Sj of Π, denote by u(Sj), the
uniquely defined utility of coalition Sj in the symmetric Cournot game with
fixed coalition structure Π. The utility of player i in this case, is defined to
be equal to u(Sj)/|Sj|.
Some justification is in order here for our definition. First, we have assumed
that members of a coalition share proportionally the utility of the coalition since
we are in a symmetric Cournot game, where all firms have the same production
cost. Hence it would be unfair to resort to non-proportional shares. Secondly, we
have made the assumption in some of the deviating actions (Type 1 and 2) that
the left over coalition from where the deviation emerged, dissolves into singleton
players. This is an assumption that has also been considered in other works on
Cournot games, such as [26], where cartel enforcement is studied in Cournot games
from a mechanism design point of view. Furthermore, we want to note here that
despite the large amount of work in coalition formation, there is no unanimously
accepted model for coalition formation and especially on how the left over players
react once a subset of the coalition they belong to decides to deviate. This has
been a disputed issue especially in the literature on partition function games,
where the value of a coalition depends on how the rest of the players partition
themselves. Several approaches have been considered there. One of them is based
on assuming that the non-deviators are trying to partition themselves so as to hurt
the deviators (α-core, see [8]); a more optimistic approach has also been considered,
where non-deviators react in the best possible way for the deviators, leading to the
so-called ω-core [94]. And within these two extremes, another suggestion that has
been made in [23] is to have the left over players dissolve into singletons and play
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individual best reply strategies. We believe this last approach can be a good fit
for an oligopoly market as in commercial agreements among firms, once there is a
deviation, the left over firms may not be able to sustain the agreement and have to
dissolve before reconsidering the terms of continuing their cooperation. For more
on alternative models for the behavior of non-deviators see [61][Section 3.1].
We will be interested in analyzing the price of anarchy for partitions in which no
player or set of players has an incentive to change the current coalition structure.
In order to characterize stable coalitions, we need to define when a deviation is
successful. A deviation is successful if and only if the utility of all the players that
induce this deviation strictly increases as a result. More formally, we have that:
Definition: A deviation is successful iff all the players that facilitate the deviation
strictly increase their payoff by doing so. Specifically, a deviation of
• Type 1 is successful iff all the players in S ′i increase their payoffs.
• Type 2 is successful iff all the deviating players in S ′i as well as all the members
of the coalition Sj who accept them increase their payoffs.
• Type 3 is successful iff all the players of all the merging coalitions increase
their payoffs.
Definition: A partition Π is stable if there is no successful deviation of any type.
In the usual manner of the ”price of anarchy” literature, we are interested in
bounding the ratio of the social welfare of the worst stable outcome (i.e. coalition
partition) divided by the optimal social welfare. In our setting, the stable outcomes
do not correspond exactly to Nash, since we allow bilateral moves (e.g. type 3).
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Nevertheless, we will still use the term price of anarchy to refer to this ratio, since
it characterizes the loss in performance due to the lack of a centralized authority
that could enforce the optimal (grand) coalition.
Definition: Given a Cournot coalition formation game, we define the price of
anarchy as the ratio of the social welfare that is achieved at the worst stable
partition divided by the optimal social welfare.
7.3 The Main Result
The starting point of our work is the observation of Corollary 7.2.4 that without
coalition formation the price of anarchy is Θ(n). Hence our goal is to understand
the quality of the worst stable partition structure and compare it to the optimal.
The optimal partition structure is trivially the one where all players have united
in a single coalition, as there is no competition in such setting. Our main result
is that the price of anarchy can be reduced when coalition formation is allowed.
Formally:
Theorem 7.3.1 The price of anarchy of the coalition formation game is Θ(n2/5).
7.3.1 The Proof of the Upper Bound
We begin by proving that the price of anarchy is O(n2/5). We will first establish
this upper bound on a restricted version of our model. In particular, we restrict
each type of the allowed deviations of Definition 7.2.2 as follows:
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Type 1: A member of a coalition of Π, decides to form a singleton coalition on his
own. The coalition from which the player left dissolves into singleton players.
Type 2: A member of a coalition of Π decides to leave its current coalition Si and
join another coalition of Π, say Sj. The rest of coalition Si (if |Si| ≥ 2) dissolves
into singleton players.
Type 3: A set of singleton players of Π decide to unite and form a coalition.
We will refer to this game as the restricted coalition formation game. Once we
establish the upper bound in the restricted model, it is trivial to extend it to the
general model since the set of stable partitions only gets smaller in the general
model. The reason for choosing this restricted version is that stability against this
restricted set of deviations is sufficient to impose the desired upper bound as we
exhibit below.
To analyze the price of anarchy, we first derive a characterization of stable
partitions in the restricted game. This will depend on a number of lemmas. The
bound of n2/5 on the price of anarchy is finally derived as a solution to a certain
mathematical program, which is determined by the constraints that are imposed
by stability against deviations (see Theorem 7.3.8).
Throughout the analysis we will normally denote the cardinality of a coalition
Si by si = |Si|. The first Lemma below says that for coalitions of size at least 2,
its members need only consider Type 1 deviations.
Lemma 7.3.2 Consider a partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk), with k ≥ 2. For a player that
belongs to a coalition of Π of size at least 2, the most profitable deviation (though
not necessarily a successful one) is the deviation where the player forms a singleton
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coalition on his own.
Proof: Consider a coalition Si of Π and denote its cardinality by si = |Si|. Sup-
pose si ≥ 2 and consider a player j ∈ Si. The available deviations for j are either
to form a coalition on his own or to join an existing coalition. In the former case,
the coalition Si will dissolve and the total number of coalitions in the new game
will be k + si − 1. Hence the payoff of j will be
u =
(a− c)2
b(k + si)2
On the other hand, if j goes to an existing coalition, then Si again dissolves but
the total number of coalitions is now k+ si− 2. Since j will be in a coalition with
at least 2 members, the payoff to j will be at most:
u′ ≤ (a− c)
2
2b(k + si − 1)2
We want to prove u ≥ u′, which is equivalent to (k + si)2 ≤ 2(k + si − 1)2, which
in turn is equivalent to (k + si)
2 − 4(k + si) + 2 ≥ 0. For this it suffices to show
that (k + si) ≥ 2 +
√
2. But we have assumed that k ≥ 2 and that si ≥ 2, hence
the proof is complete.
The next lemma is based on Lemma 7.3.2 and characterizes coalitions of size
at least 2, for which there are no successful deviations for its members.
Lemma 7.3.3 Consider a partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk), with k ≥ 2. For a coalition
Si with si ≥ 2, there is no successful deviation for its members iff si ≥ k2.
Proof: Consider a coalition of partition Π, say Si with si ≥ 2. The payoff that
a player in Si now receives is u =
(a−c)2
sib(k+1)2
. By Lemma 7.3.2 the most profitable
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deviation for any player of Si is to form a singleton coalition, in which case he would
receive a payoff of u = (a−c)
2
b(k+si)2
. Hence in order that no player has an incentive to
deviate, we need that (k + si)
2 ≥ si(k + 1)2, which is equivalent to si ≥ k2.
We now deal with deviations of players that form singleton coalitions in a
partition Π. The next Lemma eliminates the potential deviations of such players.
Lemma 7.3.4 Let n ≥ 3, and consider a partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk), with k ≥ 2.
No singleton player of Π has an incentive to perform a Type 2 deviation.
Proof: The payoff that a singleton player receives in Π is (a− c)2/(b(k + 1)2). If
he joins a coalition, say Si, then the total number of players becomes k−1 and the
payoff of the deviating player is now (a−c)
2
(si+1)bk2
. This is not a successful deviation
if (k + 1)2 ≤ (si + 1)k2, which is equivalent to sik2 ≥ 2k + 1. If k ≥ 3, this is
satisfied. For k = 2, the only case it would not be satisfied is if si = 1. But since
n ≥ 3, it is impossible that both k = 2 and si = 1.
Next, we consider Type 3 deviations for singleton players.
Lemma 7.3.5 Consider a partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk), with k ≥ 2. Suppose that Π
contains k1 singleton coalitions with k1 ≥ 2, and k2 non-singleton ones (k1 + k2 =
k). The merge of the k1 singletons is not a successful deviation iff k1 ≤ (k2 + 1)2.
Proof: The k1 singletons receive in Π a payoff of (a− c)2/(b(k1 + k2 + 1)2). After
the merge, their payoff will be (a − c)2/(k1b(k2 + 2)2). Hence, the merge will not
be successful, iff (a− c)2/(b(k1 + k2 + 1)2) ≥ (a− c)2/(k1b(k2 + 2)2). As a result,
we have that:
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(a− c)2/(b(k1 + k2 + 1)2) ≥ (a− c)2/(k1b(k2 + 2)2)⇔
k1(k2 + 2)
2 ≥ (k1 + k2 + 1)2 ⇔
k1(k2 + 1)
2 + 2k1(k2 + 1) + k1 ≥ k21 + (k2 + 1)2 + 2k1(k2 + 1)⇔
(k1 − 1)(k2 + 1)2 ≥ k21 − k1 ⇔
(k2 + 1)
2 ≥ k1
Finally we show that for ensuring stability there is no need to consider any
other Type 3 deviation of smaller coalitions.
Lemma 7.3.6 Consider a partition Π = (S1, ..., Sk), with k ≥ 2 and suppose that
it contains k1 singleton coalitions with k1 ≥ 2, and k2 non-singleton ones. There
is a successful Type 3 deviation iff the merge of all k1 singletons is a successful
deviation.
Proof: One direction is trivial, namely if the merge of all k1 singletons is a suc-
cessful deviation. For the reverse direction, suppose there is a successful type 3
deviation which is not the merge of all the k1 singletons. Let m be the number of
players who merge and suppose 2 ≤ m < k1. By arguing as in Lemma 7.3.5,
we get that in order for the deviation to be successful, it should hold that
(k1 + k2 + 1)
2 > m(k1 + k2 − m + 2)2. Let λ = k2 + 1 and θ = λ + k1 − m.
Restating the condition in terms of λ and θ we get:
(k1 + λ)
2 = (θ +m)2 > m(θ + 1)2 ⇒
θ2 +m2 + 2θm > mθ2 + 2θm+m⇒
m > θ2
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This implies that k1 > m > (λ+ k1 −m)2 > λ2 = (k2 + 1)2. By Lemma 7.3.5,
this means that the merge of all k1 singletons is also a successful deviation and the
proof is complete.
All the above can be summarized as follows:
Corollary 7.3.7 Consider a partition Π. For n ≤ 2, Π is stable iff it is the grand
coalition. For n ≥ 3, suppose Π = (S1, ..., Sk) with k1 singleton coalitions and
k2 non-singleton ones. Then Π is stable iff it is either the grand coalition or the
following hold:
• k1 ≤ (k2 + 1)2.
• For every non-singleton coalition Si, si ≥ k2.
Having acquired a characterization of the stable partitions, we are ready to analyze
the (pure) price of anarchy of the restricted coalition formation game on top of a
symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
Theorem 7.3.8 The price of anarchy of the restricted coalition formation game
under symmetric Cournot oligopoly is O(n2/5), where n is the total number of
players.
Proof: By Lemma 7.2.3 we have that the cost of a partition with k coalitions is
O(k) times worse than that of optimal and that this ratio is increasing with k.
Hence, the worst stable partition for any instance of a coalition formation game is
the one with the maximal number of coalitions. Therefore, in order to bound the
price of anarchy it suffices to find an upper bound on the number of coalitions k
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of a stable coalition structure. By Corollary 7.3.7, we thus need to optimize the
following mathematical program:
max k
s.t. k = k1 + k2
k1 +
∑k2
i=1 si = n
k1 ≤ (k2 + 1)2
si ≥ k2 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., k2}
k, k1, k2 ≥ 0
We have that
n = k1 +
∑
i:si≥2
si ≥ k1 + k2 min
i:si≥2
si ≥ k1 + k2(k1 + k2)2 (7.1)
Trivially this implies that, n ≥ k32 or equivalently k2 ≤ n
1
3 . Also, since by
Corollary 7.3.7 we have that k2 ≥
√
k1 − 1, equation (7.1) implies that n ≥
k1 +(
√
k1−1)(k1 +
√
k1−1)2. This is equivalent to n ≥ k 52 +k2−3k 32 +3k 12 −1. As
a result k1 ≤ max{9, n 25}. Putting all these together we derive the desired bound
on k and hence on the price of anarchy as well.
Finally, we come back to the original coalition formation game of Defini-
tion 7.2.2. Since in the game we are interested in, we have only enlarged the
set of possible deviations with regard to the restricted coalition formation game,
the set of stable partitions can only decrease. As a result, the price of anarchy for
the original game is also O(n2/5). This completes the proof for the upper bound
of Theorem 7.3.1.
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7.3.2 The Proof of the Lower Bound
The lower bound is obtained by the construction in the following Lemma:
Lemma 7.3.9 For any N , let n be the number: n = d4N4/5ebN1/5c + bN2/5c.
Consider a game on n players and a partition of the n players consisting of k1 =
bN2/5c singletons and k2 = bN1/5c coalitions of size s = d4N4/5e each. This
coalition structure is stable for the Cournot coalition formation game.
Proof: Here, we provide the proof of lemma 7.3.9. For any N , let n be the number:
n = d4N4/5ebN1/5c+bN2/5c. For a game on n players, let Π be a partition of the n
players into k1 = bN2/5c singletons and k2 = bN1/5c coalitions of size s = d4N4/5e
each. We will prove the desired Lemma, by exhaustively showing that for this
coalition structure all types of deviating moves are not successful. We commence
our analysis by looking into deviations of type 1.
Proposition 7.3.10 There exists no successful deviation of Type 1 for Π.
Proof: A deviation of type 1 is one in which a subset S ′i of a current coalition
Si decides to deviate and form a new coalition. The rest of the members of the
original coalition (i.e. Si/S
′
i) dissolve into singletons. In our instance, the only
such possible deviation is one where a number of s′ < s players deviate from a
coalition of size s and form a new coalition with the remaining s − s′ members
of the coalitions breaking off into singletons. The initial payoff of the players in
that coalitions were (a − c)2/(bs(k + 1)2). After the deviation the payoffs for the
deviating players will be equal to (a− c)2/(bs′(k+ (s− s′) + 1)2). In order for this
coalition to not be successful it suffices that we have:
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(a− c)2/
(
bs(k + 1)2
)
≥ (a− c)2/
(
bs′(k + (s− s′) + 1)2
)
⇔
s′
(
k + 1 + (s− s′)
)2
≥ s(k + 1)2 ⇔
s′
(
(k + 1)2 + 2(k + 1)(s− s′) + (s− s′)2
)
≥ s(k + 1)2 ⇔
2(k + 1)s′(s− s′) + s′(s− s′)2 ≥ (s− s′)(k + 1)2 ⇔
2(k + 1)s′ + s′(s− s′) ≥ (k + 1)2 ⇔
−s′2 + (2(k + 1) + s)s′ ≥ (k + 1)2 ⇔
Given that s′ ∈ [1, s−1] the minimum of the quantity X = −s′2+(2(k+1)+s)s′
is achieved at either s′ = 1 or s′ = s−1. If s′ = 1, thenX = s+2k+1 ≥ k2+2k+1 =
(k+1)2. Similarly, if s′ = s−1, then X = s′(−s′+2(k+1)+s) = (s−1)(2k+3) ≥
(k + 1)2.
Similarly, we continue to argue that no deviations of type 2 are successful either.
Proposition 7.3.11 There exists no successful deviation of Type 2 for Π.
Proof: A deviation of type 2 is one in which either a singleton decides to join an-
other coalition Sj or a subset S
′
i of a current coalition Si (with |S ′i| ≤ |Si|−1) decides
to leave its current coalition Si and join another coalition Sj. By Lemma 7.3.4 the
singleton players do not have an incentive to perform a Type 2 deviation. Hence
in our instance, the only such possible deviation is one where a number of s′ < s
players deviate from a coalition and join either a singleton or another coalition of
size s. In order to prove that such deviations are not successful, we will argue that
the members of the receiving coalition Sj (regardless of whether this is a singleton
or a coalition of size s) are better off in the initial coalition structure. Indeed, in
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the new coalition structure, we will have k + s − s′ − 1 ≥ k coalitions. Similarly,
the size of the coalition Sj that receives the deviating players will strictly increase.
Therefore, the resulting payoffs for the members of coalition Sj will decrease in
any such deviation and as a result no such deviation can be successful.
We conclude, by proving that deviations of type 3 cannot be successful. Devia-
tions of type 3 allow for any number of coalitions to unite and form a new coalition.
We exhaustively examine all possible compositions of the deviating sets and prove
that there exists no set of coalitions for which a deviation of type 3 is profitable.
Specifically, we have to examine the following cases for our instance:
1) All the coalitions that participate in the move are singletons.
2) All the coalitions that participate in the move are of size s.
3) Some of the participating coalitions are singletons and some are of size s.
It is straightforward to show that for the first two cases a deviation of type
3 cannot be successful. For the third case, we show that if any such deviation is
successful, then there exists a successful deviation of type 3 in which all single-
tons participate. The proof concludes by showing that no such deviation can be
successful either.
Proposition 7.3.12 There exists no successful deviation of Type 3 for Π.
Proof: We will show that no deviating moves of type 3 are successful, regardless
of the composition of sets of coalitions participating in the move.
1) All the coalitions that participate in the move are singletons.
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This essentially corresponds to a move of type 3 of the restricted coalition
formation game of Section 7.3.1. By Lemma 7.3.5 and Lemma 7.3.6 it suffices to
show that k1 ≤ (k2 + 1)2. This is true in our instance, since bN2/5c ≤ N2/5 =
(N1/5)2 < (bN1/5c+ 1)2.
2) All the coalitions that participate in the move are of size s.
If we have m sets of size s uniting to form a single coalition, then the original
payoff of the players were (a − c)2/s(k + 1)2, whereas their utilities in the new
coalition will be equal to (a − c)2/ms(k − m + 2)2. Equivalently, if we denote
λ = k+1, the respective costs will be expressed as (a−c)2/sλ2 and (a−c)2/ms(λ−
m+ 1)2. In order to have stability it suffices that we have :
(a− c)2/sλ2 ≥ (a− c)2/ms(λ−m+ 1)2 ⇔
ms(λ−m+ 1)2 ≥ sλ2 ⇔
m(λ2 +m2 + 1− 2mλ+ 2λ− 2m) ≥ λ2 ⇔
mλ2 +m3 +m− 2m2λ+ 2mλ− 2m2 ≥ λ2 ⇔
(m− 1)λ2 + (−2m2 + 2m)λ+m3 − 2m2 +m ≥ 0⇔
λ2 − 2mλ+m(m− 1) ≥ 0⇔
(λ−m−√m)(λ−m+√m) ≥ 0⇔ (7.2)
However, λ = k + 1 = bN2/5c + bN1/5c + 1, whereas m ≤ k2 = bN1/5c. Hence,
λ ≥ m+√m, for all N .
3) Some of the participating coalitions are singletons and some are of size s.
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We will start the analysis of this case by showing that if any such deviation
is successful, then there exists a successful deviation of type 3 in which all the
singletons participate.
Indeed, suppose that we have a profitable move of type 3 such thatm1 singletons
and m2 coalitions of size s participate, where m1 < k1. Each player, in the resulting
coalition earns (a−c)2/b(m1 +m2s)(k−m1−m2 +2)2 and since this is a successful
move, this payoff dominates the original payoff of the singleton players. Now, swap
each coalitions of size s with singletons that do not participate currently in this
move. If m1 + m2 ≤ k1, we will end up swapping all the non-singleton coalitions,
so finally the sets that participate in the move are all singletons. As a result of this
swapping the new payoffs for the players will be equal to (a− c)2/b(m1 +m2)(k−
m1 − m2 + 2)2, which is strictly better that the profits when coalitions of size s
were included. Hence, this move will be successful as well, but this is not possible,
since this is essentially a move of type 3 of the restricted coalition formation game
which has already been ruled out. The only case left, is the one where we have a
move of type 3 with m1 singletons and m2 coalitions of size s and m1 + m2 > k1.
As a result of the same swap, we define a move of type 3 with k1 singletons and
m1 +m2−k1 coalitions of size s. The payoff of the players in the resulting coalition
will be (a − c)2/(b(k + (m1 + m2 − k1)s)(k − m1 − m2 + 2)2), which dominates
the payoffs of the first move of type 3 (a− c)2/(b(m1 +m2s)(k −m1 −m2 + 2)2).
Hence, the new utilities of the singletons are higher than their utilities before the
deviation and as result this deviation will be successful as well. So, if there exists
a successful deviation of type 3, then there exists a successful deviation of type 3
where all the singletons participate (as well as some coalitions of size s).
At this point, in order to show that no moves of type 3 are successful for our
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family of examples, it suffices to show that there exist no successful moves of type
3 where we have all k1 singletons participating as well m ≥ 1 coalitions of size s.
We will show that this move is not successful by showing that the singletons have
no incentive to participate in this move.
Indeed, currently the singleton players enjoy a payoff of (a−c)2/(b(k1+k2+1)2).
After the deviation, their payoff will be equal to (a−c)2/(b(k1 +ms)(k2−m+2)2).
In order for this move to not be successful, it suffices to have that (k1 +ms)(k2 −
m+ 2)2 ≥ (k1 + k2 + 1)2.
(k1 +ms)(k2 −m+ 2)2 > 4s
= 4d4N4/5e
> (bN2/5c+ bN1/5c+ 1)2
= (k1 + k2 + 1)
2
By combining propositions 7.3.10, 7.3.11 and 7.3.12, we have finally proven
lemma 7.3.9.
Since the total number of coalitions in the construction is k = k1 +k2 ≥ N2/5 =
Ω(n2/5), by Lemma 7.2.3, we obtain the desired lower bound for any number of
players n.
Corollary 7.3.13 For any number of players n, there exist stable partitions with
cost Ω(n
2
5 ) the cost of the optimal partition.
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7.4 Coalition Formation under No-regret
So far, given a partition Π, we assign to each coalition Si value equal to its uniquely
defined utility at the Nash equilibria of the Cournot game with a fixed coalition
partition Π. The reasoning behind this is that if the coalition partition Π is not
permeable, then the players/coalitions will hopefully reach a Nash equilibrium and
hence their uniquely defined utility at it, is a good estimator of how much they
value their current coalition partition.
In this paragraph, we show that we can significantly weaken the assumption
that the players/coalitions will reach an equilibrium. In fact, we will show that
if the coalitions participate in the Cournot oligopoly repeatedly in a fashion that
minimizes their long term regret then their average utility will converge to their
levels at Nash equilibria. Intuitively, having no-regret means that no deviating
action would significantly improve the utility of the player. This notion captures
successful long-term behavior and can be achieved in practice by several natural
learning algorithms ([20] and references therein). Putting all these together, we
have that the values assigned to coalitions by our model, are in excellent agreement
with the average utilities they would actually receive by participating repeatedly
(and successfully) in the market. Since the setting of oligopolies markets is in its
nature repeated, this observation significantly strengthens the justification of our
model.
Theorem 7.4.1 Consider a Cournot oligopoly game with a fixed coalition parti-
tioning of the n players in k coalitions Π = (S1, ..., Sk). If all k (super-)players
employ no-regret strategies, then their average utilities converge to their Nash lev-
els.
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Proof: As we have argued in the proof of lemma 7.2.2, given any strategy profile
of the Cournot game with coalitions the superplayers’ payoff is exactly equal to
the payoff of regular players that play the same game with production levels equal
to the aggregate production of the corresponding superplayers.
If the superplayers experience no-regret, that means that deviating to any fixed
strategy only decreases their average payoff1. Specifically, since their payoff on any
day depends only on the aggregate production, the average utility of any player
only decreases when a player deviates and only plays strategies of a specific pro-
duction level. Now, consider the same history of play but replace every superplayer
by a simple player that produces on each day t quantity equal to the aggregate
production quantity of the respective coalition on the same day. We will show
that this history is also of no-regret. Indeed, for each player any deviation to a
constant production level will only decrease their average utility1, as is true for the
superplayers. But, in the case of simple Cournot games, as was shown in [31], if
all players experience no-regret then the average utilities of the players converge
to their levels at Nash equilibrium. Translating this result to the history of the
Cournot game with coalitions, we have that the average utilities of the superplay-
ers converge to the levels of the unique Nash of the same Cournot game with k
simple players. As was shown in lemma 7.2.2, these levels are also in agreement
with the Nash equilibria of the Cournot game with coalitions.
1More accurately, it means that at times goes to infinity the limsup of the difference between
the average utility for any fixed deviation and the experienced average utility will be at most 0.
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7.5 Discussion and Future Work
We have introduced a model for coalition formation and have studied the ineffi-
ciency of stable coalitions. Our main finding is that the price of anarchy can be
greatly reduced once players are allowed to start forming agreements with other
players. We believe that this opens up a very promising avenue for future research.
Our approach requires that we define, in a sensible manner, the utility of a coalition
at a given coalition structure. In the case of Cournot games, this was easy to do
because all Nash equilibria of the coalition-game are payoff unique. One possible
extension of our work is to asymmetric Cournot games, which still have unique
Nash equilibria. However, in the case of asymmetric producers we would need a
new way of dividing the utility of a coalition amongst its members, since equal
sharing does not reflect the true contributions of the members anymore. Other
candidate games that we are planning to study include socially concave games and
routing games.
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